Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police officers testified that they received a tip that Cregan would arrive by train on November 3, 2009, and that he had an active warrant for his arrest. They learned that he was a member of the Satan Disciples gang and that a civil warrant sought his arrest for failure to pay child support. Officers waited at the train station, approached Cregan, placed him under arrest, and searched his bags. An officer testified that he intended to bring the bags into custody, as Cregan was alone, and that he intended to conduct an inventory search of the bags, pursuant to department policy. Cregan asked if his bags could be turned over to his friend Collins, but the officer told him the bags had to be searched first. Another officer testified that gang members are “known to carry weapons,” so the officers had safety concerns. Cregan testified that when he exited the train Collins was waiting to give him a ride and that he greeted Collins before the officers approached. Officers found a jar of hair gel in the bags. Its appearance was not noteworthy. Opening it, they found a bag containing powder cocaine. Cregan was charged with unlawful possession of less than 15 grams of cocaine, a controlled substance. The court denied his motion to suppress; Cregan was convicted. The appellate court held that the search was valid incident to the arrest, because the bags were immediately associated with his person and was not limited to a brief search for weapons. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding the search lawful incident to the arrest. View "People v. Cregan" on Justia Law

Hommerson was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition did not contain a verification affidavit pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b). The circuit court dismissed the petition solely on that basis. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that a petition lacking a verification affidavit was frivolous and patently without merit. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the dismissal elevated form over substance. The legislative intent was that compliance with technical requirements was a matter for second stage review, after review of the merits of the claim. View "People v. Hommerson" on Justia Law

Chicago officers were on patrol when a man flagged them down. He did not give his name and was not asked for it, but said that there was a “possible gun” in a tan, four-door Lincoln with several persons inside. Shortly thereafter, officers saw a tan, four-door Lincoln, stopped it, and placed the driver in handcuffs. No traffic violations supported the stop. This defendant was a backseat passenger and was ordered out. He “took off running” and dropped a loaded handgun two feet from the car. Defendant was arrested after he fell. The trial court stated that a motion to suppress the gun would not have succeeded and defense counsel did not make such a motion. The defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and received an eight-year prison term. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. When an ineffectiveness claim is based on counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion, the defendant must establish prejudice by demonstrating that the unargued motion was meritorious and that a reasonable probability existed that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. The initial stop effected an illegal seizure of the defendant; the tip was insufficient to justify the stop. However, the defendant could not prove that the gun itself was the fruit of that illegal seizure. The taint of illegality was removed because the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct was interrupted, by an intervening circumstance: the defendant’s flight. That flight ended the seizure, and the defendant conceded as much. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

McFatridge prosecuted Steidl and Whitlock for 1986 murders and obtained convictions, which were subsequently overturned in federal court. The defendants filed separate federal suits seeking financial recovery against McFatridge, Edgar County, and others. McFatridge sought mandamus to compel Attorney General Madigan to approve payment for litigation expenses he incurred in his defense of the civil lawsuits, under the State Employee Indemnification Act. The Attorney General refused requests for payment, contending that payment was barred under the Act by the allegations of intentional, willful, or wanton misconduct, but that there could be indemnification later if a court or jury should find that there was no such misconduct. The circuit court dismissed the mandamus complaint, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The statute has a provision that an elected official (such as a State’s Attorney) may choose his or her own defense counsel and have the resulting expenses paid as they are incurred; the provision has no impact on an earlier provision of the Act that allows the Attorney General to decline representation if she determines that the claim is for intentional, willful, or wanton misconduct.BurkeView "McFatridge v. Madigan" on Justia Law

While patrolling a motel parking area, police approached defendant’s car and saw, in plain view in the center console, a large bullet. They ordered defendant and his passengers out of the car, handcuffed hem, found several more bullets in the car and on defendant’s person, then found a .454 revolver under a floor mat on the front passenger side. The circuit court suppressed all of the evidence, concluding that the challenged police conduct subjected defendant to an unlawful search without probable cause because the bullet did not establish evidence of a crime. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The parties agree that the officers’ initial approach and their questioning of defendant was lawful. The officers were in a vulnerable situation when they observed the bullet. It was dusk and the officers were on foot in a parking lot away from their vehicle; they were outnumbered by defendant and his two passengers, who were in a running car. The officers were forced to make a quick decision based on limited information after seeing the bullet. A reasonably cautious individual in a similar situation could reasonably suspect the presence of a gun, implicating officer safety.View "People v. Colyar" on Justia Law

In 2003, Domagala, a live-in caretaker, was seen repeatedly striking and pressing the throat of his 84-year-old charge, Stanley. Approximately a week after being taken to the emergency room, Stanley was discharged to a nursing home with a feeding tube in place. While in the nursing home, Stanley pulled out the tube several times causing peritonitis, a systemic infection, which ultimately led to his death. Domagala was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 40 years. He filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to conduct a diligent investigation to discover that a superseding, intervening cause, i.e., gross negligence of treating medical staff, and not petitioner’s conduct, caused the death of the victim. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Domagala is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.View "People v. Domagala" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for participation in a 1994 Peoria home invasion and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years for armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The appellate court affirmed; Coleman was unsuccessful in initial post-conviction claims. He claimed actual innocence in a 2009 successive post-conviction petition. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Coleman called eight witnesses and the state called an investigating detective. The trial court denied relief, finding that Coleman’s evidence was insufficient to probably change the result on retrial. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new trial. To succeed on a post-conviction claim of actual innocence, a claimant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial. Although the state’s evidence at the original trial was sufficient to convict, there was no forensic evidence linking Coleman to the attack, and the prosecution’s identifications were significantly impeached. At the post-conviction hearing, Coleman presented the testimony of five men who admitted that they were present at the crime scene and that he was not. Although their credibility could be challenged based on their voluntary intoxication and criminal records, their testimony was consistent on key details. The evidence was new, material and noncumulative. On retrial, the fact finder can determine the credibility of those witnesses and balance the conflicting accounts. View "People v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2001, a vehicle was fired at eight times by another expressway motorist on the expressway. The driver positively identified the defendant as the shooter several times, and the passenger, seriously injured, also, identified the defendant from a photo array. Convicted, the defendant was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of the passenger and to a consecutive 10-year term for shooting at the driver. He later claimed that he would have accepted a plea bargain rather than go to trial if he had known he could receive consecutive sentences, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed, but the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced. The record showed that the defendant had hoped to prove he was actually innocent and wanted to go to trial. The trial court reasonably found the defendant’s statements to the contrary incredible. The defendant had called a witness to testify that her boyfriend was the shooter, contrary to a signed statement she had given after the incident. The victim testified that he had been offered money to recant. View "People v. Hale" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping and concealment of a homicidal death. He was sentenced to terms of natural life plus 70 years. The appellate court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences and dismissal of his subsequent post-conviction petition,(725 ILCS 5/122-1. Johnson filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment in 2008, which the circuit court erroneously dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The state filed a motion to dismiss his amended petition and requested that Johnson be assessed filing fees and court costs as an inmate filing a frivolous petition, 735 ILCS 5/22-105(a). The trial court dismissed and assessed numerous fees and costs against Johnson, including a $50 fee under the Counties Code, which provides that a State’s Attorney may collect a $50 fee for each day actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus. The prosecution argued that the habeas corpus fee applies to all collateral proceedings. The appellate court held that the reference to habeas corpus was generic and applied to all collateral proceedings, in order to deter frivolous filings. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the fee, stating that, although there are several different types of habeas corpus proceedings, the Counties Code provision applies only to those and is not generic. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Illinois Department of State Police denied Coram a firearm owners’ identification (FOID) card. The trial judge ordered issuance of the card. The State Police moved to vacate on the basis of Coram’s 1992 domestic battery conviction for slapping his girlfriend. He had pled guilty, but had not served any jail time. The Illinois statute provides for denial of a FOID card to anyone prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm. In 1996, after Coram’s conviction, the federal Gun Control Act was amended to impose a firearm disability on those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. A different judge confirmed the previous order and, further, held unconstitutional, as applied, language of the federal Gun Control Act which was incorporated into the Illinois statute. Although that federal statutory language provided relief in cases of pardon, expungement of conviction, or restoration of rights after conviction, Coram, who had never served jail time, claimed that these grounds were not available to him under Illinois law. The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the matter without reaching constitutional questions concerning the right to bear arms. It vacated the holding that federal statutory law was unconstitutional as applied, but affirmed the original order directing issuance of a FOID card. Coram had a remedy under the Illinois statutory scheme, which provides a process to review whether an applicant for a FOID card should be perpetually barred from obtaining one or can have his second amendment firearm rights restored because he is determined to currently be a law-abiding, responsible citizen. That is what happened here. View "Coram v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law