Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Chicago police arrested Lozano, who was subsequently charged with burglary and possession of burglary tools. Lozano moved to suppress evidence (a car radio, a wallet, and two screwdrivers) arguing that when the officers stopped, detained, and searched him, they neither possessed a warrant nor saw him committing any crimes and could not reasonably suspect that he had committed or was about to commit any crimes or that he was armed and dangerous. Officer Rodriguez testified that he and his partner were driving in an unmarked car, on patrol, and saw Lozano “running at a fast rate of speed” and holding his front pocket. It was raining and wet outside. Rodriguez made a U-turn and approached Lozano, who fled up the stairs of an apparently abandoned building. Rodriguez pursued Lozano and saw a “big bulge” in Lozano’s pocket. Rodriguez handcuffed Lozano, then touched his hooded sweatshirt and felt a rectangular box. He reached inside Lozano’s front pocket and recovered a wallet, two screwdrivers, and a radio. The wallet and radio had been taken from a parked car.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate courts and held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lozano. The act of running in the rain while holding the front of his pocket did not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. View "People v. Lozano" on Justia Law

The Protect Illinois Communities Act restricts firearms and related items that the Act defines as “an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge” (assault weapons), 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b), and “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s],” section 24-1.10(b)). Certain restrictions do not apply to law enforcement agencies and individuals who complete firearms training as part of their employment in law enforcement, corrections, the military, and private security (trained professionals), and individuals who possessed assault weapons or LCMs (large capacity magazines) before the restrictions became effective.The circuit court of Macon County entered declaratory judgment, finding that the restrictions facially violated the Illinois Constitution because the exemptions deny the “law-abiding public” equal protection and constitute special legislation. On appeal, opponents of the law alleged for the first time that, regardless of the exemptions, the restrictions violate the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violated the three-reading requirement of the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exemptions neither deny equal protection nor constitute special legislation because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they are similarly situated to and treated differently from the exempt classes. The plaintiffs expressly waived in the circuit court any independent claim that the restrictions impermissibly infringe the Second Amendment and are jurisdictionally barred from renewing their three-readings claim. View "Caulkins v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the decision of the circuit court finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented the State from compelling Defendant to provide the passcode for his cell phone, holding that the foregone conclusion doctrine applied as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege in this case.Defendant was charged with two counts of forgery stemming from the discovery of two false paychecks made payable to him. The police applied for and obtained a warrant to search Defendant's cell phone but could not execute the warrant because the phone was passcode protected. The State then filed a motion to compel production of the passcode. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that compelling Defendant to provide the passcode would constitute compelling incriminating testimonial communication and that the foregone conclusion did not apply as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foregone conclusion applied in this case. View "People v. Sneed" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant at a Chicago home, forcibly entering the residence after nobody answered. Inside, officers saw Ramirez descending from the second floor. Ramirez was detained but allowed to return upstairs, where he retrieved his shoes from one of the bedrooms. Police searched the house and recovered a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun, a Mossberg shotgun, a 9-millimeter handgun, and ammunition. The Benelli shotgun was recovered from under the mattress of the single bed in the room where Ramirez had retrieved his shoes. From the same bedroom, police recovered mail bearing Ramirez’s name and the home's address. Ramirez was taken into custody, provided Miranda warnings, and made a statement that he bought the Benelli shotgun from a coworker for $100.Ramirez was charged with possession of a Benelli shotgun whose serial number had been “changed, altered, removed or obliterated” (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b)). The state did not present any direct evidence that Ramirez knew that the shotgun’s serial number was defaced. Ramirez did not testify or call any witnesses. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed his conviction. Section 24-5(b)’s implied mens rea of knowledge must apply to both elements of the offense, possession and defacement. The court remanded for a new trial. At the time of trial, binding precedent from an appellate court provided that the state did not have to present evidence that a defendant knew a firearm was defaced. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 2008, Graefnitz went with Wilson and Moore to buy drugs. Graefnitz was shot in the back and died from his wounds. Wilson was then 14 years old. The court granted a transfer motion, concluding that charging Wilson in the juvenile justice system “with the hope that this minor will somehow be transformed into a non-violent law-abiding citizen ready for release in society at age 21” would not serve the public interest nor the interest of justice. Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury found that Wilson did not personally discharge the weapon that caused Graefnitz’s death. The PSI consisted of more than 200 pages of reports and supporting documents, including information about Wilson’s troubled background, mental disabilities, substance abuse, criminal history, and medical diagnoses. The court sentenced Wilson to 55 years’ imprisonment for murder (which included a 15-year firearm enhancement), to be served at 100%, and a consecutive four years for attempted armed robbery.Wilson sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging his sentence as violating the eighth amendment by imposing a de facto life sentence without a finding of permanent incorrigibility or specifically addressing the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in the Supreme Court’s 2012 "Miller" decision. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed a decision that vacated Wilson’s sentence. The sentencing court reviewed the entire PSI, which contained extensive evidence regarding Wilson’s developmental age, maturity, and other circumstances, and announced several times that Wilson was young. Wilson received the constitutionally required procedure under Miller. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 1983, Prante was convicted of a strangulation murder. The appellate court rejected Prante’s claim that the state’s expert testimony concerning bite marks should not have been admitted. In 1993, Prante filed a postconviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process claim concerning “material misrepresentation of evidence” relating to blood found at the crime scene.” The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely. In 2002, Prante filed an unsuccessful petition arguing that his sentence violated Apprendi. In 2017, Prante successfully sought DNA and fingerprint testing (725 ILCS 5/116-3). No interpretable DNA profiles were obtained, and no match was found for the fingerprint.In 2018, Prante sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition that argued actual innocence, a due process claim alleging that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of bite mark analysis evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Prante asserted that recent scientific studies had discredited the forensic bite mark opinion testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Prante is not entitled to file either the due process or the actual innocence claim. Without any allegation that the state knowingly used the false bite mark testimony or failed to exercise diligence to discover that the testimony was false, Prante has not pled a cognizable due process claim under Illinois law. Prante has not met the high standard for setting forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. View "People v. Prante" on Justia Law

Moore and Williams, both sentenced to life in prison without parole for separate murders committed when they were 19 years old, appealed from judgments denying them leave to file successive postconviction petitions challenging their sentences. The Fourth District affirmed the judgment against Moore; the Second District reversed the judgment against Williams.The Illinois Supreme Court held that neither Moore nor Williams sufficiently pled cause for filing their successive postconviction petitions. The Supreme Court’s 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences imposed on young adult offenders, it does not provide cause for Moore and Williams to file their proposed successive postconviction petitions. Moore failed to allege facts that could support a finding that his brain development at the time of the crime required the court to treat him as a juvenile offender. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

Addison was convicted, in absentia, of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a converted motor vehicle, forgery, and two counts of theft, arising out of his alleged use of counterfeit money to purchase a motorcycle, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Having failed to appear for trial, he was subsequently arrested.Addison’s appellate counsel did not file a brief and determined that there are no meritorious issues, except concerning credit that should be applied toward the prison sentences. Addison filed a postconviction petition, contending that trial and appellate counsel were deficient. Appointed postconviction counsel filed an amended petition, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on improper Miranda warnings, for failing to object to expert testimony regarding counterfeit currency when no expert was disclosed, and for failing to argue sufficiency of the evidence where there were discrepancies; and that the court erred in giving an accountability instruction. The petition did not assert ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition.Addison appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance in failing to argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Addison did not forfeit collateral review of his conviction by failing to appear at trial. While any postconviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal are generally forfeited that forfeiture could have been overcome by framing the issues as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal. The appellate court properly remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) without considering the merits. View "People v. Addison" on Justia Law

During a pat-down search of Brown, Chicago officers recovered a loaded handgun from his pocket and packets of a suspected narcotic from the driver’s seat of his car. Brown was charged with being an armed habitual criminal and possessing a controlled substance. Two attorneys appeared on Brown’s behalf. The court questioned the venire members in panels and conferred with the attorneys at a sidebar to discuss objections. The court held eight sidebars off the record before announcing that a jury had been selected. The judge then went back on the record, outside the presence of the jury, and explained the challenges for cause and for peremptory challenges. The jury found Brown guilty of being an armed habitual criminal. In his motion for a new trial, Brown did not challenge the sidebars. On appeal, Brown argued that he was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the proceeding and asserted that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the process where jurors were challenged at sidebars without Brown himself being present.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Brown did not establish prejudice; he failed to show that he was not tried by an impartial jury. Brown was present in the courtroom for all the questioning of the venire members; the record is silent as to whether Brown talked with counsel about venire members before the sidebars. Without any evidence that counsel failed to represent Brown’s interests at the sidebars, there is no basis to conclude that counsell rendered deficient performance by failing to object to the procedure. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1993, Clark entered Catlin's Galesburg apartment to commit robbery. Clark was 24 years old; Catlin was 89. Clark killed Catlin by cutting her throat, then robbed the apartment. Clark pled guilty but mentally ill to first-degree murder and robbery. Clark suffered from antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and fetal alcohol syndrome. He had an IQ of 79 and the intellectual ability of a 13-14-year-old; he had been severely abused as a child and had an extensive criminal history. Clark was sentenced to 90 years of imprisonment for the murder, with a consecutive 15-year prison sentence for the robbery. The appellate court affirmed. In 2001 and 2012 Clark filed unsuccessful post-conviction petitions.In a 2018 motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, Clark challenged the constitutionality of his sentence as inconsistent with the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. Clark argued that his sentence was the functional equivalent of a life sentence and that the circuit court failed to give sufficient weight to the characteristics of his intellectual disabilities and his young age as mitigation factors. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief.The proportionate penalties clause requires penalties to be determined with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship and provides a limitation on penalties beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment. Precedent does not establish “cause” for relaxing the res judicata doctrine with respect to the issues Clark raised, which were decided on direct appeal. Clark also cannot establish prejudice under the cause-and-prejudice test by advancing a challenge to his sentence as it relates to his intellectual disabilities. “Neurological development was not a prospect for” Clark. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law