Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Lake County jury convicted Dupree of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated robbery. His convictions were upheld on direct appeal. He filed a postconviction petition. At the second stage, Dupree filed a third-amended petition raising several claims, including a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an “exculpatory witness” to testify. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that Dupree failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal without considering the ineffective assistance claim on its merits but holding that the postconviction petition was properly dismissed, as a matter of law, solely because defendant failed to attach to his petition an affidavit from the proposed witness. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial court. Under the facts of this case, the failure to provide an affidavit was not, by itself, fatal to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition was appropriate because Dupree failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. View "People v. Dupree" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed defendant's conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the evidence presented gave rise to a reasonable inference that the location was a church and that it was functioning as it purported to be at the time of the offense. View "People v. Newton" on Justia Law

Applying People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, which held that the warrantless use of a drug-detection dog at a defendant’s apartment door, located within a locked apartment building, violated a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' judgment that the police violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a dog sniff of the threshold of defendant's apartment, located on the third floor of an unlocked apartment building. The court also held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case. View "People v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's decision to reverse the circuit court's order granting defendant's motion to seal his fourth and fifth motions in limine over the objection of intervenors. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appeal.The court held that a First Amendment presumption of access did not attach to defendant's motions and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying intervenors access to the motions under a common-law right of access. In this case, a thorough review of the hearing on intervenors' request to unseal the motions revealed that the trial court attempted to strike a careful balance among competing interests and remand on this issue was unnecessary. View "People v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant was 18 years and 3 months at the time of the offenses, and he was sentenced to 76 years in prison. The appellate court vacated defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that the aggregate prison term violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; defendant forfeited his as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause because defendant did not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, an evidentiary hearing was not held on his constitutional claim, and the court declined to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing; and defendant's facial challenge to his aggregate sentence under the Eighth Amendment failed because, for sentencing purposes, the age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults. Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

Young was convicted of first-degree murder based on the 2005 stabbing death of his girlfriend. The Morgan County circuit court sentenced him to serve 40 years in prison, with 215 days of presentence custody credit. Young subsequently filed a successive post-conviction petition, which was dismissed. The appellate court declined to address Young's claim that the circuit court erred in failing to award him the correct amount of presentence custody credit, concluding that such a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal from post-conviction proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the claim for additional presentence custody credit under section 5-4.5-100 was forfeited. Young did not object to the presentence-credit calculation at sentencing, in post-trial motions, or in the motion seeking a reduction of his sentence. The issue was not raised on direct appeal or as the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor was it presented in a timely filed section 2-1401 petition. Section 5-4.5-100 does not indicate legislative intent that claims for presentence custody credit are not subject to forfeiture. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) did not permit the appellate court to grant Young's claim despite the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal from post-conviction proceedings. The court nonetheless exercised its supervisory authority to order the circuit court to address the claim and determine the amount of additional presentence custody credit to which Young is entitled. View "People v. Young" on Justia Law

Officer Beaty responded to a call reporting an unconscious person in a vehicle, possibly having a seizure. Defendant’s passenger side tires were on the grass; the driver’s side tires were on the road. The vehicle’s transmission was in park and the motor was running. Defendant was initially unresponsive and then gave incorrect information about his location. Beaty saw an uncapped syringe on the passenger seat and found a plastic bag containing a brown granular substance in defendant’s wallet in the center console. Finding a Red Bull can on the seat, he performed a “NARK swipe," which indicated the presence of opiates. Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4). Beaty requested that he submit to chemical testing and warned that refusal would result in statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. After he refused, his driver’s license was summarily suspended, Illinois Vehicle Code section 11-501.1(e). The circuit court granted his petition to rescind; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, rejecting an argument that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make the arrest. Expert testimony is not required in every case for an officer to testify to his opinion that a motorist was under the influence of drugs based on his inference from the totality of the circumstances. Defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the rescission of his license was improper; the burden did not shift to the state. View "People v. Gocmen" on Justia Law

Taylor's family gathered at her mother’s Wheaton apartment to celebrate Taylor’s release from prison. Taylor’s girlfriend, Walker, joined the party. Taylor later called Defendant to arrange a ride home for Walker. When Defendant arrived, Taylor and Walker went to Defendant’s car. Defendant gave Taylor heroin, crack cocaine, a syringe, and a crack pipe (wrapped in a dirty sock that had blood on it). Taylor returned to the apartment, told her children that she was going to take a shower and went into the bathroom, Walker began calling repeatedly. Based on what Walker told him, Taylor’s son alerted family members, who tried to enter the locked bathroom and called 911. Officers arrived, forced the door open, and performed CPR. Paramedics transported Taylor to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead. A jury convicted Defendant of drug-induced homicide, 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a). The appellate and Illinois Supreme Courts affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in refusing Defendant’s proposed jury instructions on causation and that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court declined to abandon the “contributing cause” standard in favor of a “but for” standard. The instruction should be modified in cases of drug-induced homicide where the defendant delivers multiple controlled substances to the victim but is charged with only one of the deliveries; in this case, the failure to do so was harmless error. View "People v. Nere" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of domestic battery, a Class 4 felony due to a prior aggravated battery conviction. The circuit court sentenced him to three years in prison, and imposed fines and fees. Defendant filed a pro se “Petition for Reduced Sentence,” alleging that his trial counsel should have pointed out several errors in the presentence investigation report but did not raise any issue regarding the fines, fees, or per diem credit. The trial court reappointed Defendant’s trial counsel and denied the motion. The appellate court found that the court's failure to conduct an inquiry into the ineffective assistance claim warranted remand and, noting the state’s concession of error with respect to the $20 "CASA" fee, and directed the circuit court to apply Defendant’s $5 per diem credit toward that assessment. The court rejected a claim that the $2 state’s attorney automation fee is actually a fine, subject to per diem credit, and stated that claims that the sheriff’s fee was improperly assessed; the clerk should not have assessed the $250 DNA fee because defendant was already in the database; and the trial court should not have imposed the $10 Crime Stoppers assessment, relate “to the imposition of fees, not fines,” and did not affect "fundamental fairness.” The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the Crime Stoppers assessment, which the state conceded was not properly imposed as a “fine,” but otherwise affirmed, noting that the DNA fee has been administratively corrected. View "People v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Bingham had a 1993 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault but was not required to register as a sex offender at that time because the conviction occurred before the 1986 enactment of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1). Under section 3(c)(2.1) of the Act as amended in 2011, Bingham’s 2014 felony theft conviction triggered a requirement that he register as a sex offender on account of his 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. Sex offender registration was not reflected in the trial court’s judgment. Bingham argued that the registration requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him on due process grounds and that it violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The appellate court upheld the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, concluding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. That court was not exercising any of the powers delineated in Ill. S. Ct. Rule 615(b)(2) with respect to defendant’s argument, which did not ask the reviewing court to reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken, nor did it ask to set aside or modify any “proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” View "People v. Bingham" on Justia Law