Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Belknap was convicted of first degree murder in the beating death of five-year-old Silven, the daughter of his girlfriend, and sentenced to 24 years in prison. The appellate court reversed remanded for a new trial based on the trial court’s failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) during jury selection when it did not ask the potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the four principles contained in that rule: that the defendant is presumed innocent; that the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and that the defendant’s failure to testify cannot be held against him. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that plain error review was not warranted and that the evidence was sufficient to convict. View "People v. Belknap" on Justia Law

Stevens was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court had granted a motion in limine to admit other-crimes evidence, finding that the evidence was relevant to show propensity, motive and identity. On appeal he argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when he was compelled to testify on cross-examination about a pending sexual assault charge. He had testified that his sexual activity with a prior victim was consensual and the cross-examination involved a different prior victim. The trial court noted the similarities between the assaults and characterized his testimony as “disturbing in the extreme.” The court stated that even if the other-crimes evidence had not been admitted, the evidence against Stevens was so strong that it was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding that the examination was proper because it discredited Stevens’s testimony, was probative of his intent and motive, and impeached his claim of consent. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the examination was proper to discredit a consent defense and test credibility. View "People v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Jolly was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Prosecution evidence consisted largely of the testimony of Gunn, a confidential informant and drug addict, with three felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. Gunn had implemented a controlled buy from Jolly, but did not wear a surveillance wire and used his own cell phone to call Jolly. Gunn admitted that working as a confidential informant was his only source of income. Jolly was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment as a Class X offender. He later filed a pro se motion, arguing that counsel failed to: move to reduce bond; obtain consent before waiving Jolly’s right to a speedy trial; appear in court during pretrial hearings; provide Jolly access to discovery materials; discuss trial strategy or visit Jolly; and prepare for trial while preparing for another criminal case. In a second pro se motion, he added failure to: object to testimony about recovered currency; challenge Gunn’s credibility; challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; object to police testimony that Jolly’s voice was recorded; object to the lack of testimony from experts on the state’s exhibits, including the admission of cocaine; move to dismiss for lack of evidence; and move to suppress the recovered cocaine and currency. Following a hearing with new counsel, the circuit court denied the motion. On remand, the trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, but allowed the new public defender to be excused. Jolly proceeded pro se. The court permitted the state to participate in an adversarial manner and relied on matters outside the record. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the finding that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and remanded for a new preliminary Krankel inquiry. View "People v. Jolly" on Justia Law

Smith and others were indicted for first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm in a 1998 shooting death. The jury found Smith guilty based on a theory of accountability. The appellate court affirmed. Smith filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate his claim that he suffered from a mental disability. Smith claimed he did not understand his Miranda rights and that, although he responded affirmatively to understanding those rights, his mental deficiency is such that he often gives responses that he thought others wanted to hear. Smith attached Social Security Administration documents indicating Smith was found disabled due to mental retardation, with an IQ of 74. Post-conviction counsel was appointed and indicated that an amended petition was not necessary. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The trial court denied Smith’s subsequent petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. The appellate court affirmed, stating that a defendant must make a “more exacting” showing of cause and prejudice to merit leave to file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; a defendant must show that the claim not raised in an initial post-conviction petition “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process.” The trial court twice instructed the jury that an opening statement is not evidence and, following closing argument, stated that “[n]either opening statement nor closing arguments are evidence, any statement… not based on the evidence should be disregarded.” During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that Smith did not have a gun. Defense counsel pointed out in closing argument the inconsistency between the state’s opening and closing arguments. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Holt threw eggs on the Katheiser driveway to frighten Kartheiser and his 6 year old daughter. Represented by counsel, she entered a negotiated guilty plea to resisting a peace officer. The other charge was nol-prossed. She was sentenced to 12 months of probation and was ordered to provide documentation of treatment. The court admonished Holt that the agreement involved a “conviction.” Days later, she filed a pro se motion to vacate, stating that she “was told there would be no conviction” and “never had the chance to testify.” Her counsel was allowed to withdraw. The circuit court granted the motion to withdraw the plea and appointed the public defender. The next day, Holt filed a pro se “Petition to Quash … the police report,” claiming tampering with the record, police brutality, and that her children were missing. After several more incidents, Holt was placed in a mental health center. She filed notice of appeal and a “Demand Letter for Formal Correction,” seeking to “hold Tim Brown accountable for ‘Bearing FALSE Witness’ the 8th Great Commandment and for Defamation.” The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Holt had been found fit to stand trial during the pendency of the appeal so that whether she received effective assistance of counsel during proceedings below was moot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that public interest exception applies to warrant review. Where the evidence clearly indicates that defendant is unfit to stand trial, but a defendant contends that he is fit, counsel is not obligated to argue for a finding of fitness. In doing so, counsel would be violating his duty to the client and suborning a violation of due process. View "People v. Holt" on Justia Law

In 1993, Cordrey was sentenced to 36 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, with a three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). In 2012, the Prisoner Review Board imposed MSR conditions. Cordrey was required to attend counseling, was prohibited from having contact with his victim, was required to have biweekly parole meetings, was required to register as a sex offender, with victim notification, and was subject to electronic monitoring. Cordrey was scheduled to begin MSR on April 12, 2013. That day, the Department of Corrections reported that Cordrey violated his parole because he had no suitable host site to serve his MSR. Cordrey was returned to prison to serve his MSR. Cordrey filed a grievance, followed by a pro se petition for habeas corpus. Counsel was appointed. The petition challenged the practice called “violating at the door” and alleged that more affluent offenders, who can afford suitable housing, can walk out of prison, while indigent offenders are returned to prison, in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the writ, reasoning that the Department of Corrections was unable to find placement for Cordrey due to his status as a sex offender, rather than his status as an indigent. The court noted the lack of evidence concerning housing options available for MSR, concerning whether both sex offender and non-sex offender indigent inmates are violated at the door, or whether there were alternates adequate to meet the state’s interests when there is no housing or funding available to inmates on MSR. View "Cordrey v. IL Prisoner Review Bd" on Justia Law

The state sought to commit New to the Department of Human Services as a sexually violent person under 725 ILCS 207/1, based convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault against a 12-year-old boy and a 14-year-old boy. The petition alleged that New was diagnosed with “paraphilia not otherwise specified, [paraphilia NOS], sexually attracted to adolescent males,” that his condition affected his emotional or volitional capacity which predisposed him to commit acts of sexual violence, and that there was a substantial probability that he would engage in future sexual violence. New moved to bar the expert testimony regarding the diagnosis, arguing that the experts’ opinions failed to meet the Frye standards for admissibility of novel scientific evidence. The trial court allowed the testimony. On cross-examination, the expert acknowledged controversy about how the paraphilia NOS diagnosis should be applied and over whether there should be a category in the DSM for individuals with a sexual arousal to early pubescent males, aged 11 to 14. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in holding that the diagnosis of hebephilia is subject to Frye and that there was an inadequate basis to determine whether it has gained general acceptance. View "In re Detention of New" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a 2003 murder. The state filed a six-page motion in limine to admit certain hearsay statements made by defendant’s coconspirators. Defendant filed a five-page response objecting to admission of those statements. Both sides were allowed to argue before the court. The trial court granted the state’s motion. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, armed robbery, and home invasion. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in admitting the coconspirator statements and allowing the state to elicit a prior consistent statement from one of its witnesses. The court held that defendant forfeited review of the first issue because he failed to file a motion in limine of his own to exclude those statements and failed to raise a contemporaneous objection when the state introduced the statements at trial; even if defendant had not forfeited the issue, he still was not entitled to relief because, with one harmless exception, all of the contested statements, including the prior consistent statement, were properly admitted. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, disagreeing with the forfeiture analysis, but agreeing that, with one harmless exception, the trial court properly admitted the statements in question. View "People v. Denson" on Justia Law

Defendant was 15 years old and was a ward of the state, living in a residential treatment facility when he was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a staff member. Pursuant to the Illinois automatic transfer statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130), his case was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, where he was tried as an adult, convicted by a jury of all three counts, and sentenced to a total of 36 years in prison. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court had erred by admitting defendant’s confession. The court also concluded that evidence of the victim’s sexual history was admissible on remand under the “constitutional necessity” exception to the state rape shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7(a)). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s exclusion of defendant’s confession and determination that evidence of the victim’s sexual history is admissible under an exception to the rape shield statute, rejected his ineffective assistance claim, and upheld the constitutionality of the automatic transfer statute. The court remanded to the appellate court for its initial consideration of defendant’s excessive-sentence claim. View "People v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Perez was convicted of first degree murder. The Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2009; the Illinois Supreme Court leave to appeal. Perez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On February 7, 2011, a circuit court judge signed and dated an order dismissing the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. February 7 was the ninetieth day after the petition was filed, 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a). The clerk stamped the order filed on February 8. The appellate court reversed and remanded for second stage proceedings, finding that the dismissal was untimely because it was not entered until it was filed by the clerk, which occurred on the ninety-first day after the petition was filed and docketed. The court stated that, for a judgment to be effective, it must be publicly expressed at the situs of the proceeding; the record did not reflect the presence of any party, counsel, or any other court personnel on February 7, 2011, so that the first public expression of the order was on February 8. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Because section 122-2.1(a) specifically requires “entry” of an order, an order that is signed by the judge during the 90-day period, but not file-stamped until the ninety-first day, is not timely for purposes of section 122-2.1(a). View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law