Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Johnathan was adjudicated a delinquent minor under 705 ILCS 405/5-701 after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a seven-year-old victim. During his sex offender evaluation, Johnathan stated that his lawyer did not return calls, that they “didn’t talk” and that he was never prepared for the stand. On appeal, Jonathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a “Krankel” preliminary inquiry regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in not conducting a “Krankel” hearing. The Krankel procedure applies in juvenile proceedings and is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A pro se defendant only has to bring his claim to the trial court’s attention and is not required to file a written motion. The procedure applies even though the defendant has retained counsel. Johnathan clearly stated that his attorney was not doing something that he should have been doing. A juvenile in a juvenile delinquency proceeding need do nothing more than bring his pro se claim to the attention of the court. View "In re Johnathan T." on Justia Law

After being convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), Mudd argued on appeal that comments made in the prosecution’s rebuttal closing argument constituted reversible error because they misrepresented the evidence and shifted the burden of proof to him. Alternatively, he contended that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to those rebuttal comments. The defense had emphasized the lack of evidence supporting the testimony by police officers; the prosecutor had responded that jurors should use their “common sense”; no one else was near the van when Mudd knelt beside the tire, so he was the only person who reasonably could have left the gun there, making forensic testing of the weapon unnecessary.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court upheld his conviction. To establish plain error, Mudd had to prove that the prosecutor’s comments were “clear or obvious” reversible error that shifted the burden of proof to him. Mudd had equal access to the weapon for purposes of testing. It is difficult to imagine how an accurate portrayal of the parties’ ability to request forensic testing, as required by Illinois law, can be deemed to be unduly prejudicial to a defendant. View "People v. Mudd" on Justia Law

Gorss pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence arising from a 2016 accident that resulted in a death. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Gorss, through counsel, moved to reconsider his sentence. Counsel filed a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) The circuit court denied the motion. Gorss argued that his counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) by failing to state, in the certificate, that he consulted with Gorss to ascertain his contentions of error with the entry of the guilty plea. The appellate court affirmed Gorss’s conviction and sentence, finding that the Rule 604(d) certificate did not violate the rule.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Counsel must strictly comply with each provision of Rule 604(d); failure to do so requires a remand for the filing of a new motion to withdraw a guilty plea or to reconsider a sentence. The rule is clear: counsel must certify that consultation to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error as to both the sentence and entry of the guilty plea took place. Here, counsel’s certificate as written leaves unclear whether he consulted with Gorss as to his contentions of error in the entry of his guilty plea. View "People v. Gorss" on Justia Law

The appellate court reversed Cline’s conviction for residential burglary because the only evidence tying him to the burglary was a fingerprint found on a portable headphone case inside the residence and there was no evidence that the state’s fingerprint expert, Dennewitz, verified his results with another examiner.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Cline did not dispute that the resident’s testimony was sufficient to show that someone knowingly entered his apartment without authority and with the intent to commit theft there. Cline also did not challenge the admissibility of Dennewitz’s expert testimony. The court rejected Cline’s argument that, without proof that Dennewitz’s conclusion was verified by another examiner, the state “failed to prove” Dennewitz followed the “accepted” ACE-V analytical method for fingerprint identification. Dennewitz was found qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert in forensic fingerprint identification. The evidence was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of Cline’s guilt of residential burglary. View "People v. Cline" on Justia Law

Freeport Police Sergeant Weichel identified McGee as having fled the scene of a home invasion. Fane, apprehended with McGee, was charged with residential burglary, aggravated battery of a victim over 60, home invasion, and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. McGee pled guilty to residential burglary and home invasion and testified on Fane’s behalf, naming Beales as the other burglar. McGee claimed that as he fled, he encountered Fane and advised him to run because he had just conducted a drug deal and had been set up. McGee testified that he and Fane had been friends for 15 years.Fane objected to the use of jury instruction IPI Criminal 3.17 (Testimony Of An Accomplice): “When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.” Some appellate courts had deemed 3.17 inappropriate when the accomplice witness’s testimony completely exonerated the defendant.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction. A trial court need not find that the testimony implicates the defendant before giving the accomplice witness instruction. The instruction was an accurate, impartial, and nonargumentative summation of the law. View "People v. Fane" on Justia Law

Jones was a juvenile in 2000 when he pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction relief, Jones sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in the Supreme Court’s “Miller v. Alabama” decision.The appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion, finding that Jones’ claims did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial court lacks or refuses to use discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to life, or to a de facto life, sentence. The mandatory sentencing scheme that applied in Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to Jones. By entering a plea agreement, a defendant forecloses any claim of error. A voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones. Jones has not claimed that the state engaged in any misrepresentation or committed any misconduct. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Chicago police officer Luzadder and his partner were on patrol at 11:36 p.m. when they received a dispatch stating that an anonymous person reported that two white females were walking with a white male wearing a black hoodie, who “was swinging at the females” and “has a gun” near a particular intersection. A second call reported that the group had moved north. Minutes later, at the second location, Luzadder saw Carter, a white male, wearing the described clothing, holding his waistband. Luzadder did not see two women nor did he see Carter violate any laws. Luzadder believed that Carter was attempting to conceal a firearm. Luzadder, with a hand on his service weapon, ordered Carter to raise his hands, patted down Carter over his clothes, and felt what he thought was the handle of a handgun. He lifted Carter’s shirt and recovered a revolver from Carter’s waistband. Luzadder arrested Carter, who was charged with being an armed habitual criminal, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon.The circuit court denied his motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the denial of Carter’s motion and his nine-year sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. The officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. The court otherwise vacated. The state failed to prove Carter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed habitual criminal; the other convictions were merged into that conviction. View "People v. Carter" on Justia Law

Schoonover was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault against his niece, M.L. The prosecution alleged Schoonover, who was over the age of 17, committed “act[s] of contact” with the victim, M.L., who was under the age of 13. Before M.L.’s testimony, the trial court indicated its intention to have the courtroom cleared except for M.L.’s family members and the media during M.L.’s testimony, barring Schoonover’s family members (Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/115-11).The appellate court majority reversed Schoonover’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court committed second-prong plain error for failing to inquire as to whether the spectators removed from the courtroom during the minor’s testimony had a direct interest in the case.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding no clear or obvious error under section 115-11 or the sixth amendment. The plain language of section 115-11 is clear: the trial court need only formulate an opinion as to whether the spectators being excluded have a direct interest in the case. The determination as to whether a direct interest exists is left to the discretion of the court. Section 115-11 is constitutional and the trial court comported with its requirements and limitations. View "People v. Schoonover" on Justia Law

Rock Island police responded to a report of shots fired. Rush and Childs were found in a bullet-ridden car. Rush died of his gunshot wounds. Officers spoke to witnesses who had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car at the scene at the time of the shooting. An off-duty police officer had heard the gunshots and had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car fleeing. The Lincoln and its occupants—Phelps and Reed—were stopped. Both implicated Eubanks as the shooter. Police located Eubanks weeks later. He agreed to be interviewed. Eubanks denied any involvement but admitted to being with Phelps and Reed that day. He later stated that Reed had “set it up.” Under a subsequent plea agreement, the parties agreed to a 35-year sentence. Eubanks gave a detailed videotaped statement confessing to the crimes.The court granted a subsequent motion to vacate the plea. At his stipulated bench trial, Eubanks's statement was admitted into evidence. Eubanks was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. He filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress his statement under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The videotaped statement was not part of the negotiation process and, therefore, inadmissible under Rule 402(f). A plea deal was in place when Eubanks gave his statement. Giving that statement was not a condition precedent of the deal but, rather, was a fulfillment of the deal. View "People v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, in committing a respondent under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), the circuit court must make an explicit finding that the respondent is substantially probable to commit sex offenses in the future if not confined. The Act was subsequently amended to include the required element of a substantial probability to reoffend within the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.In 1973, Snapp pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a child. In 1992, he pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In 1997, after Snappwas again charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the state filed a petition and obtained his commitment under the Act. In 2004 and 2007, Snapp filed applications for recovery, seeking release from his civil commitment. Both of those applications were denied. In 2010, Snapp filed another application for recovery. A bench trial was held in 2018, The court denied Snapp’s petition, finding he was “still a sexually dangerous person and in need of confinement.” The appellate court vacated, finding that precedent required an express finding of a substantial probability to reoffend.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The General Assembly eliminated the requirement of a separate explicit finding by the circuit court that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend if not confined. View "In re Commitment of Snapp" on Justia Law