Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant neither appealed nor sought certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. In August 2008, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition. He asserted the petition’s due date as March 11, 2008, reasoning that he would have had until June 11, 2007 to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court and until September 11, 2007, to seek certiorari. An affidavit from inmate Askew, a “freelance paralegal,” indicated that defendant was unable to obtain the record until March 19, 2008; after that, timely completion of the petition was prevented by prison lockdowns from March 25 through April 18, and on April 24 and May 15, 2008. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely; the appellate court reversed. On remand, defendant testified that sometime in 2007, he received notice that his conviction had been affirmed, but was unsure how to proceed. In January 2008 he was approached by Askew, who told him to request transcripts. Defendant stated that he never knew what the deadline was. The judge granted the motion to file the petition late. The case was reassigned. The second judge dismissed defendant’s petition as untimely, also finding that defendant’s claims had no merit. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the second judge had authority to reconsider the prior order. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its rulings. While literal reading of the statute does not specifically include a deadline for filing a post-conviction petition when no petition for leave to appeal is filed, the correct reading of the statute indicates that the post-conviction petition was due on December 11, 2007, before any of the cited hardships. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

An indictment alleged that defendant, in committing a battery, “knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Correctional Officer Jody Davis, in that the defendant threw an unknown liquid substance" on Davis "striking him about the body, knowing Jody Davis to be a correctional institution employee ... engaged in the performance of his authorized duties.” The state filed notice that defendant was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b), should defendant be convicted of the Class 2 felony of aggravated battery, 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)(h). Following questioning and admonishment, defendant waived his right to counsel, electing to proceed pro se. Defendant then filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress an incriminating statement that he made to corrections officer Snyder. At his jury trial, defendant continued to appear pro se and was convicted. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction but vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded, holding that defendant was not eligible for Class X sentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgment. Defendant was not in custody and was not coerced into incriminating himself during his interview with Officer Snyder; the court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant was properly sentenced as a Class X offender. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Price of aggravated arson and the first-degree murder of a 4-year-old who died in the fire. The court denied his request for separate verdict forms for the theories of murder charged (intentional, knowing, and felony murder), so the jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The court sentenced defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment for murder and a consecutive term of 30 years’ imprisonment for aggravated arson. The appellate court affirmed. In 2000 and in 2003, defendant unsuccessfully pursued relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In 2010, defendant unsuccessfully sought relief from judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 2-1401 . He did not challenge, on direct or collateral review, the denial of his request for separate verdict forms. In 2012, defendant filed his second section 2-1401 pro se petition, arguing that the two-year time bar did not apply to “voidness grounds,” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f), and that the court erred in denying his request for separate verdict forms and, therefore, lacked authority to render judgment. The trial court dismissed, finding that the underlying judgment was not void and that the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2009 decision (Smith) did not apply retroactively on collateral review. The appellate court remanded for resentencing on felony murder alone, finding that the rule regarding special verdict forms announced in Smith applied retroactively on collateral review. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently announced its “Castleberry” decision, abolishing the void sentence rule, then held that, in light of Castleberry, defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was untimely and properly dismissed. View "People v. Price" on Justia Law

McDonald killed his boyfriend, Gladney, during an altercation in 2004. Paramedics found Gladney lying on the ground in their Chicago backyard. His face was covered in blood; there was a very large laceration on his face. The paramedics could smell alcohol on Gladney’s breath and observed needle track marks indicating drug use. Gladney was bleeding profusely and was very combative as the paramedics attempted to treat him. He had three stab wounds. After McDonald’s 2007 conviction was overturned on appeal due to an erroneous jury instruction, he was again convicted of first-degree murder in 2012. The trial court instructed the jury on second-degree murder, unreasonable belief in self-defense, but declined to give instructions on second-degree murder due to serious provocation or involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced defendant to 27 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the tendered instructions. Employing plain-error review, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. There was insufficient evidence of serious provocation to warrant the requested instruction; McDonald was trying to prevent Gladney from leaving by keeping him from taking his bicycle. As they struggled, defendant swung the knife at Gladney, stabbing him three times. There is no evidence that Gladney threatened McDonald. The stab wound to Gladney’s cheek was deep enough to strike the carotid artery. Defendant was not merely swinging the knife recklessly. View "People v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Castleberry was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8)) based on separate contacts with the victim. The state argued that Castleberry was subject to a mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement on each conviction because the crimes were committed while Castleberry was armed with a firearm. When added to the mandatory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment for each offense, the enhancements required a mandatory minimum term of 21 years’ imprisonment on each conviction. The court held that the legislature had intended the enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances and sentenced Castleberry to a nine-year term on each conviction, adding the 15-year enhancement to only one sentence, for a total term of 33 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court rejected Castleberry’s constitutional challenge to the enhancement and, invoking the then-extant “void sentence rule,” remanded for resentencing. That rule stated that ‘[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void.’ The Illinois Supreme Court granted a mandamus petition, requiring the circuit court to sentence Castleberry with the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement imposed on each of his convictions. The court had abolished the “void sentence rule” as a means to correct sentences that do not comport with statutory mandates four days before the state’s filing. The court rejected Castleberry’s contentions that the relief sought was barred by the doctrine of laches and that a conflict in statutes defeats a “clear right to relief.” View "Alvarez v. Gaughan" on Justia Law

Defendant’s 2007 first-degree murder conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition in 2010 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence, which was dismissed as frivolous. The appellate court affirmed. On March 25, 2012, defendant mailed a petition for relief from judgment (Code of Civil Procedure section 2-1401), claiming perjury by a state’s witness. Defendant attached a “proof/certificate of service,” which stated that the petition was mailed “with proper first-class postage attached thereto” via the prison mail system.” The certificate did not indicate that the petition was mailed via certified or registered mail as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 105. The petition was marked “received” on April 11 by the clerk’s office and file-marked and docketed on April 23. On May 24, the circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely and stated that the petition contained no argument of merit. An assistant state’s attorney was present. The appellate court vacated. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the state, based on his own failure to properly serve the state. A section 2-1401 petitioner must serve the responding party with notice in compliance with Rule 105. If the respondent is not properly served, the court lacks personal jurisdiction unless the respondent waives service or makes an appearance. The defendant is estopped from claiming service was improper based on his own failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 105. View "People v. Matthews" on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant was charged with Class 2 felony aggravated DUI, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(2)(B), alleging two prior DUI convictions in 1994 (Georgia) and 2013 (Illinois). The circuit court found defendant guilty of aggravated DUI, but expressed skepticism on whether defendant’s DUI conviction should be classified as a Class 2 felony for sentencing purposes. The prosecution submitted certified copies of defendant’s two prior DUI convictions and argued that it was aggravated DUI and a Class 2 felony under subsection (d)(2)(B) because it was a third conviction. The state acknowledged that another provision, subsection (d)(2)(A), generally classified aggravated DUI as a Class 4 felony, but argued that because defendant was charged under subsection (d)(2)(B), that provision’s express classification must control. The prosecution noted that defendant’s record included a 1989 Class 2 felony conviction, a 1981 Class X felony conviction, and a 1980 Class 2 felony conviction. The court sentenced defendant as a Class 4 offender to 24 months of probation, stating that the statute was inconsistent. The Illinois Supreme Court granted a petition for mandamus. Defendant’s third DUI conviction constituted aggravated DUI, a Class 2 felony under subsection (d)(2)(B)'s plain language; because defendant had two prior Class 2 felony or higher convictions, he must be sentenced as a Class X offender on this aggravated DUI conviction. View "Glasgow v. Carlson" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Montano, for 29 counts of first-degree murder, arising out of the 2013 shooting death of Solano, and 4 counts of attempted murder and 1 count of aggravated battery, arising out of the shooting of Maza. Montano was 15 years old at the time of the offenses. The charges were brought in criminal court, under section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act as then in effect. While the charges were pending, a statutory amendment raised the age for automatic adult prosecution for the enumerated offenses from 15 to 16. The prosecution objected to a transfer, arguing that because the implementation of the amendment was delayed until January 1, 2016, it was presumed to have a prospective effect. The court transferred the cause to juvenile court, reasoning that, because the legislature had not indicated the temporal reach of the amendment, the temporal reach was determined by section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. The court concluded that the juvenile transfer statute was procedural and would apply retroactively. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the state’s petition for mandamus. The amendment was retroactive under the Statute on Statutes and belongs in juvenile court, unless it is transferred to criminal court pursuant to a discretionary transfer hearing. View "Alvarez v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2010, the circuit court adjudicated Minnis a delinquent minor for committing the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(b) and sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. The adjudication for criminal sexual abuse rendered him a “sex offender” pursuant to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), (B)(1); the court ordered Minnis to register as a sex offender. On December 17, 2010, defendant reported to the Normal police department to register. He disclosed his two e-mail addresses and his Facebook account. Defendant’s May 2011 registration form listed the same Internet information. Defendant registered again in August 2014, including his two e-mail addresses, but omitting his Facebook account. On September 9, Normal police officers viewed defendant’s publicly accessible Facebook profile online; Minnis had changed his Facebook cover photo only one month before his August 2014 registration. The circuit court of McLean County dismissed a charge of failure to register, finding that the Internet disclosure provision was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, treating the challenge as one to facial validity. The Internet disclosure provision survives intermediate scrutiny. It advances a substantial governmental interest without chilling more speech than necessary. View "People v. Minnis" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-5). Before trial, the prosecution and defense agreed that the sentencing range would be 4-30 years. Defendant’s counsel stated that the state had tendered a “certified court docket from the ’04 JD case” indicating that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary, which would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. Counsel also indicated that defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4-30 years. At trial, the evidence was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence regarding defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant guilty. A presentencing investigative report indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses, including three counts of residential burglary. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated Supreme Court rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and Shepard v. United States (2005). Defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi and falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and an exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code. The state was not required to allege the fact of his juvenile adjudication in the indictment or prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law