Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves two parents who were never married and share two daughters. In 2016, they agreed to an allocation judgment regarding parental responsibilities and parenting time, which was entered by the Circuit Court of McHenry County. The mother was awarded primary parenting time and major decision-making authority, while the father received weekly and alternating weekend visits. Over the years, circumstances changed: the father moved to a larger home, began remote work, and the children grew older, with one diagnosed with autism. In 2021, the father sought to modify the allocation judgment to increase his parenting time, arguing these changes warranted adjustment.After unsuccessful mediation, the father filed a motion in the Circuit Court to modify parental responsibilities and later amended it to seek only increased parenting time. The court held a hearing, heard testimony from experts and parties, and ultimately granted the mother’s motion for a directed finding. The court concluded that the father had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances as required under section 610.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, thus modification was not justified.On appeal, the Appellate Court, Second District, vacated the circuit court’s decision, finding that the circuit court applied the incorrect legal standard. The appellate court held that a motion to modify parenting time under section 610.5(a) requires only a showing of changed circumstances, not a substantial change, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that section 610.5(a) governs motions to modify parenting time and requires the moving party to show changed circumstances that necessitate modification to serve the child’s best interests. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Marline and Melvin Stein were the beneficial owners of a property in Wilmette, Illinois, held in trust with Chicago Title Land Trust Company as trustee. In June 2011, the Steins executed a promissory note in favor of Sara Watkin, trustee of the Sara Watkin 2000 Revocable Trust, for $150,000, secured by a mortgage on the Wilmette property. The Steins never made any payments. In June 2022, just before the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure, Watkin filed a foreclosure action. Chicago Title moved to dismiss, arguing Watkin had not provided evidence of an acceleration notice. The Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed Watkin’s foreclosure claim without prejudice, and Watkin did not amend her claim.One year after the limitations period lapsed, Chicago Title initiated a quiet title action, seeking to declare Watkin’s mortgage lien void due to the lapse of the statute of limitations. Watkin moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expiration of the limitations period barred only foreclosure, not the existence of the mortgage lien. The circuit court granted Watkin’s motion. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning that the lapse of the limitations period bars enforcement but does not extinguish the underlying obligation or the lien, and cited section 13-116 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a mortgage lien survives for 20 years after the last payment is due.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case. It held that the expiration of the 10-year limitations period for foreclosure actions does not extinguish the mortgage lien, which persists for at least 20 years pursuant to section 13-116, unless released or extended by agreement. The court affirmed the lower courts’ judgments, rejecting the quiet title action and upholding the continued existence of Watkin’s mortgage lien. View "Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. Watkin" on Justia Law

In 2016, a condominium seller was charged $470 by a property management company for preparing and delivering statutorily required disclosure documents related to the sale of his unit. The seller alleged that these fees were excessive and unreasonable, asserting that the management company’s services were of minimal value because the documents were maintained electronically and sellers had already paid for their preparation through association fees. After the seller’s death, the successor trustee continued the action, representing a proposed class of similarly situated condominium sellers.The Circuit Court of Cook County reviewed the seller's second amended complaint, which included claims for violation of the Condominium Property Act, violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act), and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed all but the Consumer Fraud Act claim. Following developments in a related case, Channon v. Westward Management, Inc., the appellate court stayed the appeal. After Channon was decided, holding that section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act does not provide an implied private right of action for sellers against property managers, the circuit court reconsidered and dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act claim. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the statutory amendment clarified the permissible fee and capped it at $475, making the $470 charge not actionable.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the appeal and affirmed the judgments of both the circuit and appellate courts. The court held that the complaint failed to state a legally sufficient claim under the Consumer Fraud Act because the alleged high fee, absent additional evidence of unfair business practices, did not violate public policy or constitute oppression or substantial injury under the Act. The court further noted that the relevant statutory scheme was intended to protect buyers, not sellers, and the legislature had implicitly rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the value and payment for the disclosure services. View "Greenswag v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A man, Mark, died in a car crash while riding as a passenger in an Uber vehicle. His estate, represented by his wife Sheridan, brought claims against Uber and the driver, including wrongful death and survival actions. Both Mark and Sheridan had accepted Uber’s terms-of-use agreements, which contained arbitration clauses. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Mark’s agreement covered survival claims and Sheridan’s agreement covered wrongful death claims brought by the estate on behalf of statutory beneficiaries.The Circuit Court of Cook County compelled arbitration of the survival claims based on Mark’s agreement but denied Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims, reasoning that Sheridan’s agreement only covered disputes arising from her own use of Uber’s services, not Mark’s. Uber appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, reversed, holding that the arbitration agreement between Sheridan and Uber included a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator to decide whether the wrongful death claims were subject to arbitration. The appellate court found the agreement was not unconscionable and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case to determine whether Sheridan’s individual arbitration agreement obligated the estate to arbitrate the arbitrability of wrongful death claims, which arose from Mark’s use of Uber’s services. The court held that it did not. The court found no clear and unmistakable evidence that Sheridan, acting as statutory beneficiary or personal representative, agreed to delegate to an arbitrator the issue of arbitrability for wrongful death claims arising from her husband’s use. The court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of the estate’s wrongful death claims, allowing those claims to proceed in court. View "Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in multiple cases in McLean County, Illinois, primarily involving possession of child pornography and violations of the Sex Offender Registration Act. He pleaded guilty to several charges and was sentenced to probation, jail time, and ordered to pay significant assessments, fines, and fees. Throughout several subsequent probation violation proceedings and new charges, the defendant remained represented by an assistant public defender. Despite this representation, he was assessed various court costs and fees without a waiver being requested or granted under the provisions applicable to indigent defendants represented by public defenders.After sentencing, the defendant appealed. The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, consolidated his appeals and considered, among other issues, his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an assessment waiver under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 404(e). The defendant argued that, as he was represented by a public defender, he was entitled to an automatic waiver of certain assessments, and his counsel’s failure to file the required certificate constituted ineffective assistance. The State responded that claims regarding assessment errors must first be raised in the circuit court via a motion under Rule 472, which governs corrections of certain sentencing errors. The appellate court agreed with the State and remanded the case to the circuit court for the defendant to pursue his claim through a Rule 472 motion.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that when a defendant alleges being improperly assessed costs despite being entitled to a waiver under Rule 404(e), the claim must be first raised in the trial court with a motion under Rule 472. Such claims cannot be raised for the first time on appeal by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court clarified that Rule 472’s broad remedial purpose encompasses such errors and allows correction at any time following judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People v. Nibbelin" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in Cook County with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated kidnapping after he kidnapped a victim and, during the course of that kidnapping, committed two separate acts of sexual assault. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The circuit court then sentenced him to consecutive terms for each sexual assault conviction and imposed two concurrent sentences for the aggravated kidnapping convictions, resulting in a total prison term of 40 years.On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, the defendant argued that entering two convictions for aggravated kidnapping based on a single kidnapping violated the one-act, one-crime rule. Although the appellate court agreed that only one kidnapping occurred, it affirmed the convictions, holding that each aggravated kidnapping conviction was based on a separate act of sexual assault that occurred during the kidnapping, and thus multiple convictions were permissible.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed whether multiple aggravated kidnapping convictions could stand when there was only one kidnapping but multiple predicate felonies. The State conceded error, agreeing that only one conviction should be entered under these circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the unit of prosecution for aggravated kidnapping is limited to one conviction per single kidnapping, regardless of the number of aggravating circumstances present during that kidnapping. It therefore found the trial court erred in entering two convictions and sentences for aggravated kidnapping. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault but reversed in part, remanding for the trial court to vacate the less serious aggravated kidnapping conviction and sentence. View "People v. Wade" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) after allegedly operating a vehicle while intoxicated at a time when his Illinois driver’s license was suspended for failing to comply with the financial responsibility (SR-22) insurance requirement. The State initially charged him under a statutory provision that elevates DUI to a felony if the driver “did not possess a driver’s license.” After the circuit court dismissed the charges for lack of specificity, the State refiled, clarifying that the defendant’s license was suspended—but not expired—due to the SR-22 violation. The defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, arguing that the statute does not support aggravated DUI based solely on an insurance-related suspension.The Circuit Court of St. Clair County agreed with the defendant, finding that the statutory provision in question did not apply to a person whose license was suspended for reasons not enumerated in a separate section addressing suspension-based offenses. The court dismissed the charges with prejudice. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed, concluding that the State’s interpretation conflicted with the plain language of the statute and would render the suspension-specific section superfluous. The appellate court found prior case law relied on by the State to be erroneous and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and held that the statute elevating DUI to aggravated DUI does not apply when a defendant possesses an unexpired driver’s license, but their driving privileges are suspended for an SR-22 violation not listed in the relevant suspension-based offenses. The court overruled prior case law to the contrary and modified the circuit court’s judgment, directing that the dismissal of charges be without prejudice, as the statute allows the State to refile. The appellate court’s judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with reckless discharge of a firearm, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF), and misdemeanor domestic battery after an incident in his Chicago apartment. He had a prior felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, specifically for possessing a firearm without a valid Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card. Evidence at trial showed he possessed and fired a handgun during a domestic dispute. The circuit court of Cook County, after a bench trial, found him guilty on all counts.On direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the UPWF statute under the Second Amendment, arguing both facially and as applied to him in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The appellate court rejected both challenges, holding that Bruen’s standards did not apply to felons and that sufficient historical precedent supported felon firearm bans. The appellate court also considered and rejected the defendant’s as-applied challenge, despite the State’s argument that the issue was forfeited because it was not raised before the circuit court.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the appellate court’s judgment regarding the as-applied constitutional challenge. The court held that an as-applied challenge requires a developed factual record, which was lacking because the defendant did not raise the issue in the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. The court vacated the part of the appellate court judgment that considered the merits of the as-applied challenge, affirmed the remainder of the appellate court’s judgment, and affirmed the defendant’s UPWF conviction. The main holding is that an as-applied constitutional challenge to the UPWF statute cannot be decided without a factual record developed in the trial court. View "People v. Benson" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a press conference in 2017 regarding approval of a hog farming operation. The plaintiff supported the measure, while the defendant opposed it and held a sign during an interview. After an interaction between the two, the defendant reported to police that she was pushed by the plaintiff, leading to his arrest for assault and subsequent battery charges. He was acquitted in a bench trial. Prior to the criminal trial, the plaintiff filed a defamation suit, later amended to include malicious prosecution, alleging the defendant falsely accused him. The defendant counterclaimed for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Schuyler County circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss under the Citizen Participation Act (the Act) without prejudice and later denied her motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues for a jury. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, reviewed the matter, rejecting the “meritless and retaliatory” standard previously applied by the First District and instead focused on the plaintiff’s intent. The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings, stating the trial court had used the wrong test and failed to resolve factual issues.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case, clarifying the framework for evaluating anti-SLAPP motions under the Act for cases filed before January 1, 2026. The court held that the second prong of the test requires a determination of the plaintiff’s subjective intent, rather than a rigid “meritless and retaliatory” standard. The trial court must base its ruling only on pleadings and supporting documents, not through an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment as modified, reversed the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Smith" on Justia Law

Two elementary school students attending a private school in East St. Louis, whose homes are more than 1½ miles from their school and located along a public school bus route, sought to compel the local public school district to provide them with bus transportation. Previously, the district had provided this service, but stopped due to a shortage of bus drivers. The students’ parents argued that the district’s refusal to transport their children violated a state law requiring districts to provide transportation to nonpublic school students under certain conditions.The Circuit Court of St. Clair County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, concluding that the relevant section of the Illinois School Code only required the district to provide transportation for nonpublic schoolchildren along its existing regular bus routes, and did not require the district to modify or create new routes to accommodate these students. The court found that the plaintiffs had not identified an existing route they could use. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the statute required the district to treat qualifying nonpublic schoolchildren the same as public schoolchildren, including modifying routes if necessary to provide transportation to and from their school.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The court held that, under section 29-4 of the School Code, a local school district’s obligation to provide transportation to nonpublic schoolchildren living at least 1½ miles from their school is limited to points along the district’s existing regular bus routes. The statute does not require the district to modify its routes or establish separate routes to serve nonpublic school students. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the district. View "E.W. v. The Board of Education of East St. Louis School District No.189" on Justia Law