Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1994, defendant Dennis Thompson fatally shot his father, Dennis Thompson, Sr., and a woman who was inside his father’s house, Don Renee Rouse. Defendant, 19 years old at the time, was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant confessed to the shootings and directed the police to the murder weapon. Defendant maintained that his actions were the result of a long history of physical and mental abuse committed by his father and, thus, constituted only second-degree murder. Defendant presented the testimony of several family members who uniformly described defendant’s father as a violent and abusive person, especially when his father consumed alcohol. Following closing arguments, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a criminal defendant could raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence for the first time on appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of a petition seeking relief from a final judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Answering that question in the negative, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s section 2-1401 petition. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Illinois v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In October 2012, defendant James Schweihs was charged in a five-count indictment with two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), one count of violating the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act), and two counts of domestic battery for striking Patricia Schweihs. Relevant to this appeal, count I of the indictment alleged that defendant committed the offense of AUUW by violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) in that defendant knowingly carried or concealed in a motor vehicle a .45-caliber handgun, at a time when he was not on his own land, and at the time he carried it he had not been issued a currently valid FOID card. Count II of the indictment alleged that defendant committed the offense of AUUW by violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) because he knowingly carried or concealed a handgun in a motor vehicle and the handgun was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible to him at the time. Defendant moved to dismiss the AUUW charges, arguing that the statute violated the second amendment of the United States Constitution. After review of this case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, reversed the circuit court's order which held to the contrary, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Illinois v. Schweihs" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, defendant, Kelvin Carter, was found guilty of the 2002 murder of Edmond Allen. Identification evidence was supplied by four occurrence witnesses. The circuit court ultimately imposed a 20-year prison sentence in addition to a 25-year enhancement, which was statutorily mandated because of the court’s determination that defendant had personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the crime. The court had initially sentenced defendant to a 30-year term of imprisonment, but immediately amended its determination, imposing the 20-year minimum instead after realizing that defendant was subject to the enhancement. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence in 2006. On May 9, 2012, defendant mailed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment” in which he argued that the 25-year firearm enhancement to his sentence was void because the trial court only found him guilty of murder. Defendant also argued that the trial court was bound by its initial statement of 30 years’ imprisonment regardless of the statutorily required enhancement. Defendant attached a “Proof/Certificate of Service” to his pleading, alleging that he placed it in the “institutional mail” at the Menard Correctional Center. He listed as addressees, the “Clerk of Court” and “State’s Atty. Office.” Defendant’s pleading was stamped “received” by the circuit clerk on May 15. It was docketed on May 29, to be called on June 5. The docket and transcript for that date showed that the case was scheduled for “court review” on July 10. On that day, the court dismissed the petition on the merits. The cover page of the transcript of proceedings reflected that defendant’s “2-1401 petition is dismissed,” but the transcript did not show that the assistant State’s Attorney took any action. In a written order entered July 10, the circuit court recited the law applicable to section 2-1401 proceedings. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition on the merits was premature, given that the petition was not properly served on the State. Then, without speaking to the merits of defendant’s petition or the substance of the circuit court’s ruling, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in prematurely dismissing petitioner’s petition. The Supreme Court reviewed the sua sponte dismissal, found that the trial court did not err in its dismissal, and reversed the appellate court. View "Illinois v. Carter" on Justia Law

The issue before the Illinois Supreme Court in this case was a circuit court’s order declaring certain sections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute as unconstitutional. The circuit court found that sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(2), (a)(3)(C) of the AUUW statute, which were based on defendant’s lack of a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID card), violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The court determined that the offense of AUUW based on the lack of a FOID card was identical to a violation of the FOID Card Act, and since the penalties for violating the two statutes were different, the court declared the AUUW statute unconstitutional and dismissed the charges against defendant. The Supreme Court concluded that the offense of AUUW based on the lack of a FOID card and a violation of the FOID Card Act do not have identical elements and thus, there can be no proportionate penalty violation. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded for reinstatement of the charges against defendant. View "Illinois v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the “void sentence rule,” should be abandoned. Defendant Steven Castleberry was convicted on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on separate acts of oral and vaginal contact with the victim. At sentencing, the State argued that defendant was subject to a mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement on each of the two counts because the crimes had been committed by defendant while he was armed with a firearm. When added to the mandatory minimum term of 6 years’ imprisonment for each offense, this meant, according to the State, that defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum term of 21 years’ imprisonment on each count. The circuit court disagreed with the State regarding the application of the 15-year enhancement, concluding that the legislature had intended the enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances presented. The circuit court sentenced defendant to a 9-year term of imprisonment on each count, adding the 15-year enhancement to only one of the counts. The two sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total term of 33 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant did not challenge the appellate court’s affirmance of his convictions. Instead, defendant argued that the appellate court erred when it held that the sentence imposed without the statutory enhancement was void. Defendant contended that the rule relied upon by the appellate court (that a sentence which does not conform to statutory requirements was void) was no longer valid in light of recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions and, thus, could not provide a basis for the appellate court to reverse the circuit court’s sentencing order. After review, the Court concluded that its recent decisions indeed undermined the rationale behind the rule to the point that the rule could no longer be considered valid. The Court therefore abolished the rule. View "Illinois v. Castleberry" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Jorge Guzman argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in “Illinois v. Delvillar,” (235 Ill. 2d 507 (2009)), should have been overturned based on the United States Supreme Court’s later decision in “Padilla v. Kentucky,” (559 U.S. 356 (2010)). In “Delvillar,” the Illinois Court examined the impact of the failure to give a statutory admonishment on the potential immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea. The Court concluded that the failure to admonish did not affect the voluntariness of the plea, and defendants wishing to withdraw their pleas on that basis were required to demonstrate prejudice or a denial of justice. After review of defendant Guzman’s arguments that the trial court erred in denying him the ability to withdraw his guilty plea, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial. View "Illinois v. Guzman" on Justia Law

M.A., then 13 years old, fought with her 14-year-old brother and cut him with a kitchen knife. M.A. was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses and ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, 730 ILCS 154/1. M.A. argued that the registration provisions violated her rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection. The Appellate Court rejected the substantive due process claim, but found the registration provisions unconstitutional for violating procedural due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the registration requirement. Current dangerousness is not relevant to the duty to register, so M.A. did not have a due process right to a hearing to address that issue. The Act requires registration solely based upon the fact of conviction or adjudication, which M.A. had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest during her juvenile adjudication proceedings. M.A. did not challenge her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent on appeal. Given that the charges for which M.A. is required to register would be felonies if M.A. committed those acts as an adult, and that those charges require a finding that the offender caused “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement,” there is a rational relationship between M.A.’s registration and protection of the public. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

Defendant admitted the allegations of petitions to revoke his probation in two cases and admitted the allegations of a delinquency petition in a third case. He was sentenced to indefinite commitment in the Department of Juvenile Justice. He moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) governs appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea and provides: “defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Defense counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate three weeks after the motion hearing. The appellate court vacated the denial for noncompliance with the rule. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Strict compliance with the rule does not require counsel to file a certificate of compliance before or at the hearing on the post-plea motion, but requires counsel to prepare a certificate that meets the rule’s content requirements and to file it with the trial court before filing of any notice of appeal. View "In re H.L." on Justia Law

Stapinski, indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ketamine) with intent to deliver, 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(10.5), moved to dismiss, arguing that the indictment violated his due process rights and an executed cooperation agreement he had entered into with police. The state did not dispute the existence of the cooperation agreement, but argued that Stapinski did not fulfill his obligations. The Will County trial court dismissed the indictment. The appellate court reversed s. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Police entered into a cooperation agreement with Stapinski, promising not to charge him with possession of ketamine if he assisted in the apprehension of others; he fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. His due process rights were violated when, over a year after he was detained by police, he was charged with possession of ketamine. Whether the cooperation agreement was “valid” in the sense that it was approved by the State’s Attorney, is not important. An unauthorized promise may be enforced on due process grounds if a defendant’s reliance on the promise has constitutional consequences. Stapinski relied upon the agreement he made with police and incriminated himself in the process of fulfilling his obligations under the agreement. View "People v. Stapinski" on Justia Law

The state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)). Officer Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress, arrived at the scene, and observed a person (Q.P.) matching the description given in the report. Irving placed him in the squad car. Q.P. stated his name was Antwan Ellis and offered to direct Irving to his residence. At the address given by Q.P., Irving spoke to a woman who stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and the woman stated she had dated Q.P.’s father and she knew him as Q. P.. Q.P. then gave his correct name, but misspelled both names. Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered that Q.P. was a runaway. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice. The appellate court reversed, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent apprehension. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Q.P. gave false information shortly after he was placed in the squad car. At that point, Irving did not know about the juvenile warrant. Q.P. told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found Q.P. provided the false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant. . View "In re Q.P." on Justia Law