Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 5, 2014, defendant received a traffic citation from a Troy police officer for speeding. The citation was filed with the Madison County circuit court clerk’s office on May 9. Defendant moved to dismiss the citation, claiming it was not transmitted to the circuit court clerk within 48 hours after it was issued, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 552. At a hearing, the court noted that defendant submitted “a stack of tickets” issued by the city of Troy. The state described the exhibit, stating “of the (50) tickets that Defendant submitted into evidence, almost half of them were filed within the 48 hours.” An officer testified that after a citation is issued, it is placed in a secure box in the dispatch office. On Mondays and Fridays, a supervisor would remove the citations, review and record them on bond sheets, and deliver them to the courthouse. He estimated that 30-50 citations were filed each Monday and Friday and that it was not “physically possible” to transport the citations to the courthouse every day. The trial court determined that the evidence showed “a clear and consistent violation of Rule 552 and not an inadvertent action” and dismissed the ticket. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reading the Rule as directory, not mandatory, so that dismissal is appropriate only if a defendant shows prejudice by the delay; here, the violation was not intentional. View "People v. Geiler" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant, then age 17, was indicted on six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) The counts alleged that he carried in a vehicle, outside the home, a .38-caliber handgun and a 9-millimeter handgun, each of which was “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible,” without a valid FOID card, and while under 21 years of age (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)). He pleaded guilty to one count. Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation, which was ultimately terminated unsatisfactorily. In 2005, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years in prison. In 2008, defendant was charged in separate cases with multiple counts of armed robbery, AUUW, and unauthorized use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), “having been previously convicted of the felony offense of [AUUW].” Defendant had robbed three different victims at gunpoint within a 24-hour period. Defendant agreed, and acknowledged that he understood that he was agreeing, that he had a prior AUUW conviction. Convicted, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 29 years for each robbery, with a concurrent sentence of 10 years for the UUW convictions. The appellate court vacated one UUW conviction, citing one-act, one-crime principles, and vacated the remaining UUW, because the AUUW conviction arose from a statute that was held to be facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Under the UUW by a felon statute, defendant’s felon status at the time of the offense properly served as sufficient proof of the predicate felony conviction. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

The Johnson County circuit court appointed a psychiatric expert at the state’s request, who testified at trial under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), 725 ILCS 205/0.01, that Grant had not recovered and was substantially likely to commit future sex offenses. A jury found that he was still a sexually dangerous person. The appellate court reversed, holding that the SDPA does not contemplate the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert for the state in a recovery proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; “when the legislature wants to grant the State the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation of a respondent, it knows how to do so.” While the SDPA quite clearly allows a respondent in a sexually dangerous persons proceeding to retain a private expert witness, there is nothing in the plain language of the SDPA allowing the state to do so, and the SDPA must be strictly construed. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced, as a habitual criminal, to natural life imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. In 2011, defendant, through privately retained counsel, filed a postconviction petition, claiming due process violations and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel on multiple grounds. The trial court advanced defendant’s petition to second-stage proceedings. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition was not timely filed; that defendant failed to allege the untimely filing was not due to his culpable negligence; that defendant’s substantive claims were barred by res judicata and waiver and consisted primarily of unsupported, conclusory allegations; and that none of the claims made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Defendant’s postconviction counsel filed a response, arguing that the petition was untimely filed because trial counsel failed to inform defendant about the appellate court’s June 3, 2009, decision. In support, defendant attached evidence that the notice of appeal was mailed to his mother, not to defendant. The court dismissed, finding that the record did not substantiate defendant’s claim that his trial counsel suborned perjury and that counsel’s decisions did not rise to the level of deprivation of a constitutional right. The court did not reference timeliness. On appeal, defendant unsuccessfully argued only that his privately retained postconviction counsel did not provide the requisite “reasonable level of assistance” during second-stage proceedings because counsel failed to contest the assertion that defendant’s petition was untimely based on culpable negligence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating the reasonable level of assistance standard applies to both retained and appointed postconviction counsel and that counsel met the standard. View "People v. Cotto" on Justia Law

Hernandez,was convicted of armed robbery, a Class X felony under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, and was sentenced to an extended term of 40 years’ imprisonment. Following an evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, during which he argued that the 40-year term imposed for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the circuit court granted a new sentencing hearing, finding the statute “facially unconstitutional” because it carried a harsher penalty than the penalty for “armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 5/33A-1. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the 40-year term of imprisonment. The definition of dangerous weapon for purposes of the armed robbery statute includes not only objects that are per se dangerous, but objects that are used or may be used in a dangerous manner. The common-law definition of “dangerous weapon” found in the armed robbery statute is broader than the definition of “dangerous weapon” in the armed violence statute. The elements of armed robbery, which require proof that defendant was “armed with a dangerous weapon” are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require proof that defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a Category III weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 33A-2. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the Walmart during regular business hours. Walmart employee Norton recognized defendant and watched him. Defendant picked up two DVDs from a display near the cash registers, took them to the customer service desk, and conducted a “no-receipt” return in exchange for a Walmart gift card. Next, defendant went to the men’s department, where he picked up a hat, removed the price tag, and put it on. In the shoe department, he picked up a pair of shoes and placed them in a Walmart bag, which he produced from his pocket. Defendant joined a friend who had accompanied him to the store, paid for his friend’s merchandise using the gift card he had received in exchange for the DVDs, and did not pay for the hat or the shoes. When the men left the store, Norton and his partner followed and called the Bloomington police department. Officer Donovan handcuffed defendant, who confessed. At trial, defendant conceded the evidence was sufficient to prove retail theft, but argued it was insufficient to prove burglary under 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) because there was no evidence that he remained in the store without authority. The court convicted defendant of burglary and sentenced him to three years in prison. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a defendant’s act of remaining within a building open to the public is “without authority” if accompanied by an intent to steal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Defendant did not exceed the scope of his physical authority as a member of the public to be in the store. View "People v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Clark was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4)) and armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2)). The judge acknowledged that Clark committed the charged offenses while armed with a gun, but determined that the gun “was used as a bludgeon and will be treated as such.” The court pronounced oral findings that defendant was “guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery without a firearm,” uncharged offenses identified in different subsections of the pertinent statutes.The appellate court concluded those uncharged offenses were not lesser-included offenses of the charged firearm offenses, so that those convictions were improper, and reduced the convictions to vehicular hijacking and robbery, respectively, and remanded for resentencing on those convictions. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. It is within a court of review’s authority to reduce the degree of a defendant’s conviction, even when a lesser offense is not charged, so long as the offense is a lesser-included offense of the crime expressly charged. The elements of the lesser offenses of vehicular hijacking and robbery were set forth in the greater offenses charged in the indictment, and the evidence at trial supported convictions for those offenses. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

Burns, lives in unit 10 on the third floor of a 12-unit three-story Urbana apartment building that is secured by locked entrances. The common areas are not accessible to the public. In November 2012, the police department’s Crimestoppers hotline received an anonymous tip that Burns was selling marijuana and ecstasy. Investigating, detective Mecum discovered that in October 2008, Burns was issued a notice to appear for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia; she had been arrested in 2003, for possession of marijuana. Mecum also observed “images for the legalization of marijuana,” “a picture containing actual marijuana,” and “a picture containing large amounts of U.S. currency” on defendant’s social media page. Mecum went to the building in plain clothes to “confirm her address.” After several visits, an unidentified tenant let him in. Walking through the building, Mecum observed a package addressed to Burns. At approximately 3:20 a.m., Officer Cervantes entered the building, without a warrant, with his drug-detection dog, and went to the third floor. The dog alerted to narcotics at Burns’s apartment door. Mecum obtained a search warrant. The ensuing search of Burns’s apartment resulted in the discovery of marijuana. Burns, charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver between 500 and 2,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(e),, successfully moved to suppress the evidence, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Jardines (2013). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the search warrant was issued on the basis of an unconstitutional warrantless dog sniff. View "People v. Burns" on Justia Law

At approximately 1:15 a.m. on Saturday, December 17, 2011, defendant was driving from Iowa to Illinois on U.S. Highway 136, a four-lane road. Just across the border, Illinois State Police had erected a safety roadblock, marked by an orange sign with black lettering. Defendant saw the roadblock and made a U-turn at a railroad crossing approximately 50 feet from the roadblock. Hancock County Deputy Duffy stopped defendant as he proceeded westbound. Illinois State Police Officer Miller, at the roadblock, saw Duffy pull over defendant’s vehicle and went to assist. Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and was cited for driving “to the left of center of roadway.” Officers conducted an inventory search incident to arrest and recovered a metal pipe and less than one gram of marijuana. Defendant’s passenger was arrested based on an active warrant.The circuit court denied a motion to suppress, finding that defendant’s U-turn provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the stop. The court found defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ conditional discharge and 90 days in the county jail. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the location, day and time of the roadblock. View "People v. Timmsen" on Justia Law

In 1997, Pipes was found dead, with stab wounds to her neck and head; semen was discovered with vaginal swabs. There was no evidence of rape. Above the bathtub in which she was found, there was a palm print left in Pipes’s blood. In 2004, the state obtained a grand jury subpoena for the Illinois Department of Corrections to take palm and fingerprints of Boston, then incarcerated on a life sentence, who was Pipes' ex-boyfriend. After prints were taken, a warrant issued for defendant’s DNA. A test showed that the DNA profile extracted from the semen was consistent with having originated from Boston. In 2005, the state obtained an indictment. Boston unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena and suppress the palm print evidence, arguing that the state improperly used the grand jury to obtain the subpoena and to supplement a police investigation in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and violated grand jury procedures by failing to return the fingerprint card to the grand jury. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis to conclude that this was a “rogue police investigation.” The information provided to the grand jury was sufficiently tied to Boston to hold that there was individualized suspicion to warrant the subpoena. View "People v. Boston" on Justia Law