Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rizzo was charged with violation of the Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(b), which states “A person who drives a vehicle ... at a speed that is 40 miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit ... commits a Class A misdemeanor,” having allegedly driven his vehicle 100 miles-per-hour in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone, and violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a), improper lane usage, having allegedly “cut in between two semi-trucks at [a] high rate of speed.” Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Corrections Code, 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(p), which precluded a disposition of supervision for those who have violated the speed parameters of section 11-601.5. The circuit court found the prohibition of supervision “unconstitutional as violating the proportionate penalties clause, Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution.” The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that one who challenges the constitutionality of a statutorily mandated “penalty” has the burden of clearly establishing that the challenged provision is in excess of general constitutional limitations and “cannot shift the burden of proof and research to the circuit court." That court “should proceed with the utmost caution before following an attorney’s ill-defined path to a finding of unconstitutionality” and should include an adequate discussion of relevant case law, differentiating the constitutional bases that might bear upon its finding. That was not done here. View "People v. Rizzo" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant, then age 17, was indicted on six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) The counts alleged that he carried in a vehicle, outside the home, a .38-caliber handgun and a 9-millimeter handgun, each of which was “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible,” without a valid FOID card, and while under 21 years of age (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)). He pleaded guilty to one count. Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation, which was ultimately terminated unsatisfactorily. In 2005, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years in prison. In 2008, defendant was charged in separate cases with multiple counts of armed robbery, AUUW, and unauthorized use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), “having been previously convicted of the felony offense of [AUUW].” Defendant had robbed three different victims at gunpoint within a 24-hour period. Defendant agreed, and acknowledged that he understood that he was agreeing, that he had a prior AUUW conviction. Convicted, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 29 years for each robbery, with a concurrent sentence of 10 years for the UUW convictions. The appellate court vacated one UUW conviction, citing one-act, one-crime principles, and vacated the remaining UUW, because the AUUW conviction arose from a statute that was held to be facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Under the UUW by a felon statute, defendant’s felon status at the time of the offense properly served as sufficient proof of the predicate felony conviction. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

Hernandez,was convicted of armed robbery, a Class X felony under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, and was sentenced to an extended term of 40 years’ imprisonment. Following an evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, during which he argued that the 40-year term imposed for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the circuit court granted a new sentencing hearing, finding the statute “facially unconstitutional” because it carried a harsher penalty than the penalty for “armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 5/33A-1. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the 40-year term of imprisonment. The definition of dangerous weapon for purposes of the armed robbery statute includes not only objects that are per se dangerous, but objects that are used or may be used in a dangerous manner. The common-law definition of “dangerous weapon” found in the armed robbery statute is broader than the definition of “dangerous weapon” in the armed violence statute. The elements of armed robbery, which require proof that defendant was “armed with a dangerous weapon” are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require proof that defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a Category III weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 33A-2. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After the 2004 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Unions and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) expired, the retiree health care benefits were the subject of an interest arbitration award. That award, which modified the retiree health care benefits, was accepted by the CTA and the Unions. Current and retired employees who had begun work with the CTA before 2001 challenged that award in a putative class action, asserting breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and that the arbitration award was unenforceable under article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution, the “pension protection clause.” The circuit court ruled that the retired CTA employees had standing to challenge the modifications to their retiree health care benefits, but current CTA employees lacked standing, then dismissed for failure to state a claim. The appellate court agreed that current employees lacked standing but held that the retirees had a vested right to receive the health care benefits that were provided in the prior CBA and had stated claims for breach of that contract and for promissory estoppel. The Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who retired before the effective date of the 2007 CBA had standing; other retirees and current employees lacked standing. Dismissal of the claim for promissory estoppel against the CTA was proper; the complaint stated claims for breach of contract and under the pension protection clause. View "Matthews v. Chicago Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Burns, lives in unit 10 on the third floor of a 12-unit three-story Urbana apartment building that is secured by locked entrances. The common areas are not accessible to the public. In November 2012, the police department’s Crimestoppers hotline received an anonymous tip that Burns was selling marijuana and ecstasy. Investigating, detective Mecum discovered that in October 2008, Burns was issued a notice to appear for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia; she had been arrested in 2003, for possession of marijuana. Mecum also observed “images for the legalization of marijuana,” “a picture containing actual marijuana,” and “a picture containing large amounts of U.S. currency” on defendant’s social media page. Mecum went to the building in plain clothes to “confirm her address.” After several visits, an unidentified tenant let him in. Walking through the building, Mecum observed a package addressed to Burns. At approximately 3:20 a.m., Officer Cervantes entered the building, without a warrant, with his drug-detection dog, and went to the third floor. The dog alerted to narcotics at Burns’s apartment door. Mecum obtained a search warrant. The ensuing search of Burns’s apartment resulted in the discovery of marijuana. Burns, charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver between 500 and 2,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(e),, successfully moved to suppress the evidence, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Jardines (2013). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the search warrant was issued on the basis of an unconstitutional warrantless dog sniff. View "People v. Burns" on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiff, a Carbondale police officer, struck the top of his head on the door of his squad car, causing him to “see stars” and experience a sharp pain in his arm, with no abrasions or blood loss. Plaintiff never returned to work. In 2007, plaintiff sought a line-of-duty disability pension (40 ILCS 5/3-114.1). The Board found that plaintiff’s disability was not the result of an on-duty injury and that plaintiff was not unable to return to work. The trial court reversed. The appellate court affirmed. In 2012, the city began providing plaintiff and his family with health insurance coverage. After a 2012 examination, the physician concluded that plaintiff was able to return to work. The Board terminated plaintiff’s disability pension. Plaintiff responded that he had not received notice of the meeting where the Board had voted to terminate his benefits. The circuit court affirmed, without addressing plaintiff’s due process claim. The city notified plaintiff that his insurance coverage would be terminated. The circuit court denied plaintiff a permanent injunction with respect to the insurance. The appellate court reversed that denial and the pension termination, finding that the Board had violated plaintiff’s due process rights by voting without notice or a proper hearing, but did not address whether the determination that plaintiff was no longer disabled was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial of an injunction with respect to insurance coverage. Plaintiff’s injury did not result from one of the conditions in the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/10), such as responding to an emergency; he did not demonstrate a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection and was not entitled to a permanent injunction View "Vaughn v. City of Carbondale" on Justia Law

At approximately 1:15 a.m. on Saturday, December 17, 2011, defendant was driving from Iowa to Illinois on U.S. Highway 136, a four-lane road. Just across the border, Illinois State Police had erected a safety roadblock, marked by an orange sign with black lettering. Defendant saw the roadblock and made a U-turn at a railroad crossing approximately 50 feet from the roadblock. Hancock County Deputy Duffy stopped defendant as he proceeded westbound. Illinois State Police Officer Miller, at the roadblock, saw Duffy pull over defendant’s vehicle and went to assist. Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and was cited for driving “to the left of center of roadway.” Officers conducted an inventory search incident to arrest and recovered a metal pipe and less than one gram of marijuana. Defendant’s passenger was arrested based on an active warrant.The circuit court denied a motion to suppress, finding that defendant’s U-turn provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the stop. The court found defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ conditional discharge and 90 days in the county jail. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the location, day and time of the roadblock. View "People v. Timmsen" on Justia Law

Illinois has four public pension plans for Chicago city employees; all subject to the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution: “Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” The funds provide traditional defined benefit plans. As with state-funded pensions, for employees hired before 2011, annuity payments were subject to 3% automatic annual increases beginning after the member’s first full year of retirement, and compounded annually. For later-hires, the annuity adjustments were tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Before Public Act 98-641, employees contributed 8.5% of their salary toward their pension. The city contributed based on a fixed multiplier, paid largely from property tax proceeds.The pensions were inadequate to cover benefits. The funds are on “a path of insolvency.” Public Act 98-641, effective in 2014, was based on a finding that financial crisis could not be addressed by increased funding alone. Under the Act, the city’s contribution progressively increases beginning in 2021; employee contributions are also increased. For two city funds, the Act: reduces the annual benefit increase to the lesser of three percent or half the annual unadjusted percentage increase in the CPI; removes the compounding component; eliminates increases in specific years, and postpones the initial increase. The Illinois Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional. Nothing in the legislative process that led to its enactment constituted a waiver of members’ rights under the pension protection clause.Whether members may be “better off” under the Act is not for the General Assembly to decide unilaterally. View "Jones v. Mun. Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

In 1997, Pipes was found dead, with stab wounds to her neck and head; semen was discovered with vaginal swabs. There was no evidence of rape. Above the bathtub in which she was found, there was a palm print left in Pipes’s blood. In 2004, the state obtained a grand jury subpoena for the Illinois Department of Corrections to take palm and fingerprints of Boston, then incarcerated on a life sentence, who was Pipes' ex-boyfriend. After prints were taken, a warrant issued for defendant’s DNA. A test showed that the DNA profile extracted from the semen was consistent with having originated from Boston. In 2005, the state obtained an indictment. Boston unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena and suppress the palm print evidence, arguing that the state improperly used the grand jury to obtain the subpoena and to supplement a police investigation in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and violated grand jury procedures by failing to return the fingerprint card to the grand jury. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis to conclude that this was a “rogue police investigation.” The information provided to the grand jury was sufficiently tied to Boston to hold that there was individualized suspicion to warrant the subpoena. View "People v. Boston" on Justia Law

Ligon, convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm (AVH/DW), a Class X felony, under 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3), (b), was adjudged to be an habitual criminal and sentenced to a term of mandatory life imprisonment under 720 ILCS 5/33B-1(a), (e). He filed a petition for relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401), contending that the sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition sua sponte. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state leave to appeal and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, rejecting the proportional it claim because AVH/DW and armed violence while armed with a category III weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-1(c)(3)). Ligon was properly convicted of AVH/DW while using a BB gun as a common-law dangerous weapon of the third type. It is irrelevant that the indictment used the term “bludgeon” instead of BB gun; the two are interchangeable under the statute. View "People v. Ligon" on Justia Law