Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Murdock, then 16, was convicted in 2001 of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements made to police. Defendant, a juvenile, alleged his statements were the product of police coercion that rendered them involuntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion on remand. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the absence of a concerned adult during defendant's police detention. Defendant was able to clearly communicate and understand the questions posed to him. He was able to understand and give assent to a waiver of his Miranda rights. On tape defendant appeared mostly calm and collected. He did not appear frightened or under any intense coercion. Defendant was never threatened physically or mentally and there were no promises or assurances to defendant to contribute to a coercive atmosphere. Defendant was allowed access to food, drink, and restroom; his statements were the result of his own decisions. View "People v. Murdock" on Justia Law

When he was 15 years old, Geiger testified for the state at the trial of a fellow gang member for a 1999 double murder. A codefendant in that case was retried in 2008, and, as to him, Geiger refused to testify, claiming Fifth Amendment privilege. The circuit court advised him that there was no reasonable basis for the claim, given his prior testimony and own earlier statement to police. The prosecution made an offer of use immunity, but he still refused to testify and was given a 20-year sentence for direct criminal contempt. The appellate court affirmed. In the meantime, the codefendant was convicted and Geiger conceded his Fifth Amendment claim. The Illinois Supreme Court found the 20-year term manifestly disproportionate and unreasonably excessive, noting that the power to punish for contempt is discretionary with the judiciary and that there is no sentencing classification or sentencing range set by the legislature. The court also noted that there was some evidence that the refusal to testify might have been driven by fear of gang retaliation. View "People v. Geiger" on Justia Law

S.B., 14 years old, and a four-year-old girl played a game; both got undressed. S.B. was charged as a juvenile with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Evidence indicated that he suffered mild retardation and functioned as if seven or eight years old, not as a pedophile. The judge found him unfit for trial and set the matter for a “discharge” or “innocence only” hearing. The provision is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure but not in the Juvenile Court Act and allows an unfit individual to be ordered held for treatment. The evidence was found sufficient to support the charge, so S.B. was found “not not guilty.” Following outpatient evaluation, the court found S.B. still unfit, although neither mentally ill nor a threat to public safety, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Because he had never been adjudicated delinquent, the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute on “discharge” or “innocence only” hearings may be applied to juveniles. S.B. can be required to register. Registration is required after “a finding not resulting in an acquittal,” following a discharge hearing on an applicable charge. The court construed the statute to allow petition for registration termination (not specified in the statute).View "In re S.B." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sex offenses against his wife’s daughter in Henry County. While still married, he had moved in with another woman in Rock Island County and was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against her nine-year-old daughter. In the Henry County case, the state introduced testimony about the Rock Island crime and the conviction. Defendant was again convicted. In both prosecutions, defendant was represented by the same attorney. On appeal of his Henry County conviction, he alleged that his lawyer had a per se conflict of interest because the Rock Island victim, who also testified at the Henry County trial, had been represented by this attorney in the capacity of guardian ad litem in an unrelated matter. The appellate court remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the conviction. A per se conflict of interest, requiring automatic reversal, does not require proof of impact on the attorney’s performance. The guardian ad litem involvement with the witness was long over when defendant was tried and the witness, as person, could not be considered an “entity” assisting the prosecution.View "People v. Fields" on Justia Law

Parents of adopted sons, Austin, 16, and Ricky, 15, retained counsel to represent both. Each was charged with misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse of other boys under foster care in the household. After a joint bench proceeding, the petition against Ricky was denied. The circuit court found that an admission Austin purportedly made to police was sufficient to prove the charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent minor and sentenced to probation. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. A minor accused of delinquency has a non-waivable right to a defense attorney. In addition to representing accuseds jointly, counsel allowed presentation of videotaped statements of the alleged victims in lieu of live testimony, which could have been cross-examined. Counsel never argued that Austin’s purported statement was involuntary or sought to suppress it, despite evidence that Austin was questioned aggressively and had diminished mental capabilities. The representation was not the type of counsel guaranteed by due process and the Juvenile Court Act. The court and counsel indicated that they viewed the attorney as functioning as a guardian ad litem. There is a per se conflict where counsel attempts to perform as guardian ad litem and defense counsel in a delinquency proceeding. The evidence was sufficient that there was no double jeopardy bar to a new trial. View "In re Austin M." on Justia Law

Hackett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), and aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3). He moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle so that evidence gathered after the improper stop constituted fruit of an unlawful search. The stated basis for the stop was improper lane usage. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that momentary crossings of a highway lane line did not give the officer reasonable grounds to make the stop. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To establish probable cause that a violation of the lane usage statute has occurred, the officer must point to facts which support a reasonable belief that defendant has deviated from his established lane of travel and that it was “practicable” for him to have remained constant in his proper lane. A traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. Here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason; an investigatory stop was proper. View "People v. Hackett" on Justia Law

Defendant, a man in his early thirties, had consensual sexual relations with a girl he knew was 17 years old. He took pictures of the activity with his cell phone. The pictures were found by the girl's mother, who complained to police, but who was initially told that the girl was too old to be considered a victim under the statutes concerning sexual abuse or sexual assault. Defendant was ultimately convicted under the child pornography statute, which set a higher age limit for the age (18) at which a teenager may legally consent to be photographed while engaged in sexual activity. The age of consent for sexual activity remains at 17. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that it was unfair to criminalize the photographing of a lawful activity and that this discrepancy was an as-applied denial of due process, equal protection, and the Illinois constitutional right to privacy. The court applied the rational basis test and found there to be a reasonable basis for the legislative decision. View "People v. Hollins" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of armed robbery while armed with a firearm and home invasion while armed with a firearm, Class X offenses, received concurrent terms of 25 years’ imprisonment. Both crimes had initial sentencing ranges of six to 30 years, plus a 15-year enhancement for use of a firearm, which made each range, 21 to 45 years. Defendant challenged his sentence for armed robbery with a firearm by comparison to the range for armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or II weapon. The crimes had identical elements, but the other crime had a sentencing range of only 15 to 30 years; he argued and that this discrepancy violated the proportionality clause of the Illinois Constitution. In 2007, the legislature eliminated the overlap between armed robbery and armed violence. The appellate court applied the identical-elements test and remanded for resentencing under the armed robbery statute as it existed before the 2000 effective date of the firearm enhancements. The supreme court affirmed, declining to overrule the identical-elements test, which it characterized as an objective, straightforward and bright-line test. Remanding for resentencing under the armed violence statute would be improper because defendant had never been charged with that offense.View "People v. Clemons" on Justia Law

A woman standing at a window inside a building was fatally shot. Gang members intended to shoot the first rival gang member to come out. Defendant, then age 15, told police that fellow gang members, closer to the building, fired first, while he, across the street, only shot into the air. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to 28 years. No evidence other than his statement linked him to the crime. In pro se attempts to file successive post-conviction petitions, defendant claimed actual innocence. He submitted affidavits from two women who claimed to have been with defendant at the time of the shooting but had refused to come forward, and from a codefendant that defendant "had nothing to do with this shooting." The attempts were rejected by the circuit and appellate courts. The appellate court considered an Illinois Supreme Court holding that the requirement of showing cause and prejudice before being allowed leave to file a successive petition may be excused where actual innocence is alleged, but found that defendant did not assert a colorable claim of actual innocence. The supreme court affirmed. The women were known and not subpoenaed for trial. Because defendant was convicted on an accountability theory, the codefendant's claims did not exonerate him.View "People v. Edwards" on Justia Law

While defendant was in custody on another matter, he became a suspect in a fatal shooting. Another inmate told police that he thought he could get the defendant to make incriminating statements concerning that homicide. Police set up the inmate-informer to wear a wire. A judicially authorized overhear was arranged, with the inmate as the consenting party. Defendant was told that he was being taken to a lineup. He called the attorney who had been appointed to represent him in the other matter. That attorney spent about 45 minutes waiting for access to defendant while the inmate-informer was conversing with defendant in an otherwise empty room and listening to his allegedly incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed and specifically overruled an earlier appellate court decision, holding that defendant was not subjected to police custodial interrogation when he conversed with the inmate-informer. The police were not required to give Miranda warnings, and defendant had no right to counsel. Neither were police required to tell the defendant that the attorney in the other matter was seeking access to him.View "People v. Hunt" on Justia Law