Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant admitted the allegations of petitions to revoke his probation in two cases and admitted the allegations of a delinquency petition in a third case. He was sentenced to indefinite commitment in the Department of Juvenile Justice. He moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) governs appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea and provides: “defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Defense counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate three weeks after the motion hearing. The appellate court vacated the denial for noncompliance with the rule. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Strict compliance with the rule does not require counsel to file a certificate of compliance before or at the hearing on the post-plea motion, but requires counsel to prepare a certificate that meets the rule’s content requirements and to file it with the trial court before filing of any notice of appeal. View "In re H.L." on Justia Law

Stapinski, indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ketamine) with intent to deliver, 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(10.5), moved to dismiss, arguing that the indictment violated his due process rights and an executed cooperation agreement he had entered into with police. The state did not dispute the existence of the cooperation agreement, but argued that Stapinski did not fulfill his obligations. The Will County trial court dismissed the indictment. The appellate court reversed s. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Police entered into a cooperation agreement with Stapinski, promising not to charge him with possession of ketamine if he assisted in the apprehension of others; he fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. His due process rights were violated when, over a year after he was detained by police, he was charged with possession of ketamine. Whether the cooperation agreement was “valid” in the sense that it was approved by the State’s Attorney, is not important. An unauthorized promise may be enforced on due process grounds if a defendant’s reliance on the promise has constitutional consequences. Stapinski relied upon the agreement he made with police and incriminated himself in the process of fulfilling his obligations under the agreement. View "People v. Stapinski" on Justia Law

The state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)). Officer Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress, arrived at the scene, and observed a person (Q.P.) matching the description given in the report. Irving placed him in the squad car. Q.P. stated his name was Antwan Ellis and offered to direct Irving to his residence. At the address given by Q.P., Irving spoke to a woman who stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and the woman stated she had dated Q.P.’s father and she knew him as Q. P.. Q.P. then gave his correct name, but misspelled both names. Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered that Q.P. was a runaway. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice. The appellate court reversed, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent apprehension. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Q.P. gave false information shortly after he was placed in the squad car. At that point, Irving did not know about the juvenile warrant. Q.P. told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found Q.P. provided the false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant. . View "In re Q.P." on Justia Law

Goossens, a police sergeant, was convicted of intimidation, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(6)), after he threatened not to respond to 911 calls from a local auto racetrack as long as two former police officers were employed at the facility. He was sentenced to a term of two years’ probation. The probation order contained numerous conditions, one of which required that Gossens “shall become current in his child support in case number 2002 D 528.” He appealed, arguing the trial court lacked the authority under section 5-6-3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections to include the payment of child support as a condition of probation, 730 ILCS - 2 - 5/5-6-3(b). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The defense’s attempted construction contradicted prior interpretation of the plain language of the Code, which says, “[t]he Court may ... require that the person ... support his dependents.” View "People v. Goossens" on Justia Law

McElwain, was involved in a traffic accident.. The driver and passenger of the motorcycle that hit McElwain's vehicle had substantial injuries; the passenger died. On the date of the accident, plaintiff was neither issued any tickets nor asked to take any chemical tests. During their investigation, police discovered rolling papers and a bag containing a residue that appeared to be cannabis in McElwain’s vehicle, but officers at the scene did not think he appeared to be under the influence of cannabis. Two days later, McElwain was questioned and admitted that he had smoked marijuana two weeks before the accident. The police issued a ticket for failing to yield when turning left and requested that he take a chemical test. The police read him statutory warnings (625 ILCS 5/11-501.6(c). McElwain refused. The Secretary of State suspended his driver’s license for three years. An ALJ upheld the suspension, rejecting an argument that the officers violated due process by waiting too long. The circuit court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. While the state can condition receipt of a driver’s license on a driver’s agreement to consent to a chemical test if he is involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, the essential nexus between the state’s interest in protecting the public from intoxicated drivers and requiring consent to a chemical test following an arrest related to a serious accident no longer exists when the test is requested two days after the accident. View "McElwain v. Ill. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Then 23-year-old Fiveash was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault, based on his sexual penetration of the vagina and mouth of his 6-year-old cousin, P.A., in 2003, when he was 14-15 years old. Fiveash was certified to teach grades 6 through 12 and had been teaching part-time at two schools. He moved to dismiss, arguing that the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120) gave the juvenile court “exclusive jurisdiction” over offenses allegedly committed when he was 14, barring prosecution in criminal court, and that he could not be prosecuted in juvenile court because he was over 21. The trial court dismissed, finding the result “unjust, absurd, and clearly unfair to the victim.” The appellate court construed the language in section 5-120 as barring criminal proceedings only against defendants under the age of 21 for offenses they allegedly committed while under the age of 17. Because defendant was 23 when indicted, the court concluded section 5-120 did not apply, and reversed and remanded for trial in adult criminal court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 does not bar prosecution in criminal court for offenses allegedly committed when a defendant was 14 or 15 but not charged with until he was over 21 and not subject to the Act. View "People v. Fiveash" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder. After the presentation of the evidence, the circuit court instructed the jurors. The term “reasonable doubt” appeared in three instructions: “The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the verdict. It is not overcome unless from all the evidence in this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.” “The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence.” The third instruction sets forth specific propositions that the state must prove to sustain the charge of first degree murder: “If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.” During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for a definition of “reasonable doubt.” The court’s written reply stated: “We cannot give you a definition it is your duty to define.” The jury found defendant guilty. Following post-trial proceedings, the court sentenced defendant to 70 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court vacated defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated defendant’s conviction. Defendant failed to show that a clear or obvious error occurred, so his procedural default of the reasonable doubt claim must be honored. View "People v. Downs" on Justia Law

In 2005, the then-17-year-old defendant entered an open guilty plea to attempted first degree murder and home invasion. In 2007, he moved to withdraw that plea, alleging deficient advice and representation. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 17½ years in prison. In 2009, defendant filed a pro se petition, alleging that he was denied his right to effective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel by failure to investigate defendant’s history of mental illness and telling defendant, defendant’s mother, and defendant’s aunt “lies” in order to “force” a guilty plea. The alleged lies included telling defendant that he would receive a sentence of between 12 and 20 years if he pleaded guilty; stating that defendant’s family had not paid enough to go to trial; and hiding exculpatory police and medical reports. Defendant alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. The trial court held that the petition “is not frivolous or patently without merit,” docketed second-stage proceedings, and appointed counsel. Three years later, appointed counsel moved to withdraw, stating that the issues raised wre without merit and unsupportable as a matter of law. The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed: If a pro se postconviction petition advances to the second stage on the basis of an affirmative judicial determination that it is neither frivolous nor patently without merit, appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw must contain at least some explanation as to why all of the claims in that petition are so lacking in legal and factual support as to compel withdrawal. The motion filed in this case failed to meet this standard. View "People v. Kuehner" on Justia Law

The state filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that D. had committed first degree murder. D. was nine years old; the victim was 14 months old. The circuit court found D. unfit to stand trial and subsequently found him “not not guilty” of murder. Thecourt remanded D. to the Department of Human Services for fitness restoration education, so that D. may become fit and be tried for murder. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in denying a suppression motion. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for “harmless error analysis,” noting that in interviewing D., a detective seized on D’s fear that his father or others in the household would go to jail, or that he, himself, would be taken away. The detective promised D that no matter what he said, no one was going to jail, no one would be in trouble, he would not be taken from his father and, at the end of the day, he could go to his grandmother’s house and “hang out” with his dad. The detective reinforced that no consequences would follow an admission that D hit the victim and rejected repeated denials, making plain that anything less than an admission was unacceptable. The detective stated that whatever happened was a mistake, and everybody makes mistakes, and was explicit about the admission that would suffice—an admission that D. hit the baby once .D eventually admitted to hitting the infant once. D., functioning at the level of a seven- or eight-year-old, was especially vulnerable and susceptible to police coercion. View "In re D.L.H." on Justia Law

Police received a hotline tip that LeFlore was committing burglaries in Aurora; learned that he was on mandatory supervised release from prison and that he had been recently arrested for fleeing in a car registered to his address; and placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on the car. The GPS showed the car parked near a gas station when it was held up. The robbery was caught on a surveillance camera. LeFlore was charged. He confessed before learning of the use of the GPS and was identified by the cashier. He unsuccessfully moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence. LeFlore was convicted. While appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones, that attachment of a GPS device and its use to monitor vehicle movements on public streets was a search under the fourth amendment The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for a new trial for failure to properly admonish defendant (Supreme Court Rule 401(a)), but, with respect to use of the GPS, held that the good-faith exception applies and that the evidence should not be excluded. There was “binding appellate precedent” that police could have reasonably relied upon in using the GPS in 2009 and it would have been objectively reasonable for police to rely upon the legal landscape and constitutional norm that had been established at that time, allowing warrantless attachment and use of GPS technology. The court found no police culpability and that there would be little deterrent value to suppressing the evidence. View "People v. LeFlore" on Justia Law