Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, charged with murder and home invasion, remained in custody after his February 8, 2009 arrest. After he was granted several continuances, trial was set for February 1, 2010. The prosecution then requested a continuance because the sole eyewitness could not travel for medical reasons. A second continuance was requested because the technician who had collected evidence was on deployment in Afghanistan. Granting this request brought the trial date to July 19, 2010. Defendant requested dismissal for expiration of his statutory speedy trial period, which he claimed ran out on June 26. The judge dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for trial, rejecting both defendant’s argument that the state may receive no more than a total of 60 days of continuance and the state’s claim that there is no limit to the number of continuances. Under the speedy-trial statute, “if a court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.” The statute means that the 60-day period is tied to the specific evidence for which the continuance is sought. The prosecution may seek separate continuances to obtain different items of material evidence, but may obtain only one 60-day continuance for each. Awareness that two witnesses are unavailable means that the state should seek a continuance as to both simultaneously, rather than exhausting a continuance as to one and then seeking a continuance as to the other, unnecessarily prolonging proceedings. This defendant did not challenge the state’s due diligence, the materiality of the testimony, or reasonable grounds to believe that the testimony would be obtained at a later date. View "People v. Lacy" on Justia Law

In 1996, Cruz was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 60 and 30 years. The appellate court affirmed. In 1999, he filed an untimely post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. In second-stage proceedings ordered by the appellate court after a supreme court supervisory order, counsel was appointed. Cruz subsequently decided to proceed pro se. In 2008, an amended petition was filed realleging the ineffectiveness claims and complaining about jury instructions given at trial. The court dismissed for untimeliness, rejecting both claims of “no culpable negligence: and ineffective assistance. On appeal, the state argued for the first time that the dismissal should be affirmed because Cruz had failed to attach a notarized verification affidavit to his supplemental petition alleging lack of culpable negligence, as required by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, finding the unverified pleading to be a “nullity.” It did not reach the claim of lack of culpable negligence. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Cruz that the state forfeited the issue and the appellate court must address allegations that lack of culpable negligence excused his late filing. View "People v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for a 1998 murder, home invasion, residential burglary and two separate charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault. A conviction for sexual assault triggers mandatory consecutive sentences. The parties negotiated a plea agreement. The burglary charge was dropped, and the defendant agreed to plead guilty to murder, home invasion and one aggravated criminal sexual assault. The court imposed concurrent terms of 55 years for murder and 30 years for each other offense. An attempt to withdraw his plea resulted in reduction of the murder sentence to 50 years. In 2005, defendant filed an unsuccessful post-conviction petition and, in 2009, filed an unsuccessful petition for relief from judgment. The appellate court agreed that the concurrent sentencing structure was void, but not that the agreement was void, because the parties’ intent that 50 years be spent in prison could be implemented by resentencing in accordance with both that agreement and applicable statutes. The supreme court affirmed, holding that both parties were mistaken in thinking that the defendant could be sentenced to concurrent terms. The mutual mistake may be rectified by contract reformation because they were in actual agreement and their true intent may be discerned. The defendant would receive the benefit of his bargain for a total of 50 years in prison if consecutive sentences for a total of 50 years are imposed. View "People v. Donelson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted murder, armed robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated battery with a firearm. A public defender was appointed, but defendant later successfully requested a different attorney. Defendant subsequently requested to proceed pro se. In granting this request, the trial court admonished him, and defendant waived his right to counsel. He then made motions, causing the matter to be continued. On the morning of trial, defendant stated that he no longer wanted to represent himself and requested a third appointment of counsel. The trial court, noting that defendant had refused to cooperate with two public defenders, viewed the request as a delaying tactic and denied it. The trial commenced with jury selection. Defendant refused to participate without counsel and remained in his holding cell. He later participated without counsel. He did not testify or call witnesses, but made an opening statement and closing argument and cross-examined prosecution witnesses, including four victims. Following conviction, the court imposed a 95-year term. The appellate court found plain error and ordered a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(a)) ambiguous, but concluding that “trial in absentia” provisions were not relevant. The trial court in this case was not statutorily required to appoint a third public defender simply because defendant decided to waive his right to be present during voir dire. View "People v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to 12 years. The appellate court affirmed. In 2008, he filed, pro se, a post-conviction petition. It was dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. In 2009, again pro se, he sought leave to file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)), alleging that he had just discovered that, after serving his sentence, he will be subject to an additional three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). MSR was not mentioned when he was sentenced, which, he claimed, denied him due process. The trial and appellate court rejected his argument. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Criminal Code states that for this offense, the three-year MSR term shall be included in the sentence “as though written therein.” The Post-Conviction Hearing Act states that a petitioner must show “cause” for failure to raise his claim earlier. This claimed defect can never be “cause” because the petitioner is presumptively charged with knowledge of mandatory supervised release as a matter of law. The court recommended that the legislature address more specifically how one seeking leave to file a successive post-conviction petition meets the statutory requirements of showing cause and prejudice. View "People v. Evans" on Justia Law

Between 2002 and 2004, the defendant assaulted his 11-year-old stepdaughter and her 13-year-old friend. While in pretrial custody, before he was charged, defendant said he wanted to talk about what happened but that he wanted guarantees of probation. The officers doing the interrogating told him that they could not give him any guarantees. The state argued at closing that these conversations were inculpatory as admissions of guilt. Defendant was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, three counts of criminal sexual assault, five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and one count of possession of child pornography; he was sentenced to 75 years. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, finding plain error in the improper admittance of plea-related statements at trial, even though defendant had not previously raised this objection. The Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no plain error. For statements to be inadmissible as plea negotiations, it must be clear that an accused actually intended to plead guilty in exchange for a concession and that such an intention is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. This defendant’s intent to engage in plea negotiations was not shown. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with five counts of burglary, pled guilty in 2009 and received a sentence of 2 years’ probation and 180 days in jail. He was ordered to pay a public defender fee of $200 after the judge questioned him about his employment. In 2010, he was sentenced to six years in prison after having been found to have violated his probation. In his appeal, defendant contended that the hearing on his ability to pay the defender fee had been inadequate, that it was too late for a remand because the statute calls for a hearing within 90 days of judgment, and that no hearing could be held at all and that the fee should be vacated. The appellate court remanded for a new hearing. The supreme court affirmed. The perfunctory hearing was inadequate and the defendant was entitled to a new hearing of the quality set forth by statute. There is no reason why the trial court’s error should be uncorrectable on appeal. View "People v. Somers" on Justia Law

In 2008, Chicago police in an unmarked car saw the defendant yelling “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle, in front of a Chicago Housing Authority building, in an area known for marijuana sales. The arresting officer testified said that “dro, dro” is slang for the sale of cannabis, and case law has recognized that this refers to a higher quality, or hydroponic, marijuana. The defendant was arrested for violation of a municipal ordinance forbidding the solicitation of unlawful business on a public way. At the scene, plastic bags containing what appeared to be cannabis were found on his person, and, at the police station, plastic bags of what later tested positive for cocaine were also found in his clothing. All took place without a warrant. The circuit court denied a motion to suppress; the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court, reversed finding that there was probable cause to arrest. The court noted that the police testimony was unrebutted; facts known to police at the time of the arrest provided reasonable grounds to believe defendant was committing a criminal offense.View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the 2004 shooting death of a man whose body was found in a garbage can. He gave a statement, but would not sign it and did not testify at trial. There was testimony that defendant had stated that he had a homosexual relationship with the victim, that they had argued, and that defendant had shot the victim before dragging the body outside. Police searched defendant’s residence with his consent. It had been cleaned; no inculpatory evidence or usable fingerprints were found. The defense offered testimony as to defendant’s mild retardation. There was testimony that the condition of the body was consistent with having been dropped on the sidewalk and dragged. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, based on purportedly inadequate jury questioning, but, following a supervisory order, affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court then affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to ask prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted the principle that failure to testify should not be held against defendant, and in failing to ask whether they understood three other principles, but the objections were defaulted for failure to raise them during voir dire or by post-trial motion. The evidence was not close. View "People v. Wilmington" on Justia Law

Lake Holiday, a private community, is governed by the Association, which enacted restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations, including rules that concern speed limits, impose fines, provide for enforcement of rules by private security officers, and require residents to provide security officers with identification when requested to do so. Plaintiff owns property in the development and was driving within the development, when a private security officer measured plaintiff’s speed, pulled plaintiff over, took plaintiff’s license, detained plaintiff for a few minutes, and issued a citation. In his third amended complaint plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices of the security department were unlawful and that the rules and regulations were void and alleged breach of fiduciary duty and willful and wanton conduct and false imprisonment. The trial court granted defendants summary judgments. The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), nor was the security department prohibited from using radar, but that the Association was not authorized by the Vehicle Code to use amber lights on its vehicles and that stopping and detaining drivers for Association rule violations was unlawful. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the Association. View "Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law