Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rock Island officer Muehler received information that the defendant was selling narcotics from a motel room. The defendant had an extensive criminal record, including two 2012 arrests for the manufacture and delivery of controlled substances. Another officer contacted the defendant, who stated that he had narcotics for sale and agreed to meet. Muehler surveilled the motel and observed the defendant drive away. Muehler knew that the defendant had a suspended driver’s license. Another officer stopped the defendant, who was arrested and signed a waiver of rights form. The motel’s staff stated that the defendant was staying in Room 130. Deputy Pena and his K-9 partner, Rio, went to the motel. Rio conducted a “free air sniff” in the alcove outside Room 130 and alerted to the odor of narcotics “within inches of the door.” Muehler obtained a search warrant. Inside the room, police found heroin and related items. The defendant admitted that the heroin was his.After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant was convicted. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The government can violate the Fourth Amendment either by a warrantless intrusion onto a person’s property or by a warrantless infringement of a person’s societally recognized privacy. Even if the defendant’s motel room was his home, the alcove outside it was not curtilage; it was not put to personal use by the defendant. He had no ownership or possession of the alcove, only a license to use it. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove. View "People v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

When police responded to a call that Brown was shooting a gun inside her home, they found a rifle in Brown’s bedroom. There was no evidence that the gun had been fired in the house. Brown was charged with possessing a firearm without a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card, 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1). Brown asserted that she kept the rifle for self-defense; that she was over 21; and that, although she did not possess a FOID card, she was a law-abiding citizen with no criminal record, history of mental illness, or other disqualifying condition and would have been eligible for a FOID card. She asserted that requiring her to go through the FOID process unconstitutionally infringed upon her fundamental right of self-defense in this “most private of areas.”The White County circuit court dismissed the charge, finding that, as applied to Brown, section 2(a)(1) was unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, finding that the circuit court unnecessarily reached the constitutional challenge. The court held that the FOID Card Act did not apply to the act of possessing a firearm in the home as a matter of statutory interpretation and, therefore, could not apply to Brown. This was an alternative, nonconstitutional basis for dismissal. In addition, there were unresolved factual issues concerning Brown’s possession of the gun and eligibility for a FOID card, which were the basis of her challenge. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Officer Baker testified that he activated his lights to initiate a stop of Hill’s vehicle based on his reasonable belief that the passenger was a known fugitive, Lee. Hill finally came to a stop. Based on his experience and training, Baker knew vehicles that take a little while to stop often are concealing or destroying contraband or producing a weapon. Baker approached the passenger side of the vehicle and had the passenger lower the window. He immediately smelled the strong odor of raw cannabis. He saw a loose bud on the backseat. Baker could not recall when he realized the passenger was not Lee. Baker searched Hill’s vehicle based on the smell of raw cannabis. The search revealed cannabis and a small rock that tested positive for crack cocaine. There was a video of the stop. The trial court found the basis of the stop too tenuous and granted, in part, a motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, finding Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop Hill’s vehicle and probable cause to search the vehicle.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, noting the legalization of medical cannabis and decriminalization of small amounts of cannabis. Facts available to the officer would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Burns sought to place on the March 2020 primary election ballot the proposal: “Shall the terms of office for those persons seeking nomination or election to, or who are holding the office of, Village President (Mayor) and Village trustee in the Village of Elk Grove Village, be limited such that, at the February 23, 2021 Consolidated Primary Election and all subsequent elections, no person shall be eligible to seek nomination or election to, or to hold, elected office in the Village of Elk Grove Village where that person has held the same elected office for two (2) or more consecutive, four (4) year terms?” An objector argued Municipal Code 3.1-10-17 provides that any term-limit referendum must be prospective only; a referendum can only consider terms in office served after the passage of the referendum to determine a candidate’s eligibility. Burns maintained that section 3.1-10-17 was unconstitutional, facially and as applied. The electoral board sustained the objection and ordered that the referendum not appear on the ballot. The circuit court reversed, finding section 3.1-10-17 unconstitutional.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the electoral board. Section 3.1-10-17 contains an express limitation on the power of a home rule unit to regulate matters involving term limits. The General Assembly has the authority to legislate in this area prospectively because it has expressly indicated its intent to do so; it may choose to “preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that authority.” View "Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Elk Grove Village" on Justia Law

In 2013, Moore was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) stemming from a traffic stop in Joliet. His prior felony was a 1990 murder conviction. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting an argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate to Moore’s felon status, thereby allowing the jury to consider highly prejudicial evidence that Moore’s prior conviction was for murder. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. This type of prior conviction evidence generally has little probative value and creates a high risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. The jury was faced with two plausible versions of events that depended on witness credibility. The evidence was closely balanced, so informing the jurors that the defendant was previously convicted of murder made Deputy Hannon’s version more plausible and tipped the scales against Moore. There was a reasonable probability of a different result, had defense counsel prevented the jury from being informed of the nature of the prior felony conviction. There was sufficient evidence that the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so double jeopardy does not preclude a new trial. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

Roddis was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and sentenced to six years in prison. The trial court dismissed as untimely Roddis’s pro se motion for reduction of his sentence that also alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence but remanded for a “Krankel” hearing. On remand, the trial court conducted a “pre-inquiry Krankel hearing” to determine if the allegations of ineffective assistance were founded, at which point the court would appoint separate counsel and proceed to a “full-blown” Krankel hearing. The court conducted a hearing with Roddis and his previous counsel, giving Roddis the opportunity to elaborate on his allegations and allowing counsel to respond. The court ruled that the allegations did not establish ineffective assistance. The appellate court, finding that the trial court should not have decided the merits at that initial hearing, remanded.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the trial court judgment. Even in preliminary Krankel inquiries, a trial court must be able to consider the merits in their entirety when determining whether to appoint new counsel on a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This serves both the ends of justice and judicial economy. After scrutinizing the record, the court found that Roddis received effective assistance and was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ performance. The court rightfully exercised its discretion to decline to appoint new counsel to address his pro se posttrial claims. View "People v. Roddis" on Justia Law

The Department of State Police revoked Johnson’s Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/8(n) due to her conviction for a misdemeanor involving domestic violence. That conviction prohibited her from possessing firearms under federal law. Johnson sought judicial relief. The circuit court held that section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), and several provisions of the FOID Card Act, which incorporate that federal statute, were unconstitutional as applied to Johnson. The court ordered the Department to reissue Johnson’s FOID card. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on different grounds, vacating the circuit court’s findings that the state and federal statutes are unconstitutional as applied to Johnson. Under the federal Act, “civil rights” include firearm rights and Johnson fits an exemption for those who have had their “civil rights restored” following a conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence. Illinois’s regulatory scheme (430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3), which affirmatively provides for a “status-altering dispensation” under section 10 of the FOID Card Act sufficiently fulfills Congress’s intent to “defer to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Granting Johnson relief is not contrary to federal law. View "Johnson v. Department of State Police" on Justia Law

Ashley was convicted of stalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2), (c)(1) and was sentenced to serve 18 months’ imprisonment. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting his arguments that the provisions of the stalking statute under which he was convicted are facially unconstitutional in violation of the first amendment and substantive due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; it does not criminalize protected speech consisting of threats to engage in lawful, nonviolent behavior. The amended statute requires two or more threats that the defendant knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; the legislature intended that the term “threatens” refers to “true threats” of unlawful violence such as bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, and restraint, as set forth in other subsections. The statute that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his speech and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. The term “threatens” is readily susceptible to a limiting construction and does not cover negligent conduct. The statute is not susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. View "People v. Ashley" on Justia Law

Rushton, an Illinois Times journalist, requested from the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) settlement agreements pertaining to claims filed in connection with the death of Franco, a former Taylorville inmate who died from cancer, including agreements involving Wexford, which contracts with DOC to provide medical for inmates. The DOC did not have a copy of the Wexford agreement. Wexford claimed that it was “confidential” and not a public record for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Wexford provided the DOC’s FOIA officer with a redacted version, which the DOC gave to Rushton. Rushton and the Times filed suit. The court allowed Wexford to intervene and ordered Wexford to provide an unredacted version of the agreement to the court under seal. Wexford argued that the agreement did not “directly relate” to the governmental function that it performs for the DOC because it memorializes its independent business decision to settle a legal claim, without mentioning Franco’s medical condition or medical care. The plaintiffs characterized the agreement as "settlement of a claim that Wexford failed to perform its governmental function properly" and argued that the amount of the settlement affected taxpayers.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the agreement is subject to FOIA. The statute is to be construed broadly in favor of disclosure. The contractor stood in the shoes of the DOC when it provided medical care to inmates. The settlement agreement was related to the provision of medical care to inmates, and public bodies may not avoid disclosure obligations by delegating their governmental function to a third party. View "Rushton v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

A pedestrian, was killed by a hit-and-run driver near a Chicago intersection; her six-year-old son was seriously injured. A jury convicted Eubanks of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)), failure to report an accident involving death or injury (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b), (d)), and aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) (section 11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C), (d)(1)(F). Before trial, Eubanks had unsuccessfully moved to suppress the results of blood and urine testing.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s holding that section 11-501.2(c)(2) was facially unconstitutional, holding that it is unconstitutional as applied to this case. The statute includes the type of general rule that the Supreme Court held will almost always support a warrantless blood test but that rule does not apply in this case. The state conceded that exigent circumstances were lacking and that the police never attempted to secure a warrant. The police told Eubanks that the law required him to give blood and urine samples, but they were not facing an emergency and dissipation was apparently not an issue. Seven hours passed between his arrest and his blood sample, and nearly 8.5 hours passed before he gave the urine sample. It “defies belief that the police could not have attempted to gain a warrant without significantly delaying" the testing. Because the state cannot prove the aggravated DUI charge without the evidence that should have been suppressed, the court upheld the reversal of that conviction and the remand for a new trial on the murder charge. The court reversed the appellate court’s judgment reducing the classification of the failure-to-report conviction. View "People v. Eubanks" on Justia Law