Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In October 2012, defendant James Schweihs was charged in a five-count indictment with two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), one count of violating the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act), and two counts of domestic battery for striking Patricia Schweihs. Relevant to this appeal, count I of the indictment alleged that defendant committed the offense of AUUW by violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) in that defendant knowingly carried or concealed in a motor vehicle a .45-caliber handgun, at a time when he was not on his own land, and at the time he carried it he had not been issued a currently valid FOID card. Count II of the indictment alleged that defendant committed the offense of AUUW by violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) because he knowingly carried or concealed a handgun in a motor vehicle and the handgun was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible to him at the time. Defendant moved to dismiss the AUUW charges, arguing that the statute violated the second amendment of the United States Constitution. After review of this case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, reversed the circuit court's order which held to the contrary, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Illinois v. Schweihs" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, defendant, Kelvin Carter, was found guilty of the 2002 murder of Edmond Allen. Identification evidence was supplied by four occurrence witnesses. The circuit court ultimately imposed a 20-year prison sentence in addition to a 25-year enhancement, which was statutorily mandated because of the court’s determination that defendant had personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the crime. The court had initially sentenced defendant to a 30-year term of imprisonment, but immediately amended its determination, imposing the 20-year minimum instead after realizing that defendant was subject to the enhancement. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence in 2006. On May 9, 2012, defendant mailed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment” in which he argued that the 25-year firearm enhancement to his sentence was void because the trial court only found him guilty of murder. Defendant also argued that the trial court was bound by its initial statement of 30 years’ imprisonment regardless of the statutorily required enhancement. Defendant attached a “Proof/Certificate of Service” to his pleading, alleging that he placed it in the “institutional mail” at the Menard Correctional Center. He listed as addressees, the “Clerk of Court” and “State’s Atty. Office.” Defendant’s pleading was stamped “received” by the circuit clerk on May 15. It was docketed on May 29, to be called on June 5. The docket and transcript for that date showed that the case was scheduled for “court review” on July 10. On that day, the court dismissed the petition on the merits. The cover page of the transcript of proceedings reflected that defendant’s “2-1401 petition is dismissed,” but the transcript did not show that the assistant State’s Attorney took any action. In a written order entered July 10, the circuit court recited the law applicable to section 2-1401 proceedings. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition on the merits was premature, given that the petition was not properly served on the State. Then, without speaking to the merits of defendant’s petition or the substance of the circuit court’s ruling, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in prematurely dismissing petitioner’s petition. The Supreme Court reviewed the sua sponte dismissal, found that the trial court did not err in its dismissal, and reversed the appellate court. View "Illinois v. Carter" on Justia Law

The issue before the Illinois Supreme Court in this case was a circuit court’s order declaring certain sections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute as unconstitutional. The circuit court found that sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(2), (a)(3)(C) of the AUUW statute, which were based on defendant’s lack of a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID card), violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The court determined that the offense of AUUW based on the lack of a FOID card was identical to a violation of the FOID Card Act, and since the penalties for violating the two statutes were different, the court declared the AUUW statute unconstitutional and dismissed the charges against defendant. The Supreme Court concluded that the offense of AUUW based on the lack of a FOID card and a violation of the FOID Card Act do not have identical elements and thus, there can be no proportionate penalty violation. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded for reinstatement of the charges against defendant. View "Illinois v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the “void sentence rule,” should be abandoned. Defendant Steven Castleberry was convicted on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on separate acts of oral and vaginal contact with the victim. At sentencing, the State argued that defendant was subject to a mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement on each of the two counts because the crimes had been committed by defendant while he was armed with a firearm. When added to the mandatory minimum term of 6 years’ imprisonment for each offense, this meant, according to the State, that defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum term of 21 years’ imprisonment on each count. The circuit court disagreed with the State regarding the application of the 15-year enhancement, concluding that the legislature had intended the enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances presented. The circuit court sentenced defendant to a 9-year term of imprisonment on each count, adding the 15-year enhancement to only one of the counts. The two sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total term of 33 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant did not challenge the appellate court’s affirmance of his convictions. Instead, defendant argued that the appellate court erred when it held that the sentence imposed without the statutory enhancement was void. Defendant contended that the rule relied upon by the appellate court (that a sentence which does not conform to statutory requirements was void) was no longer valid in light of recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions and, thus, could not provide a basis for the appellate court to reverse the circuit court’s sentencing order. After review, the Court concluded that its recent decisions indeed undermined the rationale behind the rule to the point that the rule could no longer be considered valid. The Court therefore abolished the rule. View "Illinois v. Castleberry" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Jorge Guzman argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in “Illinois v. Delvillar,” (235 Ill. 2d 507 (2009)), should have been overturned based on the United States Supreme Court’s later decision in “Padilla v. Kentucky,” (559 U.S. 356 (2010)). In “Delvillar,” the Illinois Court examined the impact of the failure to give a statutory admonishment on the potential immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea. The Court concluded that the failure to admonish did not affect the voluntariness of the plea, and defendants wishing to withdraw their pleas on that basis were required to demonstrate prejudice or a denial of justice. After review of defendant Guzman’s arguments that the trial court erred in denying him the ability to withdraw his guilty plea, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial. View "Illinois v. Guzman" on Justia Law

M.A., then 13 years old, fought with her 14-year-old brother and cut him with a kitchen knife. M.A. was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses and ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, 730 ILCS 154/1. M.A. argued that the registration provisions violated her rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection. The Appellate Court rejected the substantive due process claim, but found the registration provisions unconstitutional for violating procedural due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the registration requirement. Current dangerousness is not relevant to the duty to register, so M.A. did not have a due process right to a hearing to address that issue. The Act requires registration solely based upon the fact of conviction or adjudication, which M.A. had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest during her juvenile adjudication proceedings. M.A. did not challenge her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent on appeal. Given that the charges for which M.A. is required to register would be felonies if M.A. committed those acts as an adult, and that those charges require a finding that the offender caused “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement,” there is a rational relationship between M.A.’s registration and protection of the public. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

Stapinski, indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ketamine) with intent to deliver, 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(10.5), moved to dismiss, arguing that the indictment violated his due process rights and an executed cooperation agreement he had entered into with police. The state did not dispute the existence of the cooperation agreement, but argued that Stapinski did not fulfill his obligations. The Will County trial court dismissed the indictment. The appellate court reversed s. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Police entered into a cooperation agreement with Stapinski, promising not to charge him with possession of ketamine if he assisted in the apprehension of others; he fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. His due process rights were violated when, over a year after he was detained by police, he was charged with possession of ketamine. Whether the cooperation agreement was “valid” in the sense that it was approved by the State’s Attorney, is not important. An unauthorized promise may be enforced on due process grounds if a defendant’s reliance on the promise has constitutional consequences. Stapinski relied upon the agreement he made with police and incriminated himself in the process of fulfilling his obligations under the agreement. View "People v. Stapinski" on Justia Law

McElwain, was involved in a traffic accident.. The driver and passenger of the motorcycle that hit McElwain's vehicle had substantial injuries; the passenger died. On the date of the accident, plaintiff was neither issued any tickets nor asked to take any chemical tests. During their investigation, police discovered rolling papers and a bag containing a residue that appeared to be cannabis in McElwain’s vehicle, but officers at the scene did not think he appeared to be under the influence of cannabis. Two days later, McElwain was questioned and admitted that he had smoked marijuana two weeks before the accident. The police issued a ticket for failing to yield when turning left and requested that he take a chemical test. The police read him statutory warnings (625 ILCS 5/11-501.6(c). McElwain refused. The Secretary of State suspended his driver’s license for three years. An ALJ upheld the suspension, rejecting an argument that the officers violated due process by waiting too long. The circuit court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. While the state can condition receipt of a driver’s license on a driver’s agreement to consent to a chemical test if he is involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, the essential nexus between the state’s interest in protecting the public from intoxicated drivers and requiring consent to a chemical test following an arrest related to a serious accident no longer exists when the test is requested two days after the accident. View "McElwain v. Ill. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes a $50 filing fee in residential mortgage foreclosure cases, two percent of which is retained by the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure complaint is filed,735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 . The circuit court of Will County found section 15-1504.1 violated the judicial fee officer prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that fee officer prohibition, were aimed at officers who had a direct role in the adjudicative process of the court system, and were compensated for their services through the payment of fees taxed to the litigants. Although clerks of the circuit courts are officers of the judicial branch of government, they are nonjudicial officers. View "Walker v. McGuire" on Justia Law

The Freeport Journal published an online article concerning Hadley’s decision to again seek election to the Stephenson County Board. Online readers could post comments after completing a basic registration. “Fuboy” posted: “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has [an elementary school] from his front door” and “Anybody know the tale of Hadley’s suicide attempt? ….” Hadley filed a defamation lawsuit against the Journal and its parent company. The company provided Hadley the IP address acquired from Fuboy’s internet service provider, Comcast. The federal court dismissed the suit against as barred by federal statute. Hadley returned to state court with a defamation action against Subscriber Doe a/k/a “Fuboy” and issued a subpoena to Comcast. The circuit court directed Comcast to comply and to notify the subscriber. An attorney moved to quash. The court stated that the better procedure to discover Fuboy’s identity would be Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224, under which Hadley would have the burden of setting forth allegations that would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure 2-615, even if such a motion was not filed. The court allowed Hadley to add a count, directed at Comcast, seeking relief under Rule 224. The court concluded that count I could withstand a motion to dismiss, so Hadley was entitled to Rule 224 relief. The court found that the comment imputed the commission of a crime to Hadley; was not capable of innocent construction; and could not be considered an opinion. The court directed Comcast to provide identification. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hadley’s complaint states facts to establish a defamation cause of action sufficient to withstand a section 2-615 motion, so the court properly concluded that necessity was established under Rule 224. View "Hadley v. Subscriber Doe" on Justia Law