Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A 17-year-old defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual abuse involving his 16-year-old girlfriend. He was sentenced to pay a $100 fine and serve 300 days in the county jail, with credit for time served. Asked whether there was “any sentence regarding [sex offender] registration?” the trial judge responded, “No.” More than three years later, the defendant moved to vacate the plea and sentence, arguing they were void because the court was required to order him to register. The trial judge denied the motion on the merits. The appellate court majority dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the prosecution opposed alteration of the prior judgment, precluding the trial court from reacquiring jurisdiction over defendant’s case under the doctrine of revestment. The court should have dismissed defendant's post-judgment motion to vacate his plea and sentence for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Elliott was arrested for driving under the influence, 625 ILCS 5/11-501 and given notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. On September 1, 2009, he filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension. On October 11, the statutory summary suspension commenced. Two days later, on October 13, 2009, defendant was pulled over in another county and cited for driving on a suspended license, 625 ILCS 5/6-303. On October 19 the circuit court granted petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Four days later, the Secretary of State entered an order of rescission, removing the statutory summary suspension from Elliott’s driving record. Elliott sought dismissal of the pending citation for driving on a suspended license. The trial court rejected his arguments and he was found guilty of driving on a suspended license. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that rescinding the suspension is not simply terminating the suspension, but undoes the action so that it never existed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction, holding that rescission of a statutory summary suspension is of prospective effect only. View "People v. Elliott" on Justia Law

McChriston was convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony that carried a mandatory Class X sentence. The trial judge sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. The order did not indicate that he would also be required to serve a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) under the Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d), nor did the judge mention MSR at the sentencing hearing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentencing on direct appeal. McChriston filed a pro se post-conviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, raising issues not related to the MSR term. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. He filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Department of Corrections (DOC) impermissibly added a three-year MSR term to his sentence. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting arguments that imposition of the MSR term violated constitutional rights to due process and the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The MSR term attached by operation of law and was not unconstitutionally imposed by the DOC. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the trial court had no discretion with respect to MSR. View "People v. McChriston" on Justia Law

Hommerson was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition did not contain a verification affidavit pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b). The circuit court dismissed the petition solely on that basis. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that a petition lacking a verification affidavit was frivolous and patently without merit. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the dismissal elevated form over substance. The legislative intent was that compliance with technical requirements was a matter for second stage review, after review of the merits of the claim. View "People v. Hommerson" on Justia Law

A minor was questioned outside his home by a special agent of the police department, accompanied by a DCFS child protection worker, in the presence of the child’s mother and stepfather. After the interview, a petition for adjudication of wardship was filed, alleging that the minor was delinquent for having committed aggravated criminal sexual abuse concerning a young girl. The court suppressed the minor’s inculpatory statements after it was alleged that Miranda warnings had not been given. The appellate court dismissed, stating that it lacked jurisdiction. Although interlocutory appeals are allowed, in criminal cases, from the granting of suppression motions, there is no such provision in juvenile matters. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded after exercising its constitutional rulemaking authority to modify procedural Rule 660(a), which previously incorporated into minor proceedings criminal appeals rules only as to final judgments, to allow the state to take an interlocutory appeal. Since the 1998 Juvenile Justice Reform Amendments, virtually all of the protections of the criminal justice system are afforded to juveniles, and the law has moved toward protecting the public and holding minors more accountable. The state has the same interest in appealing a suppression order in a juvenile case as it does in a criminal case. The court declined to turn the matter over to the rules committee. View "In re B.C.P." on Justia Law

In 2006, then-policewoman Brown, entered the Chicago Patrolmen’s Federal Credit Union and presented a $1 million check made out to her and purportedly drawn by Six Flags Great America on a JP Morgan Chase bank account. She endorsed it in her own name. The check was counterfeit. Brow was charged with several offenses and testified that her mother had given her the check and had told her that it was the result of Brown’s sister’s settlement of a lawsuit. The sister already had a forgery conviction. Brown was convicted and given two years of probation and 50 hours of community service. The appellate court affirmed the convictions for attempted theft by delivering the counterfeit check and for forgery by making the check. The Illinois Supreme Court, reversed the forgery conviction, leaving the conviction for “delivery.” Brown did not “make” the check when all she did was endorse it in her own name; forgery by “making” was statutorily complete when the check was created, regardless of endorsement. There was no evidence that the defendant actually made the check. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The girl, then 15, was charged with misdemeanor battery for allegedly striking a female classmate in the face and chest. A prosecution offer to recommend a continuance under supervision in return for a guilty plea was rejected and the case proceeded to trial. The victim and a security guard who had intervened testified. The accused minor testified that she had acted in self-defense. The trial judge entered a finding of guilt. The probation officer and the prosecution recommended probation, but defense counsel asked for a continuance under supervision. The judge said that the Juvenile Court Act precludes supervision for minors without the permission of the State’s Attorney, that the “approval provision” does not apply in the adult criminal system, and that the approval provision unconstitutional. The judge placed the minor on supervision, over the state’s objection. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the supervision order as void and vacated the finding of unconstitutionality. The Juvenile Court Act has been interpreted to require that the possibility of supervision be considered before proceeding to a finding of guilt and adjudication as to delinquency. Here, supervision was not requested before the finding of guilt, so any objection by the prosecutor had become irrelevant. The minor lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue. The girl claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not know she was giving up the opportunity for supervision by rejecting the plea offer, and that neither her attorney nor the court knew that supervision had to be requested before a finding of guilt. The court found that the minor had been prejudiced and remanded to allow her to request supervision at the appropriate time. Should the state object, a challenge to the validity of the approval provision could properly be raised.View "In re: Danielle J" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers testified that a group of male teenagers was screaming, making gestures, and throwing bottles at passing vehicles, then retired to the backyard of the location, which was not the defendant’s residence. While in the street, he had been observed holding the right side of his waist area. In the backyard, defendant was heard yelling an expletive and was seen with a gun in his right hand before he dropped it to the ground. The gun was recovered; it had its serial number scratched off and was loaded with three live rounds of ammunition. The defendant testified that police searched the yard, showed him a gun and accused him of dropping it. He denied the accusation. His friend corroborated his version of events, but the defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 24 months of probation for the use conviction, but no sentence was imposed on the latter offense. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the use conviction and remanded for sentencing on the possession conviction, noting that after the conviction, the Seventh Circuit held that 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) is effectively “a flat-ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home” that violates the second amendment, which protects not only right to keep but also the right to “bear” arms. The Illinois Supreme Court said that that the federal decision did not mean that the right to self-defense outside the home is unlimited or is not subject to regulation, but only that the comprehensive ban is unconstitutional. The defendant was also convicted under a statute prohibiting possession of a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person by one who is under 18 years of age; he was 17. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

Chicago officers were on patrol when a man flagged them down. He did not give his name and was not asked for it, but said that there was a “possible gun” in a tan, four-door Lincoln with several persons inside. Shortly thereafter, officers saw a tan, four-door Lincoln, stopped it, and placed the driver in handcuffs. No traffic violations supported the stop. This defendant was a backseat passenger and was ordered out. He “took off running” and dropped a loaded handgun two feet from the car. Defendant was arrested after he fell. The trial court stated that a motion to suppress the gun would not have succeeded and defense counsel did not make such a motion. The defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and received an eight-year prison term. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. When an ineffectiveness claim is based on counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion, the defendant must establish prejudice by demonstrating that the unargued motion was meritorious and that a reasonable probability existed that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. The initial stop effected an illegal seizure of the defendant; the tip was insufficient to justify the stop. However, the defendant could not prove that the gun itself was the fruit of that illegal seizure. The taint of illegality was removed because the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct was interrupted, by an intervening circumstance: the defendant’s flight. That flight ended the seizure, and the defendant conceded as much. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Chicago police responded to a street fight. One yelled “police, stop, stop,” but M.I., then 16, fired multiple gunshots in their direction. A petition to have M.I. adjudicated delinquent was filed, and the state successfully moved to designate the proceedings as an “extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.” M.I. waived his right to a jury trial. After adjudicating him delinquent the circuit court sentenced him for aggravated discharge of a firearm, to an indeterminate period in the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections, to end no later than his twenty-first birthday. The court also imposed a 23-year adult sentence, stayed pending successful completion of the juvenile sentence. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. M.I. argued that the hearing on designation as an extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding was not held within the statutory time period, but the supreme court held that the statute is directory rather than mandatory. M.I. raised a constitutional vagueness challenge to the statutory provision that a stay of an adult sentence may be revoked for violation of the “conditions” of a sentence. Such a stay was part of the original sentence, and the state is seeking revocation based on a subsequent drug offense, but this was not the provision under which revocation was sought, so M.I. lacked standing for the challenge. M.I. also claimed that there was a due process violation in imposing a 23-year adult sentence, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The court found no Apprendi violation, noting that the extended jurisdiction juvenile statute is dispositional rather than adjudicatory.View "In re M.I." on Justia Law