Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Huber, sought judicial dissolution of American Accounting Association. In January 2013, AAA moved to dismiss Huber’s then second-amended petition. On March 6, 2013, the court held a telephone conference with the parties and dismissed the petition. Huber appealed. AAA argued that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because notice of appeal was due no later than April 5, 2013, but the clerk did not receive the notice until April 9; it claimed that where notice is received after the 30-day deadline, it is deemed timely filed only if timely mailed, which may only be proven by a certificate of the attorney or affidavit of a nonattorney, neither of which Huber provided. Huber countered that the postmark on the envelope in which he mailed his notice disclosed a timely mailing date of April 3. The appellate court dismissed, holding that a postmarked envelope does not substitute for the affidavit or certificate that Supreme Court Rules 373 and 12(b)(3) require. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that what Huber identified as a “postmark” was actually a postage label from a self-service kiosk that allows customers to mail letters and packages, buy postage, and access other postal services. View "Huber v. Am. Accounting Ass'n" on Justia Law

Lance, 53 years old, has spent much of his adult life incarcerated or institutionalized. After being paroled in 1997, he was admitted to mental health facilities 15 times before the involuntary admission at issue. In 2008 after serving a sentence for parole violations, he was involuntarily admitted to Chester Mental Health Center (CMHC). A 2011 petition included a certificate by a CMHC staff psychiatrist that described threats, violent acts, resisting treatment, and inappropriate behaviors. At the commitment hearing a CMHC social worker, testified that he had interviewed Lance and those treating him, had reviewed the clinical file, that Lance has “an Axis I diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, paraphilia NOS, history of noncompliance with the medications, and an Axis II diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder,” that Lance displayed “delusional thought content which is grandiose, paranoid, and persecutory in nature,” that he had periodic inappropriate sexual conduct, that he engaged in acts of verbal and physical aggression, and that he was noncompliant with medication. Lance appealed his involuntary admission, arguing the court violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILCS 5/1-100, by disregarding his request, in testimony, to be voluntarily admitted. The appellate court ruled more than nine months after the term of commitment ended and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court ruling, The Mental Health Code does not require a ruling for or against voluntary admission, based on an in-court request for voluntary admission during a hearing for involuntary admission, nor does it require a court to sua sponte continue a proceeding for involuntary admission upon such a request. View "In re Lance H." on Justia Law

Slepicka, a resident of a Cook County skilled nursing facility, received a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge. A Department of Public Health ALJ held a hearing at the facility. The Department approved the involuntary discharge of Slepicka unless the amount owed was paid in full. The order was mailed from a Sangamon County post office. Slepicka sought judicial review in Sangamon County. The facility moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing that Cook County was the only proper venue. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and upheld the order allowing involuntary discharge. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper venue under Administrative Review Law section 3-104, but rejected a claim that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a jurisdictional defect. The court did not decide the merits, but vacated and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to Cook County. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Sangamon County was not a permissible venue, but held that circumstance did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision. Stating that it would be a waste of resources to require the Cook County court to review the decision again, the court vacated the portion of the judgment that vacated the Sangamon County decision and remanded to the appellate court for decision on the merits. View "Slepicka v. IL Dep't of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

Bridgeview Health Care Center filed a class action complaint against Clark, an Illinois resident who operates Affordable Digital Hearing, a sole proprietorship out of Terre Haute, Indiana. Bridgeview alleged that Clark sent Bridgeview and others unsolicited faxes and claimed violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227; common law conversion of its fax paper and toner; and violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2. Clark had a comprehensive general liability policy issued by State Farm, an Illinois corporation. The policy was purchased through an Indiana agent and issued to Clark’s Indiana business address. State Farm sought declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend in Indiana state court. The action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Bridgeview. Bridgeview sought a declaration, in Illinois state court that State Farm had a duty to defend and indemnify Clark under the advertising injury and property damage provisions of the policy. State Farm argued that Illinois law conflicts with Indiana law on coverage issues and that Indiana law should apply. The circuit court found that there was no conflict and no need to conduct a choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court reversed, finding that decisions cited by State Farm were sufficient to raise the possibility of a conflict, requiring a choice-of-law analysis The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that State Farm failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that an actual conflict exists between Illinois and Indiana law.View "Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

A psychiatrist at Chicago-Read Mental Health Center sought a court order authorizing involuntary treatment of Rita. Stating that Rita met the criteria for a diagnosis of “schizophrenia paranoid type,” the doctor requested authorization to administer specific medications, including Risperidone, for up to 90 days. At a hearing, there was testimony about Rita’s behavior before her hospitalization, about police response to a call about Rita’s behavior, and about Rita’s own descriptions of her delusions and trying to choke herself to kill the people inside her. Rita had not threatened anyone at Chicago-Read, and no cause existed to place her in restraints or administer emergency medication. Although generally cooperative, Rita refused to attend group therapy, and would not take medication. The circuit court authorized involuntary treatment. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to comply with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILCS 5/3-816(a), requirement that final orders “shall be accompanied by a statement on the record of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court order, reasoning that reading the code as “directory,” so that noncompliance can be excused, does not impair the safeguards the law is intended to protect.View "In re Rita P." on Justia Law

Mitchell executed a promissory note, secured by a mortgage on her Chicago home. Four years later, the lender filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The special process server’s affidavit described substituted service: process was left at Mitchell’s residence with her daughter, Foreman, who lived at the residence. Mitchell did not answer. The lender mailed notice of intent to move for judgment of foreclosure and sale on June 9, 2010. On June 3, the lender moved for an order of default. On June 9, the court granted the motions. A notice of sale was mailed to Mitchell’s address and a judicial sale was held on September 13. On August 2, 2011, the lender sought an order of confirmation. Notice of the motion was mailed to Mitchell. The circuit court confirmed the sale on September 14. On October 12, Mitchell filed an appearance and a motion to vacate the order, asserting that “to the best of her knowledge” she was never served, had not received notice of the motion for default judgment, had been informed that a loan modification was approved, and did not receive notice of the September 14 order. She later withdrew her motion and moved to quash the order or, in the alternative, for relief from judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, and the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 735 ILCS 5/15-15083. Mitchell asserted her only child is a son and she does not know anyone named Foreman. The circuit court denied the motion. The lender subsequently argued that Mitchell waived objections to jurisdiction by filing a post-judgment motion to vacate. The appellate court noted that failure to comply with statutory requirements results in waiver of “all objections to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person” and that Mitchell’s waiver “worked prospectively and retroactively.” The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that waiver of personal jurisdiction is prospective only and does not serve to validate retroactively orders entered without personal jurisdiction. View "BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The circuit court dissolved the Tiballi marriage in 2005, awarding joint legal custody of daughter Francesca, but placing residential custody with Sheila. In 2010, Robert sought to modify custody. The court appointed a psychologist to advise it pursuant to the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/604(b), dismissed the petition, and ordered Robert to pay the fees of that psychologist. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting Robert’s argument that the psychologist’s fees were not “costs” under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1009(a). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Requiring a party who has his custody petition dismissed without prejudice, for non-abusive reasons, to automatically bear the full cost of a section 604(b) evaluator is beyond the scope of the Code and the Marriage Act. The Marriage Act is the specific statute that controls the matter and evaluator fees are not “court costs” within the meaning of the Code or Civil Procedure. When the circuit court appointed the section 604(b) evaluator, it ordered the parties to share equally in his fees without prejudice to ultimate allocation. The court never made that ultimate allocation because of its mistaken belief that section 2-1009 mandated the fees be taxed entirely to Robert as costs.View "In re Marriage of Tiballi" on Justia Law

Clark was indicted under 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) for having used an eavesdropping device to record a conversation between himself and attorney Thomas without her consent and having used a device to record a conversation between himself, Judge Janes, and Thomas while Janes was acting in the performance of official duties, without the consent of either. Defendant stated that he was in court and attorney Thomas was representing the opposing party; there was no court reporter nor was there any recording device, so he made recordings to preserve the record. He claimed he had a first amendment right to gather information by recording officials performing their public duties. The circuit court dismissed, holding that the statute is unconstitutional on substantive due process and first amendment grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that if another person overhears what we say, that person may write it down and publish it, but if that same person records our words with a recording device, even if it is not published in any way, a criminal act has been committed. The statute goes too far in its effort to protect individuals’ interest in the privacy of their communications and burdens substantially more speech than necessary to serve interests it may legitimately serve. It does not meet the requirements necessary to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law