Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Hunter was arrested in 2008 when Chicago police observed him standing in the doorway of a building. A codefendant, on the sidewalk, twice accepted money from a passerby and then nodded to Hunter, who retrieved an item from the vestibule and handed it to the passerby. Police recovered cannabis and handguns from the vestibule. Hunter was charged with possession of cannabis. Bail was set, he was released, and he filed a written demand for trial. Continuances were granted; 175 days after the speedy-trial demand, Hunter was indicted as an armed habitual criminal and on four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Hunter claimed that the gun-related offenses were known when he was originally charged, were subject to the compulsory joinder statute, and should have been combined with the cannabis charge. He claimed that the speedy-trial statute was violated since he had not been brought to trial on the new charges within 160 days of his original trial demand. The trial court dismissed the new charges. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, holding that the compulsory joinder statute requires that offenses based on the same act and known of by the prosecution must be prosecuted together and are subject to the speedy-trial period of the original charge. The original drug charge remains undisturbed.View "People v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In 2003, a stampede at a Chicago nightclub killed 21 people and injured 50 others. Security guards had released pepper spray to break up a fight on the dance floor, and a rush to the exit crushed these victims. The operators of a restaurant and bar in the building were acquitted on charges of involuntary manslaughter. They were held in indirect criminal contempt for willful violation of court orders concerning building code violations, and received two-year prison sentences. Those orders prohibited occupancy of a suspended mezzanine and occupancy of the second floor of the building. The appellate court ruled that the original orders were not clear and reversed the finding of indirect criminal contempt in 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration of other issues, holding that the jury could have found the defendants guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubtView "People v. Le Mirage, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping and concealment of a homicidal death. He was sentenced to terms of natural life plus 70 years. The appellate court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences and dismissal of his subsequent post-conviction petition,(725 ILCS 5/122-1. Johnson filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment in 2008, which the circuit court erroneously dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The state filed a motion to dismiss his amended petition and requested that Johnson be assessed filing fees and court costs as an inmate filing a frivolous petition, 735 ILCS 5/22-105(a). The trial court dismissed and assessed numerous fees and costs against Johnson, including a $50 fee under the Counties Code, which provides that a State’s Attorney may collect a $50 fee for each day actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus. The prosecution argued that the habeas corpus fee applies to all collateral proceedings. The appellate court held that the reference to habeas corpus was generic and applied to all collateral proceedings, in order to deter frivolous filings. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the fee, stating that, although there are several different types of habeas corpus proceedings, the Counties Code provision applies only to those and is not generic. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old was the subject of a petition to have her adjudicated delinquent based on unlawful consumption of alcohol and other offenses. She pled guilty to the misdemeanor of unlawful consumption of alcohol in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. Later that year, the state filed a petition to revoke her probation, claiming that drug testing revealed that she had consumed marijuana and cocaine. She was conveyed to a Department of Juvenile Justices facility. Her sentence has been served. Addressing the issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute does not permit a minor to be committed to the Department after being adjudicated delinquent for unlawful consumption of alcohol, being placed on probation with conditions, and then having that probation revoked for violation of those probation conditions. Sentencing for underage drinking is limited by a Juvenile Court Act provision stating that a minor may be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice “only if a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” Underage drinking is not an offense of which an adult may be guilty. The court rejected a claim that this juvenile could be incarcerated for having “violated a court order” by noncompliance with probation terms. View "In re Shelby R." on Justia Law

In 2006, an 80-year-old man was found strangled to death in his apartment; his garage was empty, but his car was later recovered several blocks away. The keys to the car were in the possession of Bailey when he was arrested in connection with an unrelated incident. Bailey also had the victim’s checkbook and apartment keys. Fingerprints matching Bailey’s were found at the apartment, which was in disarray. Bailey was charged with the homicide and with home invasion and robbery of a senior citizen. He had given incriminating statements to police, but he denied them at trial, although he admitted that he had known the victim and had done odd jobs for him. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder and Bailey received a natural life sentence for the homicide, with concurrent terms for the other offenses. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for resentencing on the homicide under the statute applicable at the time of trial, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a), which provided for a term of not less than 20 nor more than 60 years. The trial court’s refusal to submit separate verdict forms for felony murder brought about the sentence of natural life. View "People v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Blair was convicted of armed robbery for taking $965 from Kelly in 2009 by threatening the use of force while armed with a firearm. The circuit court imposed a 23-year term, which included a 15-year firearm enhancement. In another case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the firearm enhancement was unconstitutional as in violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, based on a comparison to the armed violence statute. Months later, the legislature amended the armed violence statute to provide that robbery cannot serve as a predicate offense for armed violence so that the two offenses no longer have identical elements which could support a proportionate penalties challenge. The appellate court agreed with Blair that the sentence was void ab initio and remanded for resentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and upheld the sentence. The firearm enhancement had merely been declared unenforceable. By amending the armed violence statute, to which the armed robbery provision had been compared, the legislature revived the firearm enhancement for armed robbery with a firearm because there was no longer any issue as to identical offense elements.View "People v. Blair" on Justia Law

Cardona was charged with indecent solicitation of a child and unlawful restraint based on a 2007 incident concerning a girl who was walking home from school. Cardona has never been tried; he was ruled unfit for trial and was transferred to a mental health center. At a statutory “innocence only” or “discharge” hearing, Cardona was acquitted of indecent solicitation, but not of unlawful restraint, on which a finding of “not not guilty” was entered. Before the supreme court, he did not contest the sufficiency of evidence that the offense was sexually motivated, providing a statutory ground for requiring registration as a sex offender. As Cardona’s term of extended treatments was ending and Cardona was still unfit for trial, the state sought to have him certified as a sex offender. The circuit court ordered him to register. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court affirmed, rejecting a due process argument that, if he was unfit for trial, he was also unfit to defend himself against the attempt to force him to register as a sex offender. Although due process bars the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent, registration proceedings are not criminal, and requiring registration is not punishment. The registration is a regulatory scheme. Cardona was represented by appointed counsel and also had an interpreter in the proceeding.View "People v. Cardona" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual misconduct against his stepdaughter in 2007, when she was nine years old. The appellate court reversed his conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault, finding the evidence insufficient. The Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for the uncharged crime of aggravated criminal sexual abuse as a lesser-included offense. The appellate court did so find and remanded for sentencing. The supreme court affirmed, rejecting an argument of forfeiture by the prosecution, noting the authority of reviewing courts to reduce offenses on appeal. The absence of a statutory element from a charging instrument will not prevent a finding that it contains an outline of the lesser offense if any missing element can be inferred. The court noted that the assault charge involves sexual penetration, while the abuse charge involves sexual gratification or arousal. The former was alleged in the indictment; the latter was not. However, the indictment specifically alleged sexual penetration and, from this, the court held that it could be inferred that the misconduct was done for sexual gratification or arousal. The defendant had reasonable notice of the potential for a conviction of the lesser-included offense and had the opportunity to defend against it.View "People v. Kennebrew" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Illinois Department of State Police denied Coram a firearm owners’ identification (FOID) card. The trial judge ordered issuance of the card. The State Police moved to vacate on the basis of Coram’s 1992 domestic battery conviction for slapping his girlfriend. He had pled guilty, but had not served any jail time. The Illinois statute provides for denial of a FOID card to anyone prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm. In 1996, after Coram’s conviction, the federal Gun Control Act was amended to impose a firearm disability on those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. A different judge confirmed the previous order and, further, held unconstitutional, as applied, language of the federal Gun Control Act which was incorporated into the Illinois statute. Although that federal statutory language provided relief in cases of pardon, expungement of conviction, or restoration of rights after conviction, Coram, who had never served jail time, claimed that these grounds were not available to him under Illinois law. The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the matter without reaching constitutional questions concerning the right to bear arms. It vacated the holding that federal statutory law was unconstitutional as applied, but affirmed the original order directing issuance of a FOID card. Coram had a remedy under the Illinois statutory scheme, which provides a process to review whether an applicant for a FOID card should be perpetually barred from obtaining one or can have his second amendment firearm rights restored because he is determined to currently be a law-abiding, responsible citizen. That is what happened here. View "Coram v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers testified that teenagers were screaming, making gestures, and throwing bottles at passing vehicles in the vicinity of 4217 West 25th Place and then retired to the backyard of that address, which was not the defendant’s residence. Defendant was heard yelling an expletive and was seen with a gun i before he dropped it to the ground. The loaded gun had its serial number scratched off. The defendant testified that police searched the yard, showed him a gun and accused him of dropping it. He denied having a gun that evening. Defendant’s friend corroborated his version of events. Convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), defendant was sentenced to 24 months of probation. He was also found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, but no sentence was imposed for that offense. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon must be reversed, but that the court should impose sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit has held that the “use” statute, which refers to “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible” is effectively “a flat-ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home” and violates the second amendment, which protects both the right to keep and the right to “bear” arms. The other statute, however, prohibits possession of a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person by one who is under 18 years of age. The defendant was 17. Possession of handguns by minors falls outside the scope of the second amendment’s protection. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law