Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Montano, for 29 counts of first-degree murder, arising out of the 2013 shooting death of Solano, and 4 counts of attempted murder and 1 count of aggravated battery, arising out of the shooting of Maza. Montano was 15 years old at the time of the offenses. The charges were brought in criminal court, under section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act as then in effect. While the charges were pending, a statutory amendment raised the age for automatic adult prosecution for the enumerated offenses from 15 to 16. The prosecution objected to a transfer, arguing that because the implementation of the amendment was delayed until January 1, 2016, it was presumed to have a prospective effect. The court transferred the cause to juvenile court, reasoning that, because the legislature had not indicated the temporal reach of the amendment, the temporal reach was determined by section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. The court concluded that the juvenile transfer statute was procedural and would apply retroactively. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the state’s petition for mandamus. The amendment was retroactive under the Statute on Statutes and belongs in juvenile court, unless it is transferred to criminal court pursuant to a discretionary transfer hearing. View "Alvarez v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2010, the circuit court adjudicated Minnis a delinquent minor for committing the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(b) and sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. The adjudication for criminal sexual abuse rendered him a “sex offender” pursuant to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), (B)(1); the court ordered Minnis to register as a sex offender. On December 17, 2010, defendant reported to the Normal police department to register. He disclosed his two e-mail addresses and his Facebook account. Defendant’s May 2011 registration form listed the same Internet information. Defendant registered again in August 2014, including his two e-mail addresses, but omitting his Facebook account. On September 9, Normal police officers viewed defendant’s publicly accessible Facebook profile online; Minnis had changed his Facebook cover photo only one month before his August 2014 registration. The circuit court of McLean County dismissed a charge of failure to register, finding that the Internet disclosure provision was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, treating the challenge as one to facial validity. The Internet disclosure provision survives intermediate scrutiny. It advances a substantial governmental interest without chilling more speech than necessary. View "People v. Minnis" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-5). Before trial, the prosecution and defense agreed that the sentencing range would be 4-30 years. Defendant’s counsel stated that the state had tendered a “certified court docket from the ’04 JD case” indicating that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary, which would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. Counsel also indicated that defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4-30 years. At trial, the evidence was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence regarding defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant guilty. A presentencing investigative report indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses, including three counts of residential burglary. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated Supreme Court rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and Shepard v. United States (2005). Defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi and falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and an exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code. The state was not required to allege the fact of his juvenile adjudication in the indictment or prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant was charged with burglary for entering and taking jewelry from an unoccupied house. The circuit court appointed a public defender and a Spanish-speaking interpreter. At a pretrial hearing, the parties informed the court that defendant would plead guilty to burglary, a Class 2 felony and would be sentenced to four months in the county jail, with credit for time served. The court admonished defendant in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) and, pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/113-8), stated that a burglary conviction “may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States.” Defendant stated that he understood and still wished to plead guilty. Later, the judge again admonished defendant that pleading guilty to burglary meant he “could be deported from the country,” a decision that would be “up to the federal government.” Defendant again acknowledged that he understood the potential immigration consequences. The court accepted defendant’s guilty plea. Within 30 days, defendant filed a pro se motion to “open and vacate” his conviction. The circuit court appointed new counsel. Counsel filed an amended motion, alleging that defense counsel failed to inform defendant of the consequences of his plea on his resident alien status. The court denied the motions, stating that any prejudice was cured by the court’s own admonishments. A divided appellate court vacated, citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the denial of the motion. “To accept the defendant’s claim would require us to characterize the court’s lengthy and exhaustive admonitions as merely a perfunctory or ritualistic formality; a characterization we are unwilling to make.” View "People v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Reyes, then 16, was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ventura and the attempted murders of two others, having discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by the three. Prosecuted as an adult, he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction plus 26 years’ imprisonment for each of the two attempted murder convictions. The sentences were required to run consecutively, resulting in aggregate sentence of 97 years’ imprisonment. Under the truth in sentencing statute he was required to serve a minimum of 89 years before he would be eligible for release. In the appellate court, defendant cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” The Court clarified that life-without-parole sentences must be based on judicial discretion rather than statutory mandates. The appellate court held that Miller applied only to actual sentences of life without the possibility of parole and not to aggregate consecutive sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law

An altercation ended with defendant shooting Miller multiple times with a laser-sighted firearm. He was convicted of armed violence predicated on aggravated battery and aggravated battery with a firearm; the jury found that an extended-term sentence was warranted (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(6)). After post-trial motions, defendant wrote a letter asserting ineffective assistance by his privately-retained counsel, who, allegedly, assigned defendant’s bond to his fee without defendant’s knowledge; failed to disclose a prior connection to Miller’s father; failed to interview certain witnesses, to test certain evidence, to hire a ballistics expert, and to contest the admission of certain evidence; and failed to prepare defendant to testify. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison for armed violence, into which was merged defendant’s aggravated battery conviction. The court appointed a public defender and scheduled a hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance claims. At the hearing, no witnesses were called. Appointed counsel summarized the concerns raised in defendant’s letter. The court concluded that, under the “Stickland” standard, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that counsel’s alleged errors substantially affected the outcome of defendant’s case. On appeal, defendant argued that aggravated battery cannot serve as the predicate for an armed violence conviction and that he received ineffective assistance from his appointed counsel by merely repeating the claims contained in defendant’s letter. The appellate court agreed that the statute prohibits predicating armed violence on the aggravated battery statute, but held that defendant was required to show that he was prejudiced by appointed counsel’s deficient performance. The court examined the record and determined that no prejudice occurred. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the armed violence conviction and affirmed as to ineffective assistance. Aggravated battery with a firearm is an enhanced form of battery; there is no reason why it cannot serve as the predicate for a charge of armed violence. The court rejected an argument that appointed counsel’s inaction “entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” such that a court may presume prejudice under United States v. Cronic. View "People v. Cherry" on Justia Law

Bishop, 69 years old, was found in his apartment bound and severely beaten. Defendant was arrested. The prosecution sought to depose Bishop under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 414, which allows an evidence deposition if there is a “substantial possibility” that the witness will not be available to testify at trial. Bishop had sustained serious head injuries during the attack; his condition was likely to deteriorate. Defendant objected, arguing that Bishop could only communicate by shaking his head, precluding meaningful cross-examination. The court granted the motion, stating that if Bishop could only shake his head, the deposition would be inadmissible. The order required that the sheriff transport defendant to the deposition. The words “over the objection of the defendant” were handwritten; the entire paragraph was then scribbled over by hand. Bishop’s video deposition took place with two assistant public defenders (APDs) present. Defendant did not attend. Bishop stated that defendant had attacked him and identified a photograph of the hammer recovered from his apartment. On cross-examination, Bishop stated that photographs had been shown to him before the deposition. Bishop remembered that he had previously shared an apartment with defendant. At a status hearing, with defendant present, an APD acknowledged waiving defendant’s appearance at the deposition. The prosecution moved to admit Bishop’s deposition as a hearsay exception (Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)), and presented testimony from Bishop’s physician. The court concluded that Bishop’s condition rendered him unavailable and admitted the deposition, concluding that there had been an opportunity to cross-examine. The jury heard testimony from neighbors about arguing between defendant and Bishop before the attack, testimony that defendant had admitted to the crime, DNA evidence, and Bishop’s deposition. Convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen, defendant was sentenced to 22 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that the admission of Bishop’s deposition violated his Sixth Amendment rights. A divided appellate court agreed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Although the court erred in not obtaining the written waiver, defendant clearly knew that the deposition had been ordered and that he could attend. Defendant was provided with the opportunity for confrontation. View "People v. Hood" on Justia Law

On May 5, 2014, defendant received a traffic citation from a Troy police officer for speeding. The citation was filed with the Madison County circuit court clerk’s office on May 9. Defendant moved to dismiss the citation, claiming it was not transmitted to the circuit court clerk within 48 hours after it was issued, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 552. At a hearing, the court noted that defendant submitted “a stack of tickets” issued by the city of Troy. The state described the exhibit, stating “of the (50) tickets that Defendant submitted into evidence, almost half of them were filed within the 48 hours.” An officer testified that after a citation is issued, it is placed in a secure box in the dispatch office. On Mondays and Fridays, a supervisor would remove the citations, review and record them on bond sheets, and deliver them to the courthouse. He estimated that 30-50 citations were filed each Monday and Friday and that it was not “physically possible” to transport the citations to the courthouse every day. The trial court determined that the evidence showed “a clear and consistent violation of Rule 552 and not an inadvertent action” and dismissed the ticket. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reading the Rule as directory, not mandatory, so that dismissal is appropriate only if a defendant shows prejudice by the delay; here, the violation was not intentional. View "People v. Geiler" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant, then age 17, was indicted on six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) The counts alleged that he carried in a vehicle, outside the home, a .38-caliber handgun and a 9-millimeter handgun, each of which was “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible,” without a valid FOID card, and while under 21 years of age (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)). He pleaded guilty to one count. Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation, which was ultimately terminated unsatisfactorily. In 2005, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years in prison. In 2008, defendant was charged in separate cases with multiple counts of armed robbery, AUUW, and unauthorized use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), “having been previously convicted of the felony offense of [AUUW].” Defendant had robbed three different victims at gunpoint within a 24-hour period. Defendant agreed, and acknowledged that he understood that he was agreeing, that he had a prior AUUW conviction. Convicted, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 29 years for each robbery, with a concurrent sentence of 10 years for the UUW convictions. The appellate court vacated one UUW conviction, citing one-act, one-crime principles, and vacated the remaining UUW, because the AUUW conviction arose from a statute that was held to be facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Under the UUW by a felon statute, defendant’s felon status at the time of the offense properly served as sufficient proof of the predicate felony conviction. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

The Johnson County circuit court appointed a psychiatric expert at the state’s request, who testified at trial under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), 725 ILCS 205/0.01, that Grant had not recovered and was substantially likely to commit future sex offenses. A jury found that he was still a sexually dangerous person. The appellate court reversed, holding that the SDPA does not contemplate the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert for the state in a recovery proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; “when the legislature wants to grant the State the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation of a respondent, it knows how to do so.” While the SDPA quite clearly allows a respondent in a sexually dangerous persons proceeding to retain a private expert witness, there is nothing in the plain language of the SDPA allowing the state to do so, and the SDPA must be strictly construed. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law