Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the circuit court adjudicated Minnis a delinquent minor for committing the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(b) and sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. The adjudication for criminal sexual abuse rendered him a “sex offender” pursuant to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), (B)(1); the court ordered Minnis to register as a sex offender. On December 17, 2010, defendant reported to the Normal police department to register. He disclosed his two e-mail addresses and his Facebook account. Defendant’s May 2011 registration form listed the same Internet information. Defendant registered again in August 2014, including his two e-mail addresses, but omitting his Facebook account. On September 9, Normal police officers viewed defendant’s publicly accessible Facebook profile online; Minnis had changed his Facebook cover photo only one month before his August 2014 registration. The circuit court of McLean County dismissed a charge of failure to register, finding that the Internet disclosure provision was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, treating the challenge as one to facial validity. The Internet disclosure provision survives intermediate scrutiny. It advances a substantial governmental interest without chilling more speech than necessary. View "People v. Minnis" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-5). Before trial, the prosecution and defense agreed that the sentencing range would be 4-30 years. Defendant’s counsel stated that the state had tendered a “certified court docket from the ’04 JD case” indicating that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary, which would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. Counsel also indicated that defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4-30 years. At trial, the evidence was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence regarding defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant guilty. A presentencing investigative report indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses, including three counts of residential burglary. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated Supreme Court rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and Shepard v. United States (2005). Defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi and falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and an exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code. The state was not required to allege the fact of his juvenile adjudication in the indictment or prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium against defendants (doctors and medical providers). Defendants moved for leave to file a 12-person jury demand and “to declare Public Act 98-1132, which amended 735 ILCS 5/2-1105(b), as unconstitutional.” Act 98-1132 limits the size of a civil jury to six persons and increases the amount paid per day to jurors across the state. The circuit court found the provision regarding the size of a jury facially unconstitutional based on article I, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution, which protects the right of trial by jury “as heretofore enjoyed.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “as heretofore enjoyed,” means the right as it was enjoyed at the time the constitution was drafted. Transcripts from the convention debates make clear that the drafters did not believe the legislature had the authority to reduce the size of a jury below 12 members and the drafters did not act to give the legislature such power. The provision regarding jury size cannot be severed from the remainder of the Act, which addresses juror pay, so the Act is entirely invalid. View "Kakos v. Butler" on Justia Law

Reyes, then 16, was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ventura and the attempted murders of two others, having discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by the three. Prosecuted as an adult, he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction plus 26 years’ imprisonment for each of the two attempted murder convictions. The sentences were required to run consecutively, resulting in aggregate sentence of 97 years’ imprisonment. Under the truth in sentencing statute he was required to serve a minimum of 89 years before he would be eligible for release. In the appellate court, defendant cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” The Court clarified that life-without-parole sentences must be based on judicial discretion rather than statutory mandates. The appellate court held that Miller applied only to actual sentences of life without the possibility of parole and not to aggregate consecutive sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law

An altercation ended with defendant shooting Miller multiple times with a laser-sighted firearm. He was convicted of armed violence predicated on aggravated battery and aggravated battery with a firearm; the jury found that an extended-term sentence was warranted (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(6)). After post-trial motions, defendant wrote a letter asserting ineffective assistance by his privately-retained counsel, who, allegedly, assigned defendant’s bond to his fee without defendant’s knowledge; failed to disclose a prior connection to Miller’s father; failed to interview certain witnesses, to test certain evidence, to hire a ballistics expert, and to contest the admission of certain evidence; and failed to prepare defendant to testify. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison for armed violence, into which was merged defendant’s aggravated battery conviction. The court appointed a public defender and scheduled a hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance claims. At the hearing, no witnesses were called. Appointed counsel summarized the concerns raised in defendant’s letter. The court concluded that, under the “Stickland” standard, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that counsel’s alleged errors substantially affected the outcome of defendant’s case. On appeal, defendant argued that aggravated battery cannot serve as the predicate for an armed violence conviction and that he received ineffective assistance from his appointed counsel by merely repeating the claims contained in defendant’s letter. The appellate court agreed that the statute prohibits predicating armed violence on the aggravated battery statute, but held that defendant was required to show that he was prejudiced by appointed counsel’s deficient performance. The court examined the record and determined that no prejudice occurred. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the armed violence conviction and affirmed as to ineffective assistance. Aggravated battery with a firearm is an enhanced form of battery; there is no reason why it cannot serve as the predicate for a charge of armed violence. The court rejected an argument that appointed counsel’s inaction “entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” such that a court may presume prejudice under United States v. Cronic. View "People v. Cherry" on Justia Law

Bishop, 69 years old, was found in his apartment bound and severely beaten. Defendant was arrested. The prosecution sought to depose Bishop under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 414, which allows an evidence deposition if there is a “substantial possibility” that the witness will not be available to testify at trial. Bishop had sustained serious head injuries during the attack; his condition was likely to deteriorate. Defendant objected, arguing that Bishop could only communicate by shaking his head, precluding meaningful cross-examination. The court granted the motion, stating that if Bishop could only shake his head, the deposition would be inadmissible. The order required that the sheriff transport defendant to the deposition. The words “over the objection of the defendant” were handwritten; the entire paragraph was then scribbled over by hand. Bishop’s video deposition took place with two assistant public defenders (APDs) present. Defendant did not attend. Bishop stated that defendant had attacked him and identified a photograph of the hammer recovered from his apartment. On cross-examination, Bishop stated that photographs had been shown to him before the deposition. Bishop remembered that he had previously shared an apartment with defendant. At a status hearing, with defendant present, an APD acknowledged waiving defendant’s appearance at the deposition. The prosecution moved to admit Bishop’s deposition as a hearsay exception (Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)), and presented testimony from Bishop’s physician. The court concluded that Bishop’s condition rendered him unavailable and admitted the deposition, concluding that there had been an opportunity to cross-examine. The jury heard testimony from neighbors about arguing between defendant and Bishop before the attack, testimony that defendant had admitted to the crime, DNA evidence, and Bishop’s deposition. Convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen, defendant was sentenced to 22 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that the admission of Bishop’s deposition violated his Sixth Amendment rights. A divided appellate court agreed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Although the court erred in not obtaining the written waiver, defendant clearly knew that the deposition had been ordered and that he could attend. Defendant was provided with the opportunity for confrontation. View "People v. Hood" on Justia Law

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 may be amended by constitutional convention; the General Assembly; or ballot initiatives, Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, sects. 1, 2, 3. Ballot initiatives may only be used for amendments directed at “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV,” pertaining to Illinois’s legislative branch. The ballot initiative at issue addresses redistricting to redraw the legislative and representative districts following each federal decennial census. In May 2016, SIM filed with the Secretary of State a petition proposing the amendment of article IV, section 3, to replace the current system for redrawing Illinois’s legislative and representative districts. The General Assembly’s role would be eliminated from the process, with primary responsibility for drawing legislative and representative districts falling to a new “Independent Redistricting Commission” selected through a process involving limited legislative input. The State Board of Elections determined that the petition received more than the required number of valid signatures. Days after submission of the petition, a “taxpayer’s suit” was filed (735 ILCS 5/11-303), seeking to enjoin the disbursal of public funds to determine the petition’s compliance with the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/1-1. The circuit court found that the petition did not comply with requirements for inclusion on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, citing “the plain language of article XIV, section 3.” View "Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Blumenthal jointly owned her Chicago home with Brewer, her domestic partner since 1981. In 2010 Blumenthal sought partition of the residence when the relationship ended. Brewer counterclaimed for common-law remedies, including an interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in a medical group so that their overall assets would be equalized. Blumenthal moved to dismiss the counterclaim under the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1979 Hewitt decision, which rejected a woman’s suit to divide assets she accumulated with a man during a long-term relationship in which they lived together, had children together, but never married. Brewer argued that it was “particularly irrational” to apply this principle to her because she and Blumenthal could not marry at the time their relationship ended because same-sex marriage was not recognized in Illinois. The counterclaim was dismissed; the partition action proceeded to final judgment. The appellate court vacated the dismissal, calling Hewitt “outmoded and ill-considered.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The legislature intended marriage to be the only legally protected family relationship under Illinois law. Permitting unmarried partners to enforce mutual property rights might “encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.” Marriage is a legal relationship that all individuals may or may not enter into, Illinois does not act irrationally or discriminatorily in refusing to grant benefits and protections under the Marriage and Dissolution Act to those who do not participate in that institution. View "Blumenthal v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

Public Act 97-1161 amended the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 ) to create an exemption from property taxes on leasehold interests and improvements on real estate owned by the Metropolitan Airport Authority of Rock Island County and used by a fixed base operator (FBO) to provide aeronautical services to the public. When the law was enacted, Elliott was the only FBO leasing land from the Authority. The law was specifically designed to provide a financial incentive for that company to expand its operations at the Authority’s facilities rather than its operations in Des Moines, Iowa, which were not subject to property tax. The School District, which faced losing more than $150,000 per year in tax revenue as a result of the exemption, filed suit, asserting violation of the Illinois Constitution’s “special legislation” clause. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court agreed, finding nothing to justify distinguishing FBOs operating at the Quad City airport from any number of other FBOs at other Illinois airports or from other Illinois businesses that compete with companies in more tax-friendly jurisdictions. The law “presents a paradigm of an arbitrary legislative classification not founded on any substantial difference of situation or condition.” View "Moline School Dist. v. Quinn" on Justia Law