Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Illinois has four public pension plans for Chicago city employees; all subject to the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution: “Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” The funds provide traditional defined benefit plans. As with state-funded pensions, for employees hired before 2011, annuity payments were subject to 3% automatic annual increases beginning after the member’s first full year of retirement, and compounded annually. For later-hires, the annuity adjustments were tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Before Public Act 98-641, employees contributed 8.5% of their salary toward their pension. The city contributed based on a fixed multiplier, paid largely from property tax proceeds.The pensions were inadequate to cover benefits. The funds are on “a path of insolvency.” Public Act 98-641, effective in 2014, was based on a finding that financial crisis could not be addressed by increased funding alone. Under the Act, the city’s contribution progressively increases beginning in 2021; employee contributions are also increased. For two city funds, the Act: reduces the annual benefit increase to the lesser of three percent or half the annual unadjusted percentage increase in the CPI; removes the compounding component; eliminates increases in specific years, and postpones the initial increase. The Illinois Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional. Nothing in the legislative process that led to its enactment constituted a waiver of members’ rights under the pension protection clause.Whether members may be “better off” under the Act is not for the General Assembly to decide unilaterally. View "Jones v. Mun. Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

In 1997, Pipes was found dead, with stab wounds to her neck and head; semen was discovered with vaginal swabs. There was no evidence of rape. Above the bathtub in which she was found, there was a palm print left in Pipes’s blood. In 2004, the state obtained a grand jury subpoena for the Illinois Department of Corrections to take palm and fingerprints of Boston, then incarcerated on a life sentence, who was Pipes' ex-boyfriend. After prints were taken, a warrant issued for defendant’s DNA. A test showed that the DNA profile extracted from the semen was consistent with having originated from Boston. In 2005, the state obtained an indictment. Boston unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena and suppress the palm print evidence, arguing that the state improperly used the grand jury to obtain the subpoena and to supplement a police investigation in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and violated grand jury procedures by failing to return the fingerprint card to the grand jury. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis to conclude that this was a “rogue police investigation.” The information provided to the grand jury was sufficiently tied to Boston to hold that there was individualized suspicion to warrant the subpoena. View "People v. Boston" on Justia Law

Ligon, convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm (AVH/DW), a Class X felony, under 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3), (b), was adjudged to be an habitual criminal and sentenced to a term of mandatory life imprisonment under 720 ILCS 5/33B-1(a), (e). He filed a petition for relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401), contending that the sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition sua sponte. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state leave to appeal and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, rejecting the proportional it claim because AVH/DW and armed violence while armed with a category III weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-1(c)(3)). Ligon was properly convicted of AVH/DW while using a BB gun as a common-law dangerous weapon of the third type. It is irrelevant that the indictment used the term “bludgeon” instead of BB gun; the two are interchangeable under the statute. View "People v. Ligon" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a van registered to a woman named Chattic in the city of Sterling. Sterling police officer Bland pulled the van over because there was a warrant out for Chattic’s arrest. Bland was unable to see the driver of the van until after he had pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching, Bland saw defendant was a man and could not have been Chattic. Bland asked defendant for a driver’s license and proof of insurance before explaining the reason for the stop. Defendant responded that he did not have a driver’s license and Bland cited him for driving while his license was suspended. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed suppression of the evidence, finding that Bland’s license request impermissibly prolonged the seizure of defendant and the van. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Rodriguez makes clear that a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective of whether that request directly relates to the purpose for the stop. As a result, Officer Bland’s request for defendant’s license did not violate the fourth amendment by prolonging the stop. View "People v. Cummings" on Justia Law

A search warrant was served at a home belonging to Chambers’ mother. He was found inside, along with a large quantity of cocaine, cash, weapons, and ammunition. The Cook County circuit court denied his repeated requests for a Franks hearing. He was convicted of armed violence and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 and 45 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court held that the trial court should have conducted a Franks hearing and remanded for determination of whether the search warrant was properly issued, stating that the informant’s appearance and testimony before an issuing judge is “but one factor to consider in determining whether to grant a Franks hearing, but it does not categorically preclude the court from holding a Franks hearing.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Chambers made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly included in the warrant affidavit; it is irrelevant that the officer’s suspicions about the presence of guns and drugs at the address turned out to be well-founded. View "People v. Chambers" on Justia Law

Sanders was convicted of the 1992 first-degree murder and aggravated kidnapping of Cooks. Sanders was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 and 15 years. Bingham, May, and Barfield were convicted in separate trials. In 2010, Sanders filed a second successive postconviction petition, alleging actual innocence. Despite the absence of any motion for leave to file the successive petition, the circuit court allowed it and advanced it to the second stage of proceedings. The court then dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding purported new evidence and a recantation “not so conclusive in character as would probably change the result on retrial.” View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the deaths of Coleman, a 68-year-old man shot multiple times at his Chicago home in a botched robbery in 2005, and Stanley, defendant’s alleged coconspirator, gunned down in an alley the next day. Defendant’s statements in taped police interrogation were admitted as evidence against him at trial, after he sought suppression of those statements, arguing they were involuntary due to police questioning him off-camera and without Miranda rights, and due to physical coercion from handcuffs kept on him an excessively long time. The appellate court concluded the confession should have been suppressed, due to doubts it was voluntary, based on defendant’s age (then 19), educational level, sleep and food deprivation, prior substance abuse, deceptive conduct by police, length of interrogation, coercive atmosphere, lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and use of marijuana while in custody. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded. While defendant adequately preserved the broad issue of voluntariness of his confession, his arguments on appeal were almost entirely distinct from his arguments before the trial court. The drastic shift in factual theories deprived the state of the opportunity to present evidence. A court of review could not be confident in the adequacy of this record to address those arguments. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant was convicted under the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)) and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. That statute was found to be unconstitutional in 2013 (Aguilar case). The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that, in Aguilar, the Illinois Supreme Court limited its finding of unconstitutionality to the “Class 4 form” of the offense and that the “Class 2 form,” applicable to felons, like defendant, was constitutional and enforceable. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A “Class 2 form” of AUUW does not exist. There is only one offense of AUUW based on section 24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(A) and a prior felony conviction is not an element of that offense. A prior felony conviction is a sentencing factor which elevates the offense from a Class 4 felony to a Class 2 felony. On its face, the provision constitutes a flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home and amounts to a wholesale ban on the exercise of a personal right that is specifically guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court. Because the prohibition is not limited to a particular subset of persons, such as felons, the statute, as written, is unconstitutional on its face. View "People v. Burns" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2013, the State filed an information charging defendant Sandro Espinoza with domestic battery. The information stated that, “said defendant, knowingly, without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a minor, a family or household member, in that said defendant struck the minor about the face, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-3.2(a)(2), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, 2012.” At Espinoza’s bond hearing, the State indicated that the victim was defendant’s son, who sustained a bloody nose. The trial court granted the State’s request for a no contact order, admonishing defendant that, as a condition of his bond, he was to have no contact with the minor, D.E. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, defense counsel indicted that Espinoza wanted to plead guilty and accept the State’s plea offer. However, defense counsel also noted his concern that there were no identifiers in the complaint, and orally moved to amend the charging instrument. The trial court declined to consider the oral motion, and directed defense counsel to file a written motion. The trial court also declined to accept Espinoza’s guilty plea to a complaint that was defective on its face. At issue in this case was whether the charging instrument, which identified the victim simply as “a minor,” was sufficient pursuant to section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. In two separate criminal cases, the trial courts dismissed criminal complaints based upon the insufficiency of the charging instruments, where those charging instruments identified the victims only as “a minor.” The cases were consolidated on appeal. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. Finding no reason to disturb the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Illinois v. Espinoza" on Justia Law

In 1994, defendant Dennis Thompson fatally shot his father, Dennis Thompson, Sr., and a woman who was inside his father’s house, Don Renee Rouse. Defendant, 19 years old at the time, was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant confessed to the shootings and directed the police to the murder weapon. Defendant maintained that his actions were the result of a long history of physical and mental abuse committed by his father and, thus, constituted only second-degree murder. Defendant presented the testimony of several family members who uniformly described defendant’s father as a violent and abusive person, especially when his father consumed alcohol. Following closing arguments, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a criminal defendant could raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence for the first time on appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of a petition seeking relief from a final judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Answering that question in the negative, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s section 2-1401 petition. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Illinois v. Thompson" on Justia Law