Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a $10 Rental Housing Support Program surcharge collected by the recorder of deeds for the recordation of any real estate-related document in a county, 55 ILCS 5/3-5018. Originally $1 was retained by the county in which it was collected. During the litigation, the section was amended to impose a $9 surcharge to fund the Rental Housing Support Program and a separate $1 recordation fee to be paid to the county. The trial court held both versions of the statute to be unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The General Assembly has no evidentiary burden and is not required to produce facts to justify the statute. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the section violated the uniformity clause. The court found a rational basis for the fee: By helping provide affordable housing to low-income families throughout the state, the statute provides needed housing security and financial stability to vulnerable residents and a more stable income stream to landlords. It decreases the number of vacant and abandoned buildings and increases the opportunities for building owners to maintain their property. View "Marks v. Vanderventer" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted in 2013 for criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse, based on acts he allegedly committed in 2012, when he was 17 years old. At the time of the alleged offenses, the Juvenile Court Act only applied to those minors under 17 years of age, with limited exceptions. Effective January 1, 2014, the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to apply to minors who were under 18 years of age, 705 ILCS 405/5-120, with a saving clause: “[t]he changes …apply to violations or attempted violations committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act.” Defendant filed, in 2014, a “Motion to Declare Adult Prosecution Unconstitutional,” alleging that the saving clause violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. Defendant argued that he was similarly situated to 17-year-olds who allegedly committed offenses on or after the amendment’s effective date and there was no rational basis to treat him differently. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, finding no rational basis for the different treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; it was reasonable for the legislature to distinguish between the two groups since applying the amendment to offenses committed before the effective date would require those cases to be transferred to the juvenile division and to begin anew. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Gaytan was a passenger in a car that had a rear-mounted, ball-type trailer hitch. Police officers stopped the car, believing that the trailer hitch obstructed the vehicle’s license plate in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b)). When the driver of rolled down her window, the officers detected an odor of cannabis. A subsequent search of the car revealed a diaper bag containing cannabis, which the driver indicated belonged to Gaytan, who nodded in agreement that it was his. The officers then arrested Gaytan for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d). The circuit court of McLean County denied a motion to suppress evidence in which Gaytan argued that the trailer hitch was not prohibited and, therefore, the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion that an offense was being committed when they stopped the car. The appellate court reversed Gaytan’s conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the convictions. Although precedent indicated that section 3-413(b) prohibits only those materials which are attached to a license plate the statute is ambiguous. Under the circumstances of this case, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to have believed that the trailer hitch violated the statute. View "People v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

Illinois has five state-funded retirement systems for public employees: the General Assembly Retirement System (GRS); the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois (SERS); the State Universities Retirement System (SURS); the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois (TRS); and the Judges Retirement System of Illinois (JRS). All provide traditional defined benefit plans and are subject to the pension protection clause of the state constitution. Public Act 98-599 (eff. June 1, 2014), amended the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-101), reducing retirement annuity benefits for individuals who first became members of four of the systems before January 1, 2011. Members of those systems brought separate actions challenging the amendment under the Illinois Constitution’s pension protection clause. The actions were consolidated. The circuit court of Sangamon County found plaintiffs’ challenge meritorious, declared Public Act 98-599 unconstitutional in its entirety, and permanently enjoined its enforcement, rejecting a contention that the Act could be upheld, notwithstanding its violation of the pension protection clause, based on the state’s reserved sovereign powers. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that although the financial challenges facing Illinois government are well known, “Obliging the government to control itself is what we are called upon to do today.” View "In re Pension Reform Litig." on Justia Law

Barner was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1)) and sentenced to natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v. Williams (2010). The appellate court again affirmed. That decision was vacated by a new supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider in light of People v. Leach (2012). The appellate court again affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Barner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated when three state witnesses were allowed to testify concerning the DNA laboratory work and conclusions of nontestifying scientists. None of the documents at issue took the form of an affidavit, attestation, certification, sworn statement, or formal declaration; they lacked the “formality and solemnity” necessary for a statement to be testimonial. The court noted that Barner presented no evidence and did not impeach the state’s witnesses in any significant way, so that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The main focus at trial did not concern the identification of the attacker, but was the victim’s credibility and her account of the assault. View "People v. Barner" on Justia Law

LVNV collection agency bought Trice’s unpaid debt and filed suit. Trice later sought to vacate a judgment against him on the ground that LVNV was not an Illinois registered agency. The circuit court of Cook County declared sections of the Collection Agency Act (225 ILCS 425/4.5, 14, 14b) unconstitutional. The appellate court remanded after holding that “a complaint filed by an unregistered collection agency is … a nullity, and any judgment entered on such a complaint is void/” The circuit court then found the penalty provisions unconstitutional on grounds of due process, equal protection and vagueness, but held that though LVNV was unlicensed when it filed suit, the resulting judgment should have been “voidable rather than void.” The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s findings, rejected the analysis of the appellate court, and remanded. The circuit court’s initial denial of Trice’s petition was correct, LVNV has been granted relief on a nonconstitutional ground. Failure to comply with a statutory requirement or prerequisite does not negate the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction or constitute a nonwaivable condition precedent to that jurisdiction, so there was no need for the circuit court to address the Act’s constitutionality. View "LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers received a call about a person with a gun in a park. Arriving, officers approached defendant, 19 years old. He walked away. The officers demanded that defendant stop, but he ran. Officers pursued defendant, noticing his hand was on his right waist. An officer witnessed defendant reach inside his waistband and pull out a revolver, which he dropped to the ground. Officers recovered the weapon and found that it was loaded. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violating the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6) The court held that, due to its findings of statutory unconstitutionality, facially and as applied, all six AUUW convictions would be vacated and a conviction of unlawful use of a weapon under 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) would be entered, and imposed a Class A misdemeanor sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) “the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense,” but reversed as to sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(C), “the person possessing the firearm has not been issued a currently valid … [FOID Card] … the person possessing the weapon was under 21 years of age, which it found to be constitutional and severable. Section 24-1.6(d)(2) (sentencing) was invalid, as relying upon the unconstitutional (a)(3)(A) subsection. View "People v. Mosley" on Justia Law

The state charged a 16-year-old (Jordan) with three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), alleging that he carried in a vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); carried a handgun in a vehicle while under 21 years of age (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I)); and carried a firearm in a vehicle without a valid FOID card (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). The UPF count alleged that Jordan, under 18 years of age, knowingly possessed a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person (24-3.1(a)(1). Jordan moved to dismiss, contending that the AUUW statute had been found unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in 2012, as violating the second amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. The circuit court dismissed the AUUW counts, but denied the motion as to the UPF count. The state conceded that one count had been properly dismissed but argued that the remaining counts remained constitutionally valid because they required proof of independent aggravating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the first count based on section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which it found to be facially unconstitutional in 2013; reversed dismissal of charges based on sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), which are severable from the unconstitutional provision. View "In re: Jordan G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a fraternal organization and tax exempt not-for-profit corporation, owns and operates, a Macon nursing home that s licensed by the Illinois Department of Public Health, with a permit to enter into life care contracts under 210 ILCS 40/1. In 2002, the Department of Public Aid directed plaintiff to pay the “Nursing Home License Fee” of $1.50 for each licensed nursing bed day for each calendar quarter, 305 ILCS 5/5E-10. The Department then claimed that plaintiff was delinquent since 1993 and owed $244,233 in back fees plus $237,890 in penalties. Plaintiff paid under protest and sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the fee was unconstitutional as applied to it because the fee’s purpose is to fund Medicaid-related expenditures that are neither precipitated by nor paid to plaintiff. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment under the uniformity clause The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The taxing classification “every nursing home,” bears some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation and to public policy. The object of the fee is not simply Medicaid reimbursement; all fees are deposited into the Long-Term Care Provider Fund, which may be used for Medicaid reimbursement, administrative expenses of the Department and its agents, enforcement of nursing home standards, the nursing home ombudsman program, expansion of home-and community-based services, and the General Obligation Bond Retirement and Interest Fund. View "Grand Chapter, Order of the E. Star of Ill. v. Topinka" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with armed robbery while in possession of a firearm, evading arrest, and reckless driving in 2005. He pled guilty to one count of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm in exchange for dismissal of the other charges and a recommendation for a maximum sentence of 30 years. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison, including a statutorily mandated 15-year sentencing enhancement for possession of the firearm, 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b). Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied his motion; the appellate court affirmed. Defendant’s 2011 post-conviction petition was dismissed. The appellate court found the 15-year sentencing enhancement violated the proportionate penalties clause and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court instructed the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider in light of its 2013 decisions. The appellate court vacated and upheld the sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court then reversed. Public Act 95-688, enacted in 2007, amended the armed violence statute so that robbery can no longer serve as a predicate offense for armed violence; the crimes no longer share identical elements and neither violates the proportionate penalties clause. However, that amendment should not be applied retroactively. Defendant was sentenced prior to the enactment, the sentencing enhancement was disproportionate when applied and the sentence is facially unconstitutional and void. View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law