Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mosley was killed in a 2006 drive-by shooting in Chicago. Trial testimony indicated that Mosley had been in a group with Robinson, a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang, and that Pikes and Donagen were in a car that approached the group and began shooting. Pikes and Donagen were members of the rival Four Corner Hustlers gang. They were tried simultaneously before separate juries. Pikes was convicted and received a 27-year prison term. The appellate court reversed, based on the introduction of evidence concerning a previous incident in which only Donagen, was involved. In that incident, a few days before Mosley was killed, Donagen had begun shooting, without success, at Robinson, who was on a scooter. A car containing Gangster Disciples was following the scooter and drove into Donagen. The Illinois Supreme Court did not agree. Because Pike was not involved in the earlier incident, the appellate court should not have applied rules concerning evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant with which he had not been charged. The question is relevance. Evidence of a continuing gang war and motivation for shooting at a group containing a rival gang member was admissible, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.View "People v. Pikes" on Justia Law

Radojcic, his daughters, his attorney Helfand, and the office manager for one of his companies, were indicted for 52 financial crimes involving fraud on mortgage lenders. It was also alleged that Radojcic, while owing the IRS more than two million dollars, fraudulently obtained rental checks exceeding $500,000 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. After discovery, the state indicated its intent to call Helfand as a witness in exchange for use immunity. Helfand and Radojcic objected, asserting attorney-client privilege, and the trial court struck Helfand’s name from the state’s witness list. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies when a client seeks the services of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity. Transcripts of grand jury testimony met the standard of providing a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of a crime or fraud by Radojcic and a reasonable basis to suspect that communications with Helfand were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. The state met its burden of overcoming the privilege; there was no need to examine Helfand in camera prior before trial testimony. The only attorney-client communications that are subject to disclosure are those related to transactions identified in the indictment.View "People v. Radojcic" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the 2004 murder of Kasavich. In pretrial motions, the trial court ruled that some evidence of domestic violence was relevant to defendant’s motive for the killing and to intent, but limited the evidence that was admissible, finding that the admission of all of it would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to exclude certain testimony from defendant’s wife based on the marital privilege. The appellate court concluded the communications between his wife and defendant were protected by marital privilege because they were made during the marriage and were made privately. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Defendant’s threat to kill his wife and Kasavich was not made in reliance on the confidences of his marriage; defendant intended that his wife reveal the threat to Kasavich. It is the type of communication that the wife might have revealed to a family member or the police. Defendant’s threat, that it was not motivated by his reliance on the intimate, special trust, and affection of the marital relationship. View "People v. Trzeciak" on Justia Law

While patrolling a motel parking area, police approached defendant’s car and saw, in plain view in the center console, a large bullet. They ordered defendant and his passengers out of the car, handcuffed hem, found several more bullets in the car and on defendant’s person, then found a .454 revolver under a floor mat on the front passenger side. The circuit court suppressed all of the evidence, concluding that the challenged police conduct subjected defendant to an unlawful search without probable cause because the bullet did not establish evidence of a crime. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The parties agree that the officers’ initial approach and their questioning of defendant was lawful. The officers were in a vulnerable situation when they observed the bullet. It was dusk and the officers were on foot in a parking lot away from their vehicle; they were outnumbered by defendant and his two passengers, who were in a running car. The officers were forced to make a quick decision based on limited information after seeing the bullet. A reasonably cautious individual in a similar situation could reasonably suspect the presence of a gun, implicating officer safety.View "People v. Colyar" on Justia Law

In 2003, Domagala, a live-in caretaker, was seen repeatedly striking and pressing the throat of his 84-year-old charge, Stanley. Approximately a week after being taken to the emergency room, Stanley was discharged to a nursing home with a feeding tube in place. While in the nursing home, Stanley pulled out the tube several times causing peritonitis, a systemic infection, which ultimately led to his death. Domagala was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 40 years. He filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to conduct a diligent investigation to discover that a superseding, intervening cause, i.e., gross negligence of treating medical staff, and not petitioner’s conduct, caused the death of the victim. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Domagala is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.View "People v. Domagala" on Justia Law

Lloyd was convicted of seven counts of criminal sexual assault under 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2). The victim was 13 years old and had known Lloyd all of her life. The appellate court affirmed six of his convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court held that all seven convictions must be reversed. The state was required to prove that Lloyd committed an act of sexual penetration with the victim and that he knew either that she was unable to understand the nature of the act or that she was unable to give knowing consent. Lloyd’s knowledge of the victim’s age, alone, was insufficient to prove that he knew the victim was unable to understand the nature of the sex acts or give knowing consent. The court criticized the state’s decision not to charge aggravated criminal sexual abuse, for which the evidence was sufficient, stating that it is “more than unfortunate that the State chose to prosecute this case in a manner that required the minor victim … to answer questions as to her motivation or willingness to engage in sexual activity … and about her sexual education.” View "People v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

In 2006, defendant was indicted for aggravated battery and mob action. Multiple continuance motions were filed by defendant and the state. When the case was called for jury trial in May 2010, the victim-witnesses had not arrived. The judge began jury selection, over defense counsel’s objection, although the defendant had not arrived. When the witnesses had not arrived, more than 90 minutes later, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and entered a written order stating that the “matter is dismissed.” The appellate court held that that the order was an appealable dismissal of charges rather than a nonappealable acquittal, then reversed and remanded for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Normally jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn, but under these unique facts, the defendant was never at risk of conviction. The state indicated it would not participate prior to the jury being sworn. The court stated that it understood the court’s frustration regarding delays and its desire to control its docket, but “cannot countenance proceedings which the court labels as a ‘trial” but which simply prove to be ‘a sham [or] artifice employed by the trial judge to achieve the result of a dismissal with prejudice for want of prosecution.’”View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for participation in a 1994 Peoria home invasion and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years for armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The appellate court affirmed; Coleman was unsuccessful in initial post-conviction claims. He claimed actual innocence in a 2009 successive post-conviction petition. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Coleman called eight witnesses and the state called an investigating detective. The trial court denied relief, finding that Coleman’s evidence was insufficient to probably change the result on retrial. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new trial. To succeed on a post-conviction claim of actual innocence, a claimant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial. Although the state’s evidence at the original trial was sufficient to convict, there was no forensic evidence linking Coleman to the attack, and the prosecution’s identifications were significantly impeached. At the post-conviction hearing, Coleman presented the testimony of five men who admitted that they were present at the crime scene and that he was not. Although their credibility could be challenged based on their voluntary intoxication and criminal records, their testimony was consistent on key details. The evidence was new, material and noncumulative. On retrial, the fact finder can determine the credibility of those witnesses and balance the conflicting accounts. View "People v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2001, a vehicle was fired at eight times by another expressway motorist on the expressway. The driver positively identified the defendant as the shooter several times, and the passenger, seriously injured, also, identified the defendant from a photo array. Convicted, the defendant was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of the passenger and to a consecutive 10-year term for shooting at the driver. He later claimed that he would have accepted a plea bargain rather than go to trial if he had known he could receive consecutive sentences, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed, but the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced. The record showed that the defendant had hoped to prove he was actually innocent and wanted to go to trial. The trial court reasonably found the defendant’s statements to the contrary incredible. The defendant had called a witness to testify that her boyfriend was the shooter, contrary to a signed statement she had given after the incident. The victim testified that he had been offered money to recant. View "People v. Hale" on Justia Law

Fitzpatrick was stopped by a Zion police officer for walking down the middle of a street, a petty offense which violates the Illinois Vehicle Code and was also contrary to municipal ordinance. After a brief pat-down search, Fitzpatrick was placed under arrest and, at the police station, was searched for contraband. Cocaine was found in his sock. Fitzpatrick was charged with possessing fewer than 15 grams of cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence on a theory that a full custodial arrest for a petty offense violates the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution. The motion was denied and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the issue has been settled under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Fitzpatrick failed to meet his burden of establishing his claim that there is any long-standing Illinois tradition prohibiting arrests for petty offenses. The same meaning should be given to article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution as has been given to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.View "People v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law