Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Barner was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1)) and sentenced to natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v. Williams (2010). The appellate court again affirmed. That decision was vacated by a new supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider in light of People v. Leach (2012). The appellate court again affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Barner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated when three state witnesses were allowed to testify concerning the DNA laboratory work and conclusions of nontestifying scientists. None of the documents at issue took the form of an affidavit, attestation, certification, sworn statement, or formal declaration; they lacked the “formality and solemnity” necessary for a statement to be testimonial. The court noted that Barner presented no evidence and did not impeach the state’s witnesses in any significant way, so that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The main focus at trial did not concern the identification of the attacker, but was the victim’s credibility and her account of the assault. View "People v. Barner" on Justia Law

Cowper’s sentencing judgment provided that he was to receive 275 days’ credit for time served. He was transported to prison on June 2. On June 23, Cowper filed a “Motion to Recalculate Time Served.” On October 16, 2011, he was released. On November 22, the state responded, conceding that he had not been given credit for time served between January 8, 2008, and February 2, 2008, and between November 29, 2010, and May 11, 2011. The court entered an amended judgment that included all of the good time credits. Cowper sued the sheriff of Saline County and the circuit clerk, alleging negligence in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(e)(4)). The trial court dismissed, noting that the statute requires the clerk to forward the information received from the sheriff; there was no allegation that the clerk failed to do so. As to the sheriff, the court found that the statute did not expressly grant a private right of action and none could be implied. The appellate court reversed, finding that Cowper was in the class of persons for whom the statute was enacted; that implying a private cause of action was consistent with the purpose to restore the offender to useful citizenship; that the injury is one that the law was designed to prevent; and that implying a private cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the complaint alleged negligence, so the court erred in analyzing whether there was a statutory right of action. Clerks may be liable for negligence. The court agreed that Cowper had stated a claim as to the sheriff. View "Cowper v. Nyberg" on Justia Law

After receiving an anonymous tip, officers encountered defendant at a Chicago liquor store and, in response to an inquiry about why he was there, defendant replied, “I just got to let you know I got a gun on me.” Officers searched defendant and recovered a loaded firearm. Defendant was convicted of multiple firearm offense counts arising from his possession of a single loaded handgun while he was a felon. He challenged the convictions under the the one-act, one-crime rule. The appellate court concluded that defendant could receive only one conviction “based on the same physical act of possessing one loaded firearm,” but rejected defendant’s fourth amendment challenge to his arrest and recovery of the loaded firearm. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction and sentence for unauthorized use of a weapon by a felon based on his possession of firearm ammunition. Defendant was properly convicted of armed habitual criminal. The court rejected defendant’s fourth amendment challenge because the underlying incident was a consensual encounter. View "People v. Almond" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers received a call about a person with a gun in a park. Arriving, officers approached defendant, 19 years old. He walked away. The officers demanded that defendant stop, but he ran. Officers pursued defendant, noticing his hand was on his right waist. An officer witnessed defendant reach inside his waistband and pull out a revolver, which he dropped to the ground. Officers recovered the weapon and found that it was loaded. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violating the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6) The court held that, due to its findings of statutory unconstitutionality, facially and as applied, all six AUUW convictions would be vacated and a conviction of unlawful use of a weapon under 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) would be entered, and imposed a Class A misdemeanor sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) “the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense,” but reversed as to sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(C), “the person possessing the firearm has not been issued a currently valid … [FOID Card] … the person possessing the weapon was under 21 years of age, which it found to be constitutional and severable. Section 24-1.6(d)(2) (sentencing) was invalid, as relying upon the unconstitutional (a)(3)(A) subsection. View "People v. Mosley" on Justia Law

The state charged a 16-year-old (Jordan) with three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), alleging that he carried in a vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); carried a handgun in a vehicle while under 21 years of age (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I)); and carried a firearm in a vehicle without a valid FOID card (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). The UPF count alleged that Jordan, under 18 years of age, knowingly possessed a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person (24-3.1(a)(1). Jordan moved to dismiss, contending that the AUUW statute had been found unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in 2012, as violating the second amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. The circuit court dismissed the AUUW counts, but denied the motion as to the UPF count. The state conceded that one count had been properly dismissed but argued that the remaining counts remained constitutionally valid because they required proof of independent aggravating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the first count based on section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which it found to be facially unconstitutional in 2013; reversed dismissal of charges based on sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), which are severable from the unconstitutional provision. View "In re: Jordan G." on Justia Law

Defendant, serving a life sentence for murder, mailed letters that were opened by prison officials and was charged with solicitation of murder and attempted solicitation of murder on a “request” theory. Defendant argued that to be found guilty of solicitation, the defendant must have actually communicated to the person allegedly solicited. “A command, encouragement, or request cannot be made if no one" receives it. Defendant suggested that, though Illinois substantially adopted its solicitation statute from the Model Penal Code, including the “commands, encourages, or requests” language, Illinois had declined to adopt the section that would proscribe uncommunicated solicitation. The State dropped the solicitation charge and proceeded on the attempt charge. Defendant argued, “This crime is an impermissible stacking of double inchoate crimes. … the attempt statute is void for vagueness as applied because it combines the elements of three crimes and does not offer … a reasonable opportunity to know what activity is prohibited.” Defendant was convicted. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the lack of specific attempt language within the statutory definitions of solicitation and solicitation of murder was indicative of legislative intent that the general attempt statute apply to the offense of solicitation of murder. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The legislature did not intend that a defendant escape criminal liability simply because authorities were vigilant enough to intercept his letters before they reached the intended recipient. View "People v. Boyce" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with shooting White in the back and causing his death, as “an armed habitual criminal.” The state indicated that it intended to seek a sentencing enhancement of 25 years to natural life imprisonment on the ground that Smith used a firearm. Smith pleaded guilty to first degree murder. In exchange, the state dismissed counts I and III, recommended a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment, and withdrew its notice of intent to seek the firearm sentencing enhancement. The circuit court advised Smith that he was eligible for a sentence of 20 to 60 years, accepted the plea, and imposed a sentence of 30 years. Smith did appeal, but filed a pro se post-conviction petition claiming that his sentence and plea were void under the 2011 Illinois Supreme Court decision, People v. White, because his sentence did not include the statutory firearm enhancement. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the factual basis for Smith’s plea established that a firearm was used in the murder, thereby requiring the imposition of the firearm sentencing enhancement, which required a 25-year prison term in addition to the minimum 20-year prison term for murder. The appellate court concluded that White did not establish a new rule of law and applied to the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that White does not apply retroactively. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Simpson was convicted of first degree murder in connection with the2006 beating death of Thomas. At defendant’s 2010 trial Franklin testified that he was near the crime scene on the date of the murder, but did not recall what defendant said to him or what he told police that night. The state then admitted Franklin’s videotaped statement to police in which he stated that defendant told him that he had hit the victim 30 times with a bat. The state emphasized the statement in its closing argument. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the introduction of Franklin’s statement where the “personal knowledge” requirement for admission of a prior inconsistent statement was not satisfied under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; for a prior inconsistent statement to be admissible under section 115-10.1, the witness must have actually perceived the events that are the subject of the statement, not merely the statement of those events made by the defendant. View "People v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Acting under power of attorney, Chenoweth sold her stepmother’s house in 2005 and used most of the money for personal expenses. Chenoweth was charged in 2009 and convicted of financial exploitation of an elderly person, 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3(a). She sought dismissal under the standard three-year period of limitations (720 ILCS 5/3-5(b), arguing that the indictment failed to allege any circumstances that would have placed the indictment within the one-year extended limitations of 720 ILCS 5/3-6(a)(2). The court rejected her arguments and she was sentenced to four years’ probation, and ordered to pay $32,266 in restitution. The appellate court vacated the conviction, holding that the extended period of limitations (720 ILCS 5/3-6(a)(2)) had expired prior to prosecution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the one-year extended period of limitations commenced on January 22, 2009, when the Adams County State’s Attorney became aware of the offense when he received the police investigation file. The legislature enacted section 3-6(a) specifically to deal with the offender who has successfully avoided detection of a breach of fiduciary obligation for the term of the general time limitation. View "People v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with armed robbery while in possession of a firearm, evading arrest, and reckless driving in 2005. He pled guilty to one count of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm in exchange for dismissal of the other charges and a recommendation for a maximum sentence of 30 years. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison, including a statutorily mandated 15-year sentencing enhancement for possession of the firearm, 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b). Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied his motion; the appellate court affirmed. Defendant’s 2011 post-conviction petition was dismissed. The appellate court found the 15-year sentencing enhancement violated the proportionate penalties clause and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court instructed the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider in light of its 2013 decisions. The appellate court vacated and upheld the sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court then reversed. Public Act 95-688, enacted in 2007, amended the armed violence statute so that robbery can no longer serve as a predicate offense for armed violence; the crimes no longer share identical elements and neither violates the proportionate penalties clause. However, that amendment should not be applied retroactively. Defendant was sentenced prior to the enactment, the sentencing enhancement was disproportionate when applied and the sentence is facially unconstitutional and void. View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law