Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Based on allegations that he sexually abused his grandson, J.M., McKown was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)), three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (11-1.60(c)(1)(i)), and one count of child pornography (11- 20.1(a)(1)(ii)). There were inconsistencies in J.M.’s testimony. An officer testified that McKown had consented to a search of his basement, where the officer saw “multiple cutout pictures of young female children’s faces that had slits cut into the mouths and cutout images of male penises inserted into those slits.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed McKown’s convictions. The pictures of young children that McKown modified to depict sexual conduct constitute child pornography under section 11-20.1 and section 11-20.1 is consistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. McKown possessed images of actual, identifiable children that he altered to depict sexual conduct. Sufficient corroboration existed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule as to McKown’s convictions for various sexual offenses. View "People v. McKown" on Justia Law

Collins ran from Chicago police who were approaching on the street where he was standing in a group. An officer saw him drop a handgun while running. Collins was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and of being an armed habitual criminal. The circuit court merged the counts and sentenced him to 90 months. Collins argued that the prosecution improperly presented audio recordings from a bodyworn camera that were subject to exclusion as hearsay statements.The Appellate Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for leave to appeal, which raised the issue of whether the Law Enforcement Officer Body-Worn Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1) “provides that relevant body-worn camera recordings are admissible without limitation and, in any event, [whether] such recordings are … hearsay.” The state argued that such “audiovisual recordings are not hearsay and are admissible provided they are relevant and properly authenticated.” The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the state failed to argue the threshold question presented through its petition and upon which leave to appeal was granted. View "People v. Collins" on Justia Law

Pingelton was charged with criminal sexual assault on victims who were 16 years old. The emergency medicine physicians who examined the victims testified that they had no opinion as to whether either victim was sexually assaulted. The appellate court affirmed his convictions. Pingelton pro se filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, citing failure to object to the presentation of improper expert testimony by the physicians. The prosecution’s motion to dismiss was served on Pingelton’s appointed counsel. Almost two years later, postconviction counsel moved to withdraw, arguing that Pingelton’s claims could not be supported as a matter of law and that the record revealed no other meritorious issues. Pingelton requested that the court allow him to amend his petition and proceed. At a “status” hearing, the state and postconviction counsel appeared personally. Pingelton appeared via telephone. The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed, finding that none of Pingelton’s allegations indicated that he had received “unreasonable” assistance from his attorneys.The Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Pingelton’s right to procedural due process was violated when the court dismissed his postconviction petition without affording him adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. However, Pingelton’s claims lack merit, so he did not present a substantial showing of a constitutional deprivation at trial or on direct appeal. View "People v. Pingelton" on Justia Law

In 2016, Stewart, then 20 years old, was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. While the case was pending, Stewart turned 21. In 2017, a jury found Stewart guilty. The trial court found that Stewart was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b): When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. Stewart had a 2013 conviction for residential burglary, a Class 1 felony, and a 2014 conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. The trial court found Stewart eligible for Class X sentencing and sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Stewart’s first felony offense, committed when he was 17 years old, was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing and could not serve as a basis for Class X sentencing eligibility. View "People v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Kelan, in Missouri with an adult accomplice, allegedly took Luterman’s 2019 Volkswagen by force or the threat of force. The two drove the car into Illinois, where they were apprehended. Kelan was 16 years old. He resides in Illinois with his mother. The state filed a petition to adjudicate Kelan a delinquent minor based on the Missouri carjacking and, under Illinois law, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a person under 21, and theft.The state argued that delinquency proceedings based on out-of-state conduct are explicitly permitted under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120). The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the charges that were based on Missouri law. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 of the Act unambiguously authorizes delinquency proceedings against a minor in Illinois who violates another state’s law. Illinois is likely to be in a better position than any other state to ensure that family and community are involved in our juveniles’ rehabilitative process, and it may help reduce disruption to the minor’s life to receive necessary services in his home state. View "In re Kelan W." on Justia Law

In 1993, Kastman was charged with misdemeanor offenses based on acts of public indecency involving children and disorderly conduct. The state’s attorney initiated a civil commitment proceeding against Kastman under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01). Evidence indicated that Kastman suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, exhibitionism, and alcohol dependency. Kastman was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and the circuit court granted the petition. In 2016, Kastman was granted conditional release from institutional care.In 2020, he sought financial assistance. Kastman asserted that he was unemployed, disabled, and could not afford his $300 monthly treatment costs and the $1800 monthly rent for housing that complied with the Sex Offender Registration Act. The circuit court of Lake County ordered the Department of Corrections to pay a portion of Kastman’s monthly expenses. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statutes indicate that a sex offender’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding who should bear the expense of treatment costs; without a clear statutory directive, the legislature is not presumed to have intended that only financially stable individuals are eligible for conditional release. Financial instability and the need for supervision to protect the public are not the same things. View "People v. Kastman" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. After the jury returned its signed verdict forms in open court, Jackson’s attorney asked the court to poll the jury. The circuit court then asked 11 of the 12 jurors whether the verdicts reflected on the verdict forms were their verdicts. All of the 11 jurors who were questioned confirmed that the signed verdict forms accurately reflected their verdicts. The circuit court dismissed the jury without polling the twelfth juror. Jackson’s attorney failed to object to the error and did not include the error in a posttrial motion.Jackson raised the error for the first time on direct appeal. The appellate court held that the error in polling the jury constituted structural error that called into question the integrity of the judicial process, excused the forfeiture under the second prong of Illinois’s plain error rule, and reversed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. A procedure that is not required in every criminal jury trial cannot be logically categorized as an essential element of every criminal jury trial on par with the jury trial oath; no U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests that a criminal defendant is denied the fundamental right to juror unanimity when jury polling does not take place or when there is an error in the jury polling process. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 1999, Riley was shot and killed in Chicago. Coleman made a statement to police that she saw Blalock, whom she knew from grammar school, with his hand out a car window, shooting in Riley’s direction. Coleman stated that no threats or promises had been made to her and that she had been allowed to make corrections to her statement. Blalock gave a handwritten statement confessing to the shooting. Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, alleging that Blalock's statement was the result of physical coercion by detectives, who slapped and yelled at him, threatened him, and cut or sliced his fingernails. At trial, Coleman recanted her statement, claiming that police had struck her with pens and her statement had not been freely given.Convicted of first-degree murder, Blalock was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. In 2016, Blalock sought leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, claiming that newly discovered evidence showed that the officers who interrogated him had engaged in a pattern and practice of police brutality. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that petition. Blalock failed to establish prejudice by showing that the claim not raised during the initial proceeding so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process, 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). Blalock’s trial testimony indicated that he fabricated his statement to appease the detectives and assistant state’s attorney, not because of physical abuse, which contradicts the abuse allegations contained in the post-conviction petition. View "People v. Blalock" on Justia Law

In 2013, Craig (age 49) executed an Illinois statutory short-form health care power of attorney, appointing his mother as his agent. In 2016, Craig was hospitalized at McFarland after being charged with burglary and found unfit to stand trial. In 2018, a McFarland psychiatrist sought to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications to Craig under the Mental Health Code, 405 ILCS 5/2-107. Craig alleged that decisions on his medical treatment rested with his agent. A psychiatrist testified that Craig was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, when he was 25 years old and had been experiencing hallucinations with symptoms of paranoia, inability to sleep, poor impulse control, hypersexuality, physical aggression, and psychomotor agitation; Craig had no understanding of his mental illness and lacked the capacity to make rational treatment decisions. She opined that the benefits of the medications outweighed the potential risks. Without treatment, Craig was unable to live outside a hospital. Craig’s 82-year-old mother declined to consent, believing that the medications caused brain damage, made Craig “like a zombie,” and made him look “like a man without a head.”The trial court granted the petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for a period not to exceed 90 days. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Mental Health Code, which includes strict standards for an order permitting involuntary administration of psychotropic medications, provides a narrow exception to an agent’s authority to make a principal’s health care decisions. View "In re Craig H." on Justia Law

Lewis was charged with involuntary sexual servitude of a minor (720 ILCS 5/10-9(c)(2)), traveling to meet a minor (11- 26(a)), and grooming (i11-25(a)). He asserted the defense of entrapment. Convicted, he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that defense counsel’s cumulative errors rendered the proceeding unreliable under Strickland v. Washington.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the remand for a new trial. Defense counsel was ineffective in presenting his entrapment defense where he failed to object to the circuit court’s responses to two jury notes regarding the legal definition of “predisposed,” object to the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterizing the entrapment defense and the parties’ relevant burdens of proof, and present defendant’s lack of a criminal record to the jury. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law