Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Maria and Jim began living together. During a 2003 trip to Slovakia to visit family, Maria met Scarlett, an orphan born in 1999. Under Slovakian law, Jim was not permitted to adopt Scarlett because he was neither a Slovakian national nor married to Maria. Maria commenced the year-long adoption process and lived in Slovakia during that time. Jim financially supported the process, traveled there five times, and participated in a psychological evaluation. In 2004, Maria adopted Scarlett under Slovakian law, and the three returned to Elmhurst, Illinois. Scarlett used the hyphenated form of their last names. Scarlett referred to Jim as “daddy.” Jim’s name appears in Scarlett’s school records as Scarlett’s father. Jim paid all family expenses; he established a $500,000 irrevocable trust for Scarlett. In 2008, Maria moved out of Jim’s home, taking Scarlett. Jim sought a declaration of parental rights. Jim also alleged common law contract claims. The circuit court dismissed Jim’s common law claims and concluded that Jim lacked standing and was not subject to paying child support. The appellate court reversed, holding that the equitable adoption doctrine might present a potentially viable theory of standing , but affirmed the dismissal of Jim’s contract claims. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable adoption, previously recognized in a will contest, does not apply to child custody proceedings. View "In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D." on Justia Law

A brief relationship between mother, a Missouri resident, and father, an Illinois resident, resulted in a child, L.M., born in Missouri in 2009. In 2010, father sought to establish the existence of a father-child relationship and to obtain joint custody under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/1), which allows parentage actions to be brought in the county in which any party resides. Mother filed an appearance. Both attended the hearing and stated that they had entered into a joint parenting agreement. The court entered its judgment, incorporating the agreement, in which they submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction. Father began a military tour of duty. Upon leaving the service in 2012, he was able to visit L.M. frequently in Missouri. In November 2012, mother moved to Las Vegas, taking L.M. Father sought custody. Mother filed suit in Nevada, asserting that the Illinois judgment was void due to lack of Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (750 ILCS 36/101] subject matter jurisdiction. At her request, the Champaign County circuit court vacated its 2010 order and dismissed father’s complaint. The appellate court vacated, holding that compliance with the statute was not a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. As used in the statute, “jurisdiction” is a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters, not a precondition to the exercise of its inherent authority. Determination of who should have custody of L.M. presented a justiciable matter that fell within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Once a court has subject matter jurisdiction, its judgment will not be rendered void merely because of an error in its determination of the facts or application of the law. View "McCormick v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Williams sued his employer, BNSF Railway, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging an employment related injury. BNSF filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity against QTS. A jury rendered a verdict, finding that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from his employment, but assessed 50% of the fault to Wllams, 37.5% to BNSF, and 12.5% to QTS. The jury also rendered a verdict in favor of QTS on BNSF’s claim for contractual indemnity, finding that BNSF’s notice of claim was untimely. The appellate court dismissed BNSF’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the notice of appeal was untimely. BNSF had filed its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the written order, but 72 days after the trial court’s oral ruling on BNSF’s post-trial motion. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing Supreme Court Rule 272, which states: “judgment is entered at the time it is entered of record.” The trial court’s oral pronouncement was not entered of record in the law record book. View "Williams v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, seeking joint custody of the couple’s three children. The circuit court appointed attorney Rosenberg to represent the children, under 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(3). Husband sought to set a temporary parenting schedule, stating that he and wife were unable to reach agreement. At the hearing, Rosenberg stated that the parties had agreed on a schedule, but had failed to agree on conditions of visitation. Rosenberg presented a proposed order. Wife objected on the basis that it infringed on her right to parent and communicate with her children. The court entered the order, which “enjoin[ed]” the parties from: striking, threatening or interfering with the personal liberty of the children; discussing any aspect of the pending litigation in the presence of the children; discussing with the children their preferences as to custody or visitation; questioning, discussing, or coaching the children with regard to testimony or interviews; questioning the children with regard to the conduct or expenditures of the other party; engaging in all forms of recording or electronic surveillance of the other party or of the children; using alcohol or nonprescription drugs in the presence of the children; allowing an unrelated member of the opposite sex to reside overnight in a residence while the children are present; disparaging either party; and removing the children from the state without consent. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed an appeal as moot because the divorce had been granted, so the order was no longer in effect. View "In re Marriage of Eckersall" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached. View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law

In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state’s request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act. View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2011, Huber, sought judicial dissolution of American Accounting Association. In January 2013, AAA moved to dismiss Huber’s then second-amended petition. On March 6, 2013, the court held a telephone conference with the parties and dismissed the petition. Huber appealed. AAA argued that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because notice of appeal was due no later than April 5, 2013, but the clerk did not receive the notice until April 9; it claimed that where notice is received after the 30-day deadline, it is deemed timely filed only if timely mailed, which may only be proven by a certificate of the attorney or affidavit of a nonattorney, neither of which Huber provided. Huber countered that the postmark on the envelope in which he mailed his notice disclosed a timely mailing date of April 3. The appellate court dismissed, holding that a postmarked envelope does not substitute for the affidavit or certificate that Supreme Court Rules 373 and 12(b)(3) require. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that what Huber identified as a “postmark” was actually a postage label from a self-service kiosk that allows customers to mail letters and packages, buy postage, and access other postal services. View "Huber v. Am. Accounting Ass'n" on Justia Law

Lance, 53 years old, has spent much of his adult life incarcerated or institutionalized. After being paroled in 1997, he was admitted to mental health facilities 15 times before the involuntary admission at issue. In 2008 after serving a sentence for parole violations, he was involuntarily admitted to Chester Mental Health Center (CMHC). A 2011 petition included a certificate by a CMHC staff psychiatrist that described threats, violent acts, resisting treatment, and inappropriate behaviors. At the commitment hearing a CMHC social worker, testified that he had interviewed Lance and those treating him, had reviewed the clinical file, that Lance has “an Axis I diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, paraphilia NOS, history of noncompliance with the medications, and an Axis II diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder,” that Lance displayed “delusional thought content which is grandiose, paranoid, and persecutory in nature,” that he had periodic inappropriate sexual conduct, that he engaged in acts of verbal and physical aggression, and that he was noncompliant with medication. Lance appealed his involuntary admission, arguing the court violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILCS 5/1-100, by disregarding his request, in testimony, to be voluntarily admitted. The appellate court ruled more than nine months after the term of commitment ended and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court ruling, The Mental Health Code does not require a ruling for or against voluntary admission, based on an in-court request for voluntary admission during a hearing for involuntary admission, nor does it require a court to sua sponte continue a proceeding for involuntary admission upon such a request. View "In re Lance H." on Justia Law

Slepicka, a resident of a Cook County skilled nursing facility, received a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge. A Department of Public Health ALJ held a hearing at the facility. The Department approved the involuntary discharge of Slepicka unless the amount owed was paid in full. The order was mailed from a Sangamon County post office. Slepicka sought judicial review in Sangamon County. The facility moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing that Cook County was the only proper venue. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and upheld the order allowing involuntary discharge. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper venue under Administrative Review Law section 3-104, but rejected a claim that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a jurisdictional defect. The court did not decide the merits, but vacated and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to Cook County. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Sangamon County was not a permissible venue, but held that circumstance did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision. Stating that it would be a waste of resources to require the Cook County court to review the decision again, the court vacated the portion of the judgment that vacated the Sangamon County decision and remanded to the appellate court for decision on the merits. View "Slepicka v. IL Dep't of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

Bridgeview Health Care Center filed a class action complaint against Clark, an Illinois resident who operates Affordable Digital Hearing, a sole proprietorship out of Terre Haute, Indiana. Bridgeview alleged that Clark sent Bridgeview and others unsolicited faxes and claimed violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227; common law conversion of its fax paper and toner; and violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2. Clark had a comprehensive general liability policy issued by State Farm, an Illinois corporation. The policy was purchased through an Indiana agent and issued to Clark’s Indiana business address. State Farm sought declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend in Indiana state court. The action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Bridgeview. Bridgeview sought a declaration, in Illinois state court that State Farm had a duty to defend and indemnify Clark under the advertising injury and property damage provisions of the policy. State Farm argued that Illinois law conflicts with Indiana law on coverage issues and that Indiana law should apply. The circuit court found that there was no conflict and no need to conduct a choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court reversed, finding that decisions cited by State Farm were sufficient to raise the possibility of a conflict, requiring a choice-of-law analysis The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that State Farm failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that an actual conflict exists between Illinois and Indiana law.View "Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law