Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Chicago police in an unmarked car saw the defendant yelling “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle, in front of a Chicago Housing Authority building, in an area known for marijuana sales. The arresting officer testified said that “dro, dro” is slang for the sale of cannabis, and case law has recognized that this refers to a higher quality, or hydroponic, marijuana. The defendant was arrested for violation of a municipal ordinance forbidding the solicitation of unlawful business on a public way. At the scene, plastic bags containing what appeared to be cannabis were found on his person, and, at the police station, plastic bags of what later tested positive for cocaine were also found in his clothing. All took place without a warrant. The circuit court denied a motion to suppress; the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court, reversed finding that there was probable cause to arrest. The court noted that the police testimony was unrebutted; facts known to police at the time of the arrest provided reasonable grounds to believe defendant was committing a criminal offense.View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

In 1997, at age 15 and without a drivers’ license, Jackson was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. The Secretary of State created a driving record, issued a license number, then suspended the license under 625 ILCS 5/11- 501.1(h). In 1998 he was charged with driving on a suspended license. He was convicted. In 2006 Jackson obtained a new license, answering no to a question as to whether his license had ever been suspended. He was later cited for speeding and driving without insurance. In 2011 he was charged with a Class 4 felony of driving on a suspended license. Jackson argued that the statute denied him due process by preventing him from presenting evidence that he thought he had a valid license. The circuit court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, holding that the case can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds and was not subject to direct appeal. The issue concerns proof of the elements of the offense, not constitutionality. The defendant is entitled to present evidence that he did possess a valid license, while the state may offer rebuttal that he misled authorities into reinstating his driving privilege by providing erroneous information. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Citizens, unhappy with how public education is funded in Illinois, sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the funding system requires taxpayers in school districts with low property values to pay property taxes to fund local public schools at a higher rate than similarly situated taxpayers in school districts with higher property values, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the complaint was properly dismissed for lack of standing. The funding statute is not a taxing statute; plaintiffs failed to establish that the inequalities alleged are a direct result of the enforcement of the education funding statute or are fairly traceable to defendants’ actions. It is entirely within the discretion of the school districts to determine the actual rate of local property taxes, and the funding statute does not require school districts to tax at a certain rate. Although a district might decide that more local property tax revenues are required in order to provide students with a sufficient education, that decision is left to the school district and is not compelled or required by the educational funding statute. View "Carr v. Koch" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a police station and reported that he had strangled his wife to death. Although there had been an argument and a struggle, he claimed that the death was an accident. At trial, defense counsel argued that the evidence showed, at most, recklessness and involuntary manslaughter. Leach was convicted of first degree murder, based on knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The court properly admitted testimony of a qualified expert that it would take three to six minutes for a person to die from strangulation. Leach raised constitutional confrontation issues because the autopsy report, concluding that the death was a homicide, was made by a pathologist who had retired before trial and could not be cross-examined. A different expert testified, based on the report. The routine autopsy report is not testimonial and not subject to the “Crawford” rule even if the examiner is aware that police suspect homicide and a specific individual. It was not prepared for the primary purpose of criminal prosecution. Any error was harmless given that Leach did not dispute the manner and cause of death or that he was guilty of some form of homicide. View "People v. Leach" on Justia Law

Tate was convicted for a 2001 fatal shooting. Four eyewitnesses identified him. The appellate court affirmed. Tate retained counsel and filed a post-conviction petition, attaching affidavits of alibi witnesses and of occurrence witnesses. Tate alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call these witnesses. Although this issue had not been raised by post-trial motion, the supreme court found that there was no forfeiture. The circuit court nonetheless summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed. Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, a petition may be dismissed, initially, if it is “frivolous or patently without merit.” If this does not occur, the court determines whether there is a substantial showing of a constitutional violation meriting an evidentiary hearing. Most petitions are filed pro se. The state argued that Tate should be held to the higher standard of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, because he had counsel. The court rejected the argument. Tate’s petition could survive the first stage if it was arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and if it was arguable that he was prejudiced.View "People v. Tate" on Justia Law

Murdock, then 16, was convicted in 2001 of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements made to police. Defendant, a juvenile, alleged his statements were the product of police coercion that rendered them involuntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion on remand. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the absence of a concerned adult during defendant's police detention. Defendant was able to clearly communicate and understand the questions posed to him. He was able to understand and give assent to a waiver of his Miranda rights. On tape defendant appeared mostly calm and collected. He did not appear frightened or under any intense coercion. Defendant was never threatened physically or mentally and there were no promises or assurances to defendant to contribute to a coercive atmosphere. Defendant was allowed access to food, drink, and restroom; his statements were the result of his own decisions. View "People v. Murdock" on Justia Law

When he was 15 years old, Geiger testified for the state at the trial of a fellow gang member for a 1999 double murder. A codefendant in that case was retried in 2008, and, as to him, Geiger refused to testify, claiming Fifth Amendment privilege. The circuit court advised him that there was no reasonable basis for the claim, given his prior testimony and own earlier statement to police. The prosecution made an offer of use immunity, but he still refused to testify and was given a 20-year sentence for direct criminal contempt. The appellate court affirmed. In the meantime, the codefendant was convicted and Geiger conceded his Fifth Amendment claim. The Illinois Supreme Court found the 20-year term manifestly disproportionate and unreasonably excessive, noting that the power to punish for contempt is discretionary with the judiciary and that there is no sentencing classification or sentencing range set by the legislature. The court also noted that there was some evidence that the refusal to testify might have been driven by fear of gang retaliation. View "People v. Geiger" on Justia Law

S.B., 14 years old, and a four-year-old girl played a game; both got undressed. S.B. was charged as a juvenile with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Evidence indicated that he suffered mild retardation and functioned as if seven or eight years old, not as a pedophile. The judge found him unfit for trial and set the matter for a “discharge” or “innocence only” hearing. The provision is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure but not in the Juvenile Court Act and allows an unfit individual to be ordered held for treatment. The evidence was found sufficient to support the charge, so S.B. was found “not not guilty.” Following outpatient evaluation, the court found S.B. still unfit, although neither mentally ill nor a threat to public safety, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Because he had never been adjudicated delinquent, the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute on “discharge” or “innocence only” hearings may be applied to juveniles. S.B. can be required to register. Registration is required after “a finding not resulting in an acquittal,” following a discharge hearing on an applicable charge. The court construed the statute to allow petition for registration termination (not specified in the statute).View "In re S.B." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sex offenses against his wife’s daughter in Henry County. While still married, he had moved in with another woman in Rock Island County and was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against her nine-year-old daughter. In the Henry County case, the state introduced testimony about the Rock Island crime and the conviction. Defendant was again convicted. In both prosecutions, defendant was represented by the same attorney. On appeal of his Henry County conviction, he alleged that his lawyer had a per se conflict of interest because the Rock Island victim, who also testified at the Henry County trial, had been represented by this attorney in the capacity of guardian ad litem in an unrelated matter. The appellate court remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the conviction. A per se conflict of interest, requiring automatic reversal, does not require proof of impact on the attorney’s performance. The guardian ad litem involvement with the witness was long over when defendant was tried and the witness, as person, could not be considered an “entity” assisting the prosecution.View "People v. Fields" on Justia Law

Parents of adopted sons, Austin, 16, and Ricky, 15, retained counsel to represent both. Each was charged with misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse of other boys under foster care in the household. After a joint bench proceeding, the petition against Ricky was denied. The circuit court found that an admission Austin purportedly made to police was sufficient to prove the charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent minor and sentenced to probation. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. A minor accused of delinquency has a non-waivable right to a defense attorney. In addition to representing accuseds jointly, counsel allowed presentation of videotaped statements of the alleged victims in lieu of live testimony, which could have been cross-examined. Counsel never argued that Austin’s purported statement was involuntary or sought to suppress it, despite evidence that Austin was questioned aggressively and had diminished mental capabilities. The representation was not the type of counsel guaranteed by due process and the Juvenile Court Act. The court and counsel indicated that they viewed the attorney as functioning as a guardian ad litem. There is a per se conflict where counsel attempts to perform as guardian ad litem and defense counsel in a delinquency proceeding. The evidence was sufficient that there was no double jeopardy bar to a new trial. View "In re Austin M." on Justia Law