Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bishop, 69 years old, was found in his apartment bound and severely beaten. Defendant was arrested. The prosecution sought to depose Bishop under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 414, which allows an evidence deposition if there is a “substantial possibility” that the witness will not be available to testify at trial. Bishop had sustained serious head injuries during the attack; his condition was likely to deteriorate. Defendant objected, arguing that Bishop could only communicate by shaking his head, precluding meaningful cross-examination. The court granted the motion, stating that if Bishop could only shake his head, the deposition would be inadmissible. The order required that the sheriff transport defendant to the deposition. The words “over the objection of the defendant” were handwritten; the entire paragraph was then scribbled over by hand. Bishop’s video deposition took place with two assistant public defenders (APDs) present. Defendant did not attend. Bishop stated that defendant had attacked him and identified a photograph of the hammer recovered from his apartment. On cross-examination, Bishop stated that photographs had been shown to him before the deposition. Bishop remembered that he had previously shared an apartment with defendant. At a status hearing, with defendant present, an APD acknowledged waiving defendant’s appearance at the deposition. The prosecution moved to admit Bishop’s deposition as a hearsay exception (Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)), and presented testimony from Bishop’s physician. The court concluded that Bishop’s condition rendered him unavailable and admitted the deposition, concluding that there had been an opportunity to cross-examine. The jury heard testimony from neighbors about arguing between defendant and Bishop before the attack, testimony that defendant had admitted to the crime, DNA evidence, and Bishop’s deposition. Convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen, defendant was sentenced to 22 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that the admission of Bishop’s deposition violated his Sixth Amendment rights. A divided appellate court agreed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Although the court erred in not obtaining the written waiver, defendant clearly knew that the deposition had been ordered and that he could attend. Defendant was provided with the opportunity for confrontation. View "People v. Hood" on Justia Law

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 may be amended by constitutional convention; the General Assembly; or ballot initiatives, Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, sects. 1, 2, 3. Ballot initiatives may only be used for amendments directed at “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV,” pertaining to Illinois’s legislative branch. The ballot initiative at issue addresses redistricting to redraw the legislative and representative districts following each federal decennial census. In May 2016, SIM filed with the Secretary of State a petition proposing the amendment of article IV, section 3, to replace the current system for redrawing Illinois’s legislative and representative districts. The General Assembly’s role would be eliminated from the process, with primary responsibility for drawing legislative and representative districts falling to a new “Independent Redistricting Commission” selected through a process involving limited legislative input. The State Board of Elections determined that the petition received more than the required number of valid signatures. Days after submission of the petition, a “taxpayer’s suit” was filed (735 ILCS 5/11-303), seeking to enjoin the disbursal of public funds to determine the petition’s compliance with the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/1-1. The circuit court found that the petition did not comply with requirements for inclusion on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, citing “the plain language of article XIV, section 3.” View "Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Blumenthal jointly owned her Chicago home with Brewer, her domestic partner since 1981. In 2010 Blumenthal sought partition of the residence when the relationship ended. Brewer counterclaimed for common-law remedies, including an interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in a medical group so that their overall assets would be equalized. Blumenthal moved to dismiss the counterclaim under the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1979 Hewitt decision, which rejected a woman’s suit to divide assets she accumulated with a man during a long-term relationship in which they lived together, had children together, but never married. Brewer argued that it was “particularly irrational” to apply this principle to her because she and Blumenthal could not marry at the time their relationship ended because same-sex marriage was not recognized in Illinois. The counterclaim was dismissed; the partition action proceeded to final judgment. The appellate court vacated the dismissal, calling Hewitt “outmoded and ill-considered.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The legislature intended marriage to be the only legally protected family relationship under Illinois law. Permitting unmarried partners to enforce mutual property rights might “encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.” Marriage is a legal relationship that all individuals may or may not enter into, Illinois does not act irrationally or discriminatorily in refusing to grant benefits and protections under the Marriage and Dissolution Act to those who do not participate in that institution. View "Blumenthal v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

Public Act 97-1161 amended the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 ) to create an exemption from property taxes on leasehold interests and improvements on real estate owned by the Metropolitan Airport Authority of Rock Island County and used by a fixed base operator (FBO) to provide aeronautical services to the public. When the law was enacted, Elliott was the only FBO leasing land from the Authority. The law was specifically designed to provide a financial incentive for that company to expand its operations at the Authority’s facilities rather than its operations in Des Moines, Iowa, which were not subject to property tax. The School District, which faced losing more than $150,000 per year in tax revenue as a result of the exemption, filed suit, asserting violation of the Illinois Constitution’s “special legislation” clause. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court agreed, finding nothing to justify distinguishing FBOs operating at the Quad City airport from any number of other FBOs at other Illinois airports or from other Illinois businesses that compete with companies in more tax-friendly jurisdictions. The law “presents a paradigm of an arbitrary legislative classification not founded on any substantial difference of situation or condition.” View "Moline School Dist. v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Rizzo was charged with violation of the Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(b), which states “A person who drives a vehicle ... at a speed that is 40 miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit ... commits a Class A misdemeanor,” having allegedly driven his vehicle 100 miles-per-hour in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone, and violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a), improper lane usage, having allegedly “cut in between two semi-trucks at [a] high rate of speed.” Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Corrections Code, 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(p), which precluded a disposition of supervision for those who have violated the speed parameters of section 11-601.5. The circuit court found the prohibition of supervision “unconstitutional as violating the proportionate penalties clause, Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution.” The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that one who challenges the constitutionality of a statutorily mandated “penalty” has the burden of clearly establishing that the challenged provision is in excess of general constitutional limitations and “cannot shift the burden of proof and research to the circuit court." That court “should proceed with the utmost caution before following an attorney’s ill-defined path to a finding of unconstitutionality” and should include an adequate discussion of relevant case law, differentiating the constitutional bases that might bear upon its finding. That was not done here. View "People v. Rizzo" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant, then age 17, was indicted on six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) The counts alleged that he carried in a vehicle, outside the home, a .38-caliber handgun and a 9-millimeter handgun, each of which was “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible,” without a valid FOID card, and while under 21 years of age (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)). He pleaded guilty to one count. Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation, which was ultimately terminated unsatisfactorily. In 2005, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years in prison. In 2008, defendant was charged in separate cases with multiple counts of armed robbery, AUUW, and unauthorized use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), “having been previously convicted of the felony offense of [AUUW].” Defendant had robbed three different victims at gunpoint within a 24-hour period. Defendant agreed, and acknowledged that he understood that he was agreeing, that he had a prior AUUW conviction. Convicted, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 29 years for each robbery, with a concurrent sentence of 10 years for the UUW convictions. The appellate court vacated one UUW conviction, citing one-act, one-crime principles, and vacated the remaining UUW, because the AUUW conviction arose from a statute that was held to be facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Under the UUW by a felon statute, defendant’s felon status at the time of the offense properly served as sufficient proof of the predicate felony conviction. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

Hernandez,was convicted of armed robbery, a Class X felony under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, and was sentenced to an extended term of 40 years’ imprisonment. Following an evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, during which he argued that the 40-year term imposed for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the circuit court granted a new sentencing hearing, finding the statute “facially unconstitutional” because it carried a harsher penalty than the penalty for “armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 5/33A-1. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the 40-year term of imprisonment. The definition of dangerous weapon for purposes of the armed robbery statute includes not only objects that are per se dangerous, but objects that are used or may be used in a dangerous manner. The common-law definition of “dangerous weapon” found in the armed robbery statute is broader than the definition of “dangerous weapon” in the armed violence statute. The elements of armed robbery, which require proof that defendant was “armed with a dangerous weapon” are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require proof that defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a Category III weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 33A-2. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After the 2004 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Unions and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) expired, the retiree health care benefits were the subject of an interest arbitration award. That award, which modified the retiree health care benefits, was accepted by the CTA and the Unions. Current and retired employees who had begun work with the CTA before 2001 challenged that award in a putative class action, asserting breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and that the arbitration award was unenforceable under article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution, the “pension protection clause.” The circuit court ruled that the retired CTA employees had standing to challenge the modifications to their retiree health care benefits, but current CTA employees lacked standing, then dismissed for failure to state a claim. The appellate court agreed that current employees lacked standing but held that the retirees had a vested right to receive the health care benefits that were provided in the prior CBA and had stated claims for breach of that contract and for promissory estoppel. The Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who retired before the effective date of the 2007 CBA had standing; other retirees and current employees lacked standing. Dismissal of the claim for promissory estoppel against the CTA was proper; the complaint stated claims for breach of contract and under the pension protection clause. View "Matthews v. Chicago Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Burns, lives in unit 10 on the third floor of a 12-unit three-story Urbana apartment building that is secured by locked entrances. The common areas are not accessible to the public. In November 2012, the police department’s Crimestoppers hotline received an anonymous tip that Burns was selling marijuana and ecstasy. Investigating, detective Mecum discovered that in October 2008, Burns was issued a notice to appear for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia; she had been arrested in 2003, for possession of marijuana. Mecum also observed “images for the legalization of marijuana,” “a picture containing actual marijuana,” and “a picture containing large amounts of U.S. currency” on defendant’s social media page. Mecum went to the building in plain clothes to “confirm her address.” After several visits, an unidentified tenant let him in. Walking through the building, Mecum observed a package addressed to Burns. At approximately 3:20 a.m., Officer Cervantes entered the building, without a warrant, with his drug-detection dog, and went to the third floor. The dog alerted to narcotics at Burns’s apartment door. Mecum obtained a search warrant. The ensuing search of Burns’s apartment resulted in the discovery of marijuana. Burns, charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver between 500 and 2,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(e),, successfully moved to suppress the evidence, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Jardines (2013). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the search warrant was issued on the basis of an unconstitutional warrantless dog sniff. View "People v. Burns" on Justia Law