Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Allen was convicted of murder and armed robbery for the 1984 shooting death of Ciralski. In 2009, Allen filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging actual innocence and raising constitutional issues related to his claim of innocence, chiefly that the state suborned perjury and coerced confessions. He attached to his petition an unnotarized statement, styled as an affidavit. The statement indicated its writer was Langford, and the author took responsibility for Ciralski’s murder, stating that Allen had no involvement. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the petition, finding it frivolous and patently without merit. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Langford statement contained elements consistent with the testimony at trial and the overall defense theory of the case. The statement, while subject to challenge at the second stage for lack of notarization, qualifies as other evidence for first-stage post-conviction review, where dismissal is appropriate only if “the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” The circuit court’s alternative reasons to dismiss the post-conviction petition constituted greater scrutiny than the first stage involves. The court remanded for second-stage proceedings. View "People v. Allen" on Justia Law

Barner was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1)) and sentenced to natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v. Williams (2010). The appellate court again affirmed. That decision was vacated by a new supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider in light of People v. Leach (2012). The appellate court again affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Barner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated when three state witnesses were allowed to testify concerning the DNA laboratory work and conclusions of nontestifying scientists. None of the documents at issue took the form of an affidavit, attestation, certification, sworn statement, or formal declaration; they lacked the “formality and solemnity” necessary for a statement to be testimonial. The court noted that Barner presented no evidence and did not impeach the state’s witnesses in any significant way, so that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The main focus at trial did not concern the identification of the attacker, but was the victim’s credibility and her account of the assault. View "People v. Barner" on Justia Law

Cowper’s sentencing judgment provided that he was to receive 275 days’ credit for time served. He was transported to prison on June 2. On June 23, Cowper filed a “Motion to Recalculate Time Served.” On October 16, 2011, he was released. On November 22, the state responded, conceding that he had not been given credit for time served between January 8, 2008, and February 2, 2008, and between November 29, 2010, and May 11, 2011. The court entered an amended judgment that included all of the good time credits. Cowper sued the sheriff of Saline County and the circuit clerk, alleging negligence in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(e)(4)). The trial court dismissed, noting that the statute requires the clerk to forward the information received from the sheriff; there was no allegation that the clerk failed to do so. As to the sheriff, the court found that the statute did not expressly grant a private right of action and none could be implied. The appellate court reversed, finding that Cowper was in the class of persons for whom the statute was enacted; that implying a private cause of action was consistent with the purpose to restore the offender to useful citizenship; that the injury is one that the law was designed to prevent; and that implying a private cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the complaint alleged negligence, so the court erred in analyzing whether there was a statutory right of action. Clerks may be liable for negligence. The court agreed that Cowper had stated a claim as to the sheriff. View "Cowper v. Nyberg" on Justia Law

Stevens was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court had granted a motion in limine to admit other-crimes evidence, finding that the evidence was relevant to show propensity, motive and identity. On appeal he argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when he was compelled to testify on cross-examination about a pending sexual assault charge. He had testified that his sexual activity with a prior victim was consensual and the cross-examination involved a different prior victim. The trial court noted the similarities between the assaults and characterized his testimony as “disturbing in the extreme.” The court stated that even if the other-crimes evidence had not been admitted, the evidence against Stevens was so strong that it was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding that the examination was proper because it discredited Stevens’s testimony, was probative of his intent and motive, and impeached his claim of consent. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the examination was proper to discredit a consent defense and test credibility. View "People v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Jolly was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Prosecution evidence consisted largely of the testimony of Gunn, a confidential informant and drug addict, with three felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. Gunn had implemented a controlled buy from Jolly, but did not wear a surveillance wire and used his own cell phone to call Jolly. Gunn admitted that working as a confidential informant was his only source of income. Jolly was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment as a Class X offender. He later filed a pro se motion, arguing that counsel failed to: move to reduce bond; obtain consent before waiving Jolly’s right to a speedy trial; appear in court during pretrial hearings; provide Jolly access to discovery materials; discuss trial strategy or visit Jolly; and prepare for trial while preparing for another criminal case. In a second pro se motion, he added failure to: object to testimony about recovered currency; challenge Gunn’s credibility; challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; object to police testimony that Jolly’s voice was recorded; object to the lack of testimony from experts on the state’s exhibits, including the admission of cocaine; move to dismiss for lack of evidence; and move to suppress the recovered cocaine and currency. Following a hearing with new counsel, the circuit court denied the motion. On remand, the trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, but allowed the new public defender to be excused. Jolly proceeded pro se. The court permitted the state to participate in an adversarial manner and relied on matters outside the record. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the finding that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and remanded for a new preliminary Krankel inquiry. View "People v. Jolly" on Justia Law

Smith and others were indicted for first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm in a 1998 shooting death. The jury found Smith guilty based on a theory of accountability. The appellate court affirmed. Smith filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate his claim that he suffered from a mental disability. Smith claimed he did not understand his Miranda rights and that, although he responded affirmatively to understanding those rights, his mental deficiency is such that he often gives responses that he thought others wanted to hear. Smith attached Social Security Administration documents indicating Smith was found disabled due to mental retardation, with an IQ of 74. Post-conviction counsel was appointed and indicated that an amended petition was not necessary. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The trial court denied Smith’s subsequent petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. The appellate court affirmed, stating that a defendant must make a “more exacting” showing of cause and prejudice to merit leave to file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; a defendant must show that the claim not raised in an initial post-conviction petition “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process.” The trial court twice instructed the jury that an opening statement is not evidence and, following closing argument, stated that “[n]either opening statement nor closing arguments are evidence, any statement… not based on the evidence should be disregarded.” During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that Smith did not have a gun. Defense counsel pointed out in closing argument the inconsistency between the state’s opening and closing arguments. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Holt threw eggs on the Katheiser driveway to frighten Kartheiser and his 6 year old daughter. Represented by counsel, she entered a negotiated guilty plea to resisting a peace officer. The other charge was nol-prossed. She was sentenced to 12 months of probation and was ordered to provide documentation of treatment. The court admonished Holt that the agreement involved a “conviction.” Days later, she filed a pro se motion to vacate, stating that she “was told there would be no conviction” and “never had the chance to testify.” Her counsel was allowed to withdraw. The circuit court granted the motion to withdraw the plea and appointed the public defender. The next day, Holt filed a pro se “Petition to Quash … the police report,” claiming tampering with the record, police brutality, and that her children were missing. After several more incidents, Holt was placed in a mental health center. She filed notice of appeal and a “Demand Letter for Formal Correction,” seeking to “hold Tim Brown accountable for ‘Bearing FALSE Witness’ the 8th Great Commandment and for Defamation.” The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Holt had been found fit to stand trial during the pendency of the appeal so that whether she received effective assistance of counsel during proceedings below was moot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that public interest exception applies to warrant review. Where the evidence clearly indicates that defendant is unfit to stand trial, but a defendant contends that he is fit, counsel is not obligated to argue for a finding of fitness. In doing so, counsel would be violating his duty to the client and suborning a violation of due process. View "People v. Holt" on Justia Law

In 1993, Cordrey was sentenced to 36 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, with a three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). In 2012, the Prisoner Review Board imposed MSR conditions. Cordrey was required to attend counseling, was prohibited from having contact with his victim, was required to have biweekly parole meetings, was required to register as a sex offender, with victim notification, and was subject to electronic monitoring. Cordrey was scheduled to begin MSR on April 12, 2013. That day, the Department of Corrections reported that Cordrey violated his parole because he had no suitable host site to serve his MSR. Cordrey was returned to prison to serve his MSR. Cordrey filed a grievance, followed by a pro se petition for habeas corpus. Counsel was appointed. The petition challenged the practice called “violating at the door” and alleged that more affluent offenders, who can afford suitable housing, can walk out of prison, while indigent offenders are returned to prison, in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the writ, reasoning that the Department of Corrections was unable to find placement for Cordrey due to his status as a sex offender, rather than his status as an indigent. The court noted the lack of evidence concerning housing options available for MSR, concerning whether both sex offender and non-sex offender indigent inmates are violated at the door, or whether there were alternates adequate to meet the state’s interests when there is no housing or funding available to inmates on MSR. View "Cordrey v. IL Prisoner Review Bd" on Justia Law

The state sought to commit New to the Department of Human Services as a sexually violent person under 725 ILCS 207/1, based convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault against a 12-year-old boy and a 14-year-old boy. The petition alleged that New was diagnosed with “paraphilia not otherwise specified, [paraphilia NOS], sexually attracted to adolescent males,” that his condition affected his emotional or volitional capacity which predisposed him to commit acts of sexual violence, and that there was a substantial probability that he would engage in future sexual violence. New moved to bar the expert testimony regarding the diagnosis, arguing that the experts’ opinions failed to meet the Frye standards for admissibility of novel scientific evidence. The trial court allowed the testimony. On cross-examination, the expert acknowledged controversy about how the paraphilia NOS diagnosis should be applied and over whether there should be a category in the DSM for individuals with a sexual arousal to early pubescent males, aged 11 to 14. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in holding that the diagnosis of hebephilia is subject to Frye and that there was an inadequate basis to determine whether it has gained general acceptance. View "In re Detention of New" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department) permanently revoked the health care licenses of physicians (plaintiffs) pursuant to the Department of Professional Regulation Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105-165) as a result of plaintiffs’ prior misdemeanor convictions for battery and criminal sexual abuse of their patients. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed their challenges. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the Act: did not apply to individuals who were convicted of a triggering offense prior to the Act’s effective date; was impermissibly retroactive and impaired certain fundamental rights, in violation of substantive due process; violated procedural due process; was unenforceable based on the res judicata effect of the previous discipline imposed by the Department; violated federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy; violated the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder; violated the federal takings clause; and violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto law. View "Hayashi v. IL Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation" on Justia Law