Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a third trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the state failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining DNA test results, so the trial court erred in granting an extension of the speedy-trial deadline. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal; the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. In 2014, a private attorney retained by Defendant filed a post-conviction petition, which was summarily dismissed. Defendant’s attorney filed a notice of appeal. Two weeks later, defendant filed a timely pro se motion to reconsider the dismissal and to allow supplementation, alleging his post-conviction attorney had failed to include several claims that defendant had requested be part of the petition. Defendant stated that, after receiving a letter from his attorney “about money and why he didn’t raise ineffective [assistance] of direct appeal counsel,” defendant “never heard from counsel again, until [the] court dismiss[ed] [the] petition.” The circuit court denied the motion and did not consider the merits or whether defendant’s attorney should have included those claims. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A defendant who retains a private attorney at the first stage of postconviction proceedings is entitled to reasonable assistance of counsel. At the first stage, there are no hearings, no arguments, and no introduction of evidence; any assertion of deficient attorney performance will almost certainly be that counsel failed to include claims the defendant wanted to have raised. A defendant who retains private counsel is bound by the attorney’s decision not to include a claim in the petition. The rationale for requiring a reasonable level of assistance from privately retained counsel at the second and third stages of postconviction proceedings applies equally to first stage representation. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Easton pled guilty to aggravated unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and four counts of unlawful use of a credit card. At sentencing, the court imposed concurrent 10-year prison terms for all six convictions. Defendant moved for reconsideration of the sentences. Defense counsel filed an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) certificate. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court vacated, holding that the certificate did not comply with Rule 604(d), which was amended during the pendency of the appeal, requiring that counsel certify that he “has consulted with the defendant ... to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty”. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the certificate did not comply with the unamended rule. The amended rule, although procedural in nature, did not apply to the petition. The defendant’s post-plea proceedings in the circuit court were completed more than a year before Rule 604(d) was amended, so there were no “ongoing proceedings” to which the amended rule would apply. The result of the appellate court’s decision was to necessitate new proceedings in order to apply an amendment to a procedural rule that postdated the post-plea proceedings, which is not warranted under Illinois retroactivity jurisprudence. View "People v. Easton" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant failed to cooperate with both an Assistant Public Defender (ADA) and private counsel, who withdrew. Defendant failed to appear and was taken into custody. The court appointed another ADA. who appeared twice, then informed the court that Defendant had not come into the office. The court urged Defendant to cooperate. In April 2013, while free on bond, defendant was arrested and charged with two additional counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. In June 2013, Defendant pled guilty to two counts in exchange for consecutive sentences of five years’ and six years’ imprisonment. The state dismissed four additional charges. In September 2013, Defendant pro se filed a post-conviction petition alleging that counsel failed to adequately investigate and that no justification was given for consecutive sentences. Defendant appeared with ADA Cappellini and requested a long continuance because he and Cappellini had a disagreement. Cappellini stated that Defendant refused to listen to him. Additional continuances followed; after falling out with another ADA, Defendant was required to proceed pro se. The court denied his petition. The Illinois Supreme Court found waiver by conduct of Defendant’s right to representation. Defendant was expressly warned, several times, that he could lose his right to counsel through his continued conduct and then would be required to represent himself; he was granted 17 continuances. The court took extraordinary pains to accommodate his desire to retain private counsel. Defendant’s "dilatory efforts served to thwart the administration of justice" by further delay caused the court to require him to represent himself. Defendant’s continued refusal to cooperate constituted a knowing and intelligent election to proceed pro se. View "People v. Lesley" on Justia Law

A Lake County jury convicted Dupree of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated robbery. His convictions were upheld on direct appeal. He filed a postconviction petition. At the second stage, Dupree filed a third-amended petition raising several claims, including a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an “exculpatory witness” to testify. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that Dupree failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal without considering the ineffective assistance claim on its merits but holding that the postconviction petition was properly dismissed, as a matter of law, solely because defendant failed to attach to his petition an affidavit from the proposed witness. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial court. Under the facts of this case, the failure to provide an affidavit was not, by itself, fatal to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition was appropriate because Dupree failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. View "People v. Dupree" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed defendant's conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the evidence presented gave rise to a reasonable inference that the location was a church and that it was functioning as it purported to be at the time of the offense. View "People v. Newton" on Justia Law

Applying People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, which held that the warrantless use of a drug-detection dog at a defendant’s apartment door, located within a locked apartment building, violated a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' judgment that the police violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a dog sniff of the threshold of defendant's apartment, located on the third floor of an unlocked apartment building. The court also held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case. View "People v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's decision to reverse the circuit court's order granting defendant's motion to seal his fourth and fifth motions in limine over the objection of intervenors. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appeal.The court held that a First Amendment presumption of access did not attach to defendant's motions and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying intervenors access to the motions under a common-law right of access. In this case, a thorough review of the hearing on intervenors' request to unseal the motions revealed that the trial court attempted to strike a careful balance among competing interests and remand on this issue was unnecessary. View "People v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant was 18 years and 3 months at the time of the offenses, and he was sentenced to 76 years in prison. The appellate court vacated defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that the aggregate prison term violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; defendant forfeited his as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause because defendant did not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, an evidentiary hearing was not held on his constitutional claim, and the court declined to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing; and defendant's facial challenge to his aggregate sentence under the Eighth Amendment failed because, for sentencing purposes, the age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults. Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

Young was convicted of first-degree murder based on the 2005 stabbing death of his girlfriend. The Morgan County circuit court sentenced him to serve 40 years in prison, with 215 days of presentence custody credit. Young subsequently filed a successive post-conviction petition, which was dismissed. The appellate court declined to address Young's claim that the circuit court erred in failing to award him the correct amount of presentence custody credit, concluding that such a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal from post-conviction proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the claim for additional presentence custody credit under section 5-4.5-100 was forfeited. Young did not object to the presentence-credit calculation at sentencing, in post-trial motions, or in the motion seeking a reduction of his sentence. The issue was not raised on direct appeal or as the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor was it presented in a timely filed section 2-1401 petition. Section 5-4.5-100 does not indicate legislative intent that claims for presentence custody credit are not subject to forfeiture. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) did not permit the appellate court to grant Young's claim despite the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal from post-conviction proceedings. The court nonetheless exercised its supervisory authority to order the circuit court to address the claim and determine the amount of additional presentence custody credit to which Young is entitled. View "People v. Young" on Justia Law

Officer Beaty responded to a call reporting an unconscious person in a vehicle, possibly having a seizure. Defendant’s passenger side tires were on the grass; the driver’s side tires were on the road. The vehicle’s transmission was in park and the motor was running. Defendant was initially unresponsive and then gave incorrect information about his location. Beaty saw an uncapped syringe on the passenger seat and found a plastic bag containing a brown granular substance in defendant’s wallet in the center console. Finding a Red Bull can on the seat, he performed a “NARK swipe," which indicated the presence of opiates. Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4). Beaty requested that he submit to chemical testing and warned that refusal would result in statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. After he refused, his driver’s license was summarily suspended, Illinois Vehicle Code section 11-501.1(e). The circuit court granted his petition to rescind; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, rejecting an argument that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make the arrest. Expert testimony is not required in every case for an officer to testify to his opinion that a motorist was under the influence of drugs based on his inference from the totality of the circumstances. Defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the rescission of his license was improper; the burden did not shift to the state. View "People v. Gocmen" on Justia Law