Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rock Island police responded to a report of shots fired. Rush and Childs were found in a bullet-ridden car. Rush died of his gunshot wounds. Officers spoke to witnesses who had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car at the scene at the time of the shooting. An off-duty police officer had heard the gunshots and had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car fleeing. The Lincoln and its occupants—Phelps and Reed—were stopped. Both implicated Eubanks as the shooter. Police located Eubanks weeks later. He agreed to be interviewed. Eubanks denied any involvement but admitted to being with Phelps and Reed that day. He later stated that Reed had “set it up.” Under a subsequent plea agreement, the parties agreed to a 35-year sentence. Eubanks gave a detailed videotaped statement confessing to the crimes.The court granted a subsequent motion to vacate the plea. At his stipulated bench trial, Eubanks's statement was admitted into evidence. Eubanks was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. He filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress his statement under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The videotaped statement was not part of the negotiation process and, therefore, inadmissible under Rule 402(f). A plea deal was in place when Eubanks gave his statement. Giving that statement was not a condition precedent of the deal but, rather, was a fulfillment of the deal. View "People v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, in committing a respondent under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), the circuit court must make an explicit finding that the respondent is substantially probable to commit sex offenses in the future if not confined. The Act was subsequently amended to include the required element of a substantial probability to reoffend within the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.In 1973, Snapp pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a child. In 1992, he pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In 1997, after Snappwas again charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the state filed a petition and obtained his commitment under the Act. In 2004 and 2007, Snapp filed applications for recovery, seeking release from his civil commitment. Both of those applications were denied. In 2010, Snapp filed another application for recovery. A bench trial was held in 2018, The court denied Snapp’s petition, finding he was “still a sexually dangerous person and in need of confinement.” The appellate court vacated, finding that precedent required an express finding of a substantial probability to reoffend.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The General Assembly eliminated the requirement of a separate explicit finding by the circuit court that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend if not confined. View "In re Commitment of Snapp" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, home invasion, and possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. At trial, the victim (defendant’s former girlfriend) testified to having received threatening Facebook Messenger communications that used a nickname, “Masetti Meech” that defendant had used while they were dating. A message under that name led the victim to her car, days after defendant took it. The messages included personal information only defendant would have known. Police found defendant in possession of the victim’s car keys, near her brother’s workplace.The appellate court affirmed, finding that proof of intent to permanently deprive the victim of her car was not required because defendant was charged with conversion or theft. It was sufficient that the victim testified that defendant broke into her residence, committed assault, stole her keys, and took her car. Because the trial court failed to hold a “Krankel" hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the State agreed a hearing was necessary, and the appellate court remanded the cause for a preliminary Krankel hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding the contents of Facebook messages allegedly sent by defendant and that the state failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. The prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence properly authenticating the Facebook Messenger messages. View "People v. Brand" on Justia Law

House was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his participation in 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of two teenagers. House was 19 at the time of the crimes. He claimed that he had no idea of the larger plan when the victims were driven to the deserted location and that the victims were killed after he left. The circuit court sentenced him to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively.In 2001, House’s sentence for the kidnappings was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms. House filed a post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence based on a witness’s recantation of her trial testimony; newly discovered evidence of police misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his mandatory sentence of natural life violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court vacated House’s sentence, finding that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties provision as applied because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically House’s age, level of culpability, and criminal history.The Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and to reconsider the effect of its 2018 Harris opinion. On remand, the appellate court denied an agreed motion seeking remand and again vacated House’s sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The appellate court erroneously held that House’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge. The court vacated the dismissal of the actual innocence claim. View "People v. House" on Justia Law

In 2015, Yost was charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of his former girlfriend, Randall. After Yost was convicted, he notified the court that he had just learned that his appointed counsel, Rau, had represented Randall in a past case; he requested a new trial. Rau also filed a motion for a new trial but did not reference Yost’s allegations of a conflict of interest. The court denied the motion and sentenced Yost to 75 years’ imprisonment. After conducting a preliminary inquiry on remand, the trial court concluded that the allegations had merit and appointed new counsel, Lookofsky, to investigate. Yost’s amended motion for a new trial alleged that Rau had represented Randall, on two prior occasions in an unrelated case. Yost waived any conflict of interest based on Lookofsky’s prior hiring of Rau on an unrelated civil matter and any conflict-of-interest claims based on the judge’s prior representation of Yost’s family members.The court concluded that there was no per se conflict of interest, which would have required automatic reversal of the conviction, absent a waiver. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Illinois now recognizes three per se conflicts of interest: when defense counsel has a contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; when defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and when defense counsel was a former prosecutor who was personally involved in the defendant's prosecution. Yost did not claim an actual conflict of interest. View "People v. Yost" on Justia Law

On November 25, 2015, a police officer, investigating an accident, found Rogers in physical control of the vehicle and suspected him to be under the influence. The officer charged Rogers under 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4). At a hospital, Rogers underwent a blood test, which revealed the presence of THC. The officer filed the uniform citation on December 1, 2015. On December 14, Rogers’s counsel filed a speedy trial demand. On April 6, 2016, Rogers was charged by superseding information with two counts of misdemeanor DUI. The parties continued the trial to May 20. The circuit court granted the state two continuances after Rogers initially objected but then agreed to the continuance. On September 20, the court granted the state a continuance over Rogers’s objection. On October 28, 2016, the state filed a superseding three-count information. On December 1, the trial was continued by agreement. The trial occurred on January 17, 2018. Rogers, convicted on one count, was sentenced to 12 months of court supervision.The appellate court reversed, reasoning that, because of the similarity of the offenses and the officer having sufficient knowledge to ticket both offenses at the time of the first citation, compulsory joinder applied and the clock for speedy-trial purposes began to run on December 14, 2015. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Counsel’s performance could not have been deficient for failing to make an objection where binding precedent would have made such an objection meritless; any motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds premised on the compulsory-joinder rule would have been otherwise futile. View "People v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The Kankakee County State’s Attorney authorized the secret recording of a controlled drug purchase between a confidential informant and another individual. Davis was not the person to be recorded. When the informant went to the target’s home, he could not locate him. The informant walked to the porch of a different home and conducted a drug transaction with Davis, which was recorded by a hidden device. At the hearing on Davis’s motion to suppress, the parties agreed that the audio portion of the recording violated the eavesdropping statute. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that there was an illegal overhear conversation between Davis and the informant that took place before the drugs were seen in the video so that the video recording was the fruit of the poisonous tree that must be suppressed and the informant could not testify concerning the drug transaction.The Appellate Court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The informant was a participant in the conversation, so his knowledge of that conversation was not derived from the illegal audio recording; the video recording was made simultaneously with the audio recording and could not have been derived from the audio recording. Because neither the informant’s testimony nor the video recording was obtained as a result of the illegal audio recording, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply. The evidence was admissible. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Illinois State Police obtained warrants to search a personal computer owned by Peoria Police Officer McCavitt, for digital evidence of two unrelated incidents: an aggravated criminal sexual assault and the unauthorized video recording and live video transmission of an unnamed victim. McCavitt was tried and acquitted of the alleged sexual assault before the unauthorized video recording was investigated. Following his acquittal, without seeking a new warrant, the Peoria Police Department searched a copy of the computer’s hard drive, uncovering evidence of the unauthorized video recording. The digital search also uncovered child pornography, which was not mentioned in the warrant. Based on the images, McCavitt was convicted of several counts of child pornography.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the denial of McCavitt’s motion to suppress. Under the unique facts of this case, the search that uncovered child pornography did not violate McCavitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. The warrant at issue diminished McCavitt’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the images and videos he stored on his computer. When he was acquitted of the sexual assault, his reasonable expectation of privacy in his data relating to that offense was restored. However, the acquittal did not resolve the portion of the warrant that authorized a search for digital evidence of the unauthorized video recording. The post-acquittal computer examination was reasonably directed at obtaining that evidence and the child pornography found during the search was admissible because it was found in plain view. View "People v. McCavitt" on Justia Law

Taliani was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (12-4.2(a)(1)) in relation to the 1994 shooting death of his girlfriend and the shooting and injury of her mother. His direct appeal, two postconviction petitions, and a motion for relief from judgment were all unsuccessful. Taliani sought leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, in which he asserted that he has set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence based on “a change in the law that allows for a new affirmative defense [which] constitutes newly discovered evidence for purposes of an actual innocence claim.” An actual innocence claim must be supported by “newly discovered evidence” and evidence that Taliani took prescription medications that could cause serotonin syndrome was not “newly discovered.” Taliani argued that the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication based on unwarned side effects from prescription medication was not recognized in Illinois until 2006 and that this newly available affirmative defense constituted “newly discovered evidence.”The circuit court, appellate court, and Illinois Supreme Court denied relief. A new defense is a new theory; it is not new evidence. Taliani presented no newly discovered evidence, such as witness affidavits or other contemporary documentation, that would persuasively show that, at the time of the shootings, he was involuntarily intoxicated and, therefore, lacked the substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law. View "People v. Taliani" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of armed robbery. The evidence at trial established that a 9-millimeter pistol and a BB pistol were discovered on the premises where he was arrested after the offense. The 9-millimeter was swabbed but the swabs were never tested for DNA. Johnson argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the swabs be tested. The appellate court panel granted him a new trial.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, affirming Johnson’s conviction. Johnson was unable to demonstrate prejudice for purposes of “Strickland” to establish ineffective assistance. It is unknown whether the swabs contain DNA sufficient for testing, let alone whether the results would be exculpatory. Because there is no exculpatory evidence to consider, any opinion that could be made with respect to prejudice would be advisory. Prejudice under Strickland cannot be based on “mere conjecture or speculation.” View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law