Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

N.G., born in 2011, was declared a ward of the court, based on neglect, and was placed with relatives. Her father, Floyd, was incarcerated. The Will County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of N.G.’s mother and of Floyd, on the grounds that he was an unfit person under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)) because, before N.G.’s birth, he had been convicted of at least three felonies and was therefore “depraved.” The appellate court held that because one of the felonies on which the circuit court had relied, a 2008 conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d)), was based on a statute the Illinois Supreme Court declared unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in 2013, the conviction had no legal effect and should not have been considered in making the fitness determination. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that it had “an affirmative duty to invalidate" Floyd’s AUUW conviction and to treat the statute on which it was based as having never existed. Absent that conviction, the statutory presumption of depravity under section 1(D)(i) would not have been triggered. Under Illinois law, there is no fixed procedural mechanism or forum, nor is there any temporal limitation governing when a void ab initio challenge may be asserted. View "In re N.G." on Justia Law

Vara was convicted of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6)(vii)). The circuit court sentenced him to three years of imprisonment and imposed fines mandated by statutes: a $1000 child pornography fine (720 ILCS 11-20.1(c)), a $500 sex offender fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.15)), and a $500 additional child pornography fine (720 ILCS 5-9-1.14). The court also imposed a $200 fine that was described at the hearing as a “sheriff’s office fine” but was referenced in the written sentencing order as a “sexual assault fine” (720 ILCS 5-9-1.7). The clerk of the Stephenson County Circuit Court included several entries in the electronic accounts receivable record pertaining to Vara’s conviction; some indicated that he was obligated to pay fines not specified in the judgment: “Court” ($50), “Youth Diversion” ($5), “Violent Crime” ($100), “Lump Sum Surcharge” ($250), “Sexual Assault” ($200), “Sex Offender Regis” ($500), “Medical Costs” ($10), “State Police Ops” ($15), “Child Pornography” ($495), and “Clerk Op Deduction” ($5). The appellate court vacated the challenged data entries, rejecting the state’s argument that it had authority to order imposition of mandatory fines that were not imposed by the circuit court. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the clerk’s recording of fines that were not ordered by the circuit court. View "People v. Vara" on Justia Law

The Illinois Vehicle Code prohibits anyone with a revoked driver’s license from driving a “motor vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a); such an individual may still drive a “low-speed gas bicycle.” Section 1-14-.15 defines “low-speed gas bicycle” as a “2 or 3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and a gasoline motor of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved level surface, when powered solely by such a motor while ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour.” Plank, charged with driving a motor vehicle with a revoked license, claimed that the definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” was unconstitutionally vague. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” satisfies due process requirements. The statutory language means that a defining characteristic of a low-speed gas bicycle is an engine that is incapable of transporting 170 pounds at 20 miles per hour without help from gravity or pedaling. A bicycle’s motor will either have this capability or not, regardless of the weight of any particular driver. The vagueness doctrine is not implicated every time officers cannot conclusively determine at a glance whether someone has violated a statutory provision. Once someone is charged with violating section 6-303(a), the prosecutor has the burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt—including that the bicycle at issue had a strong enough motor to qualify as a “motor vehicle.” View "People v. Plank" on Justia Law

In 1998, the defendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. He pleaded guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. In 2013, Bolingbrook Officer Alexander was patrolling a municipal park around 4:30 p.m. when he observed a van improperly parked, checked the van’s plates, and learned that it was registered to the defendant. The defendant acknowledged that he was a child sex offender but stated that his registration requirement had expired in 2010. Alexander informed the defendant that, as a child sex offender, he was forbidden to be on park property. Though the defendant was unaware of the ban, he was arrested for violating 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b), which provides, “It is unlawful for a sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any ... public park.” The trial court rejected a challenge that the law was facially unconstitutional and sentenced the defendant to 24 months’ conditional discharge plus community service. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction and sentence, noting that the rational basis test does not require narrow tailoring. There is a rational relationship between protecting the public, particularly children, from sex offenders and prohibiting sex offenders who have been convicted of crimes against minors from being in public park. The court remanded for consideration of a challenge under the ex post facto clause. View "People v. Pepitone" on Justia Law

Manning’s second trial for first-degree murder established that the victim was a highly-intoxicated unwelcome visitor at a residence occupied by Manning and others. A fight ensued between the victim and four residents, including Manning. The victim was stabbed and died. Only Manning was armed. The court instructed the jury on self-defense and on second-degree murder, based on statutory mitigating factors: an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense and provocation, with mutual combat being the requisite provocation, 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) The jury asked: For approving mitigating factors to reduce charge to second-degree murder, if vote on mitigating factor is not unanimous, does it revert to first-degree murder? The court responded: Your verdict must be unanimous ... continue your deliberations. The jury found Manning guilty of first-degree murder. The court denied Manning’s request to poll the jury on the issue of mitigating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction. A defendant’s failure to sustain his burden of convincing all 12 jurors that a mitigating factor exists does not nullify the jurors’ unanimous finding that the state has proven first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The response to the jury’s question was correct when considered with instructions the jurors had received that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proof with regard to second-degree murder until it has first determined that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each element of first-degree murder.The statute places no burden on the state to disprove mitigating factors. View "People v. Manning" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating an order of protection, a Class 4 felony based on his prior conviction (720 ILCS 5/12-3.4(d)). The parties did not agree to a sentence, but the state agreed not to prosecute two counts of aggravated battery of a peace officer and another count of violating an order of protection. The court explained that the offense carried a sentencing range of one to six years’ imprisonment but misstated that the offense required a one-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to three years’ imprisonment and one year of MSR. A year later, at a hearing where Defendant was present without counsel. the court entered an amended order, indicating four years of MSR as required by 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(6). Defendant was released from prison onto MSR and moved to “correct” the mittimus to reflect the original imposition of a one-year MSR term, arguing that he would not have entered a plea if he had been properly advised that he was subject to a mandatory four-year MSR term. The court stated that the only option to correct the sentence was a mandamus action in the Illinois Supreme Court. That court granted the state’s mandamus petition. The record does not support Defendant’s suggestion that the trial court would have been inclined to reduce his prison term had it imposed the correct MSR. The court declined to enter a new rule to allow statutorily unauthorized sentences to be corrected at any time by motion in the circuit court. View "Berlin v. Bakalis" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on 15 charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault and three charges of criminal sexual assault. Before trial, the state successfully moved for admission other crimes evidence to show that defendant committed similar sexual assaults. Defense counsel indicated that Defendant intended to testify that the victims all consented to sex with Defendant in exchange for cash and drugs but that, after they provided the agreed services, Defendant took back the payments. Counsel asked the court to inquire of the venire whether “[t]he fact that you will hear evidence about … prostitution. Would that fact alone prevent you from being fair to either side?” The court refused, The victims testified about the attacks. Defendant testified. The jury found Defendant guilty. The appellate court remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. There is no body of law indicating that the public harbors bias against the patrons of prostitutes to the extent that such a person’s testimony cannot be considered fairly. Defendant’s proffered question did not involve a matter that was indisputably true and inextricably a part of the trial but amounted to a preliminary argument regarding a disputed question of fact, which is generally not permitted. Even if the victims were prostitutes, it is difficult to conceive how a juror who could fairly judge the explicit sexual conduct would be rendered incapable of fairly judging defendant based on the fact he patronized prostitutes. View "People v. Encalado" on Justia Law

A Robinson police officer heard a motorcycle “revving” before observing it making a “very wide” turn, nearly hitting a telephone pole. The officer followed, turned on his emergency lights, and activated his siren, but the motorcycle continued to weave across the road for about 12 blocks before turning into a driveway. The motorcycle was driven by Mark, whose wife, Petra, was a passenger on the back. Mark got off the motorcycle, exhibiting “a strong odor of alcohol,” slurred speech, and poor balance. A breath test revealed his blood alcohol concentration was 0.161, over twice the legal limit. Mark was charged with aggravated DUI and driving without a valid driver’s license. Since 1996, his license had been summarily suspended multiple times; it was revoked following his 2008 DUI conviction. That revocation was extended after he was convicted of driving with a revoked license. Police seized the 2010 Harley-Davidson. The state sought forfeiture (720 ILCS 5/36-1(a)(6)(A)(i)). Petra was shown to be the vehicle’s title owner, although Mark maintained it and had the key. The court entered an order of civil forfeiture, finding Petra’s testimony not credible, and that she consented to Mark driving, knowing he was intoxicated and did not have a valid license. The court rejected her claim that forfeiture constituted an as-applied violation of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Petra’s culpability in Mark’s aggravated DUI was far more than negligible and she did not establish the motorcycle’s value for purposes of showing disproportionality. View "Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson" on Justia Law

Chairez pled guilty to possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a park in Aurora, Illinois. He filed a post-conviction petition, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment because an individual who is barred from carrying a firearm within 1000 feet of the locations listed in the statute (schools, public parks, public transportation facilities, residential properties owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency) is essentially barred from carrying a firearm in public. The circuit court declared section 24-1(a)(4)(c)(1.5) unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, vacating Chairez’s conviction, without addressing other provisions of the statute. With respect to the provision concerning public parks, which is severable, the state provided no evidentiary support for its claims that prohibiting firearms within 1000 feet of a public park would reduce the risks posed to the police and public from dangerous weapons. The state merely speculates that the proximity of firearms threatens the health and safety of those in the public park. The lack of a valid explanation for how the law actually achieves its goal of protecting children and vulnerable populations from gun violence amounts to a failure by the state to justify the restriction on gun possession within 1000 feet of a public park. View "People v. Chairez" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers executed a search warrant at an apartment, forced entry and detained four individuals. Officers approached a locked, rear room, knocked and heard people moving, but got no response. Forcing entry, officers saw defendant holding a handgun (loaded with live rounds) and plastic bags, one containing 53 smaller bags of suspected crack cocaine and the other containing 92 bags of suspected heroin. Drugs, cash, ammunition, and narcotics packaging materials were also recovered from other areas. A chemist verified the contents of the bags defendant was holding. Defendant had prior convictions for robbery and aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted as an armed habitual criminal, armed violence, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The possession counts merged into the armed violence count. Defendant was sentenced to 7 years in prison on the armed habitual criminal count, consecutive to 15 years on the armed violence count. Consecutive sentences were mandated under Unified Code of Corrections section 5-8-4(d)(3). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that his convictions for both armed violence and armed habitual criminal violated the one-act, one-crime rule because they were predicated on the same physical act of gun possession. The offenses did not result from precisely the same physical act and neither was a lesser-included offense of the other. Defendant’s conduct consisted of possession of the handgun and possession of the drugs. Although the two offenses shared the common act of possession of the handgun, the armed violence conviction involved a separate act, possessing the drugs. View "People v. Coats" on Justia Law