Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

English, was charged with knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)), felony murder predicated on aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)), and aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a)), based on the death of his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. Convicted of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child, he was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. The appellate court held that the court did not err by not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter, but that the sentencing statute violated Illinois’ single-subject rule. On remand, he was sentenced to 50 years. While direct appeal was pending, English filed a post-conviction petition, which he voluntarily dismissed in 2003. In 2004, he filed another post-conviction petition, which the court treated as successive and dismissed. The appellate court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider dismissal of the 2004 petition, but that the court erred in declining to reinstate the 1999 petition. On remand, English argued that his felony-murder conviction was improper because the acts constituting the aggravated battery of a child arose from, and were inherent in, the killing. The circuit court denied the petition as barred by res judicata because it was related to the claim raised on direct appeal regarding jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. View "People v. English" on Justia Law

Stanbridge served time for aggravated criminal sex abuse concerning a 1999 Adams County; Lieberman was convicted of multiple Cook County counts of rape in 1980. Both were committed to the Department of Human Services under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1), which establishes a framework under which persons who have been convicted of certain sex offenses may be subjected to further civil detention after service of their criminal sentences. Their petitions for release were dismissed by the circuit courts. In Stanbridge’s case, the appellate court reversed, but as to Lieberman, dismissal was affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed (reinstated) dismissal of the petitions, clarifying the evidence required at post-commitment hearings for discharge or release. There must be a plausible account on each of the required elements of the petition, demonstrating a change in the circumstances that led to the initial commitment. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to bring forward sufficient evidence. In both of the proceedings at issue, the evidence did not, essentially, present anything new; there was no “plausible account” showing that the individual should no longer be civilly committed as sexually violent. View "In re the Detention of Stanbridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of committing multiple sex offenses concerning his 14-year-old daughter in 2007 and 2008. The convictions were for two counts of criminal sexual assault, one count of criminal transmission of HIV, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant had HIV, knew it, and took medication for it. He did not always wear a condom, but the victim did not contract the disease. The appellate court reduced the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault to criminal sexual assault; the supreme court affirmed. Section 12-14(a)(3) of the Criminal Code provides for aggravation of a criminal sexual assault if the offender “during the commission of the offense … acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of the victim.” Mere exposure of the victim to HIV during the commission of the offense did not threaten or endanger her life. The court noted that the sentence for criminal transmission of HIV should be consecutive to the others. View "People v. Giraud" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty in 2006 to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor and received a 14-year term. He had originally been indicted for offenses involving several minor victims between 1995 and 1998. Some charges were nol-prossed in 1999 and the state attempted to have defendant involuntarily committed as sexually dangerous (725 ILCS 205/0.01). After a 2004 remand, the state did not seek commitment a second time, but proceeded with criminal prosecution and agreed to dismiss remaining counts except one. Considering time already spent in custody, it was anticipated that defendant would soon be sent home. However, two weeks after the plea, the Attorney General (not the State’s Attorney) sought commitment under a different statute, the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). A motion to withdraw the guilty plea was denied; the appellate and supreme courts affirmed. Where an accused pleads guilty to an offense which could trigger the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, defense counsel has a minimal duty to advise him that, after completing his prison term, he will be evaluated and may risk involuntary commitment, but defendant failed to showing that he was denied effective assistance or prejudiced: that he could establish actual innocence or a plausible defense. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a police station and reported that he had strangled his wife to death. Although there had been an argument and a struggle, he claimed that the death was an accident. At trial, defense counsel argued that the evidence showed, at most, recklessness and involuntary manslaughter. Leach was convicted of first degree murder, based on knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The court properly admitted testimony of a qualified expert that it would take three to six minutes for a person to die from strangulation. Leach raised constitutional confrontation issues because the autopsy report, concluding that the death was a homicide, was made by a pathologist who had retired before trial and could not be cross-examined. A different expert testified, based on the report. The routine autopsy report is not testimonial and not subject to the “Crawford” rule even if the examiner is aware that police suspect homicide and a specific individual. It was not prepared for the primary purpose of criminal prosecution. Any error was harmless given that Leach did not dispute the manner and cause of death or that he was guilty of some form of homicide. View "People v. Leach" on Justia Law

A sex offender pled guilty to criminal sexual assault, to failing to register as a sex offender, and to subsequently failing to register a change of address. A 12-year sentence was imposed for the assault; different judges later imposed concurrent sentences of two and three years for his registration convictions. The State’s Attorney sought a writ of mandamus, claiming that consecutive sentences were required by law. The supreme court agreed with the State’s Attorney, construing the section 5-8-4(d)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2)) and finding that criminal sexual assault is a “triggering” event for purposes of consecutive sentencing. Although the two registration offenses may themselves be the subject of concurrent sentences, the term for criminal sexual assault must be served first. View "People v. Meersman" on Justia Law

Tate was convicted for a 2001 fatal shooting. Four eyewitnesses identified him. The appellate court affirmed. Tate retained counsel and filed a post-conviction petition, attaching affidavits of alibi witnesses and of occurrence witnesses. Tate alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call these witnesses. Although this issue had not been raised by post-trial motion, the supreme court found that there was no forfeiture. The circuit court nonetheless summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed. Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, a petition may be dismissed, initially, if it is “frivolous or patently without merit.” If this does not occur, the court determines whether there is a substantial showing of a constitutional violation meriting an evidentiary hearing. Most petitions are filed pro se. The state argued that Tate should be held to the higher standard of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, because he had counsel. The court rejected the argument. Tate’s petition could survive the first stage if it was arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and if it was arguable that he was prejudiced.View "People v. Tate" on Justia Law

Murdock, then 16, was convicted in 2001 of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements made to police. Defendant, a juvenile, alleged his statements were the product of police coercion that rendered them involuntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion on remand. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the absence of a concerned adult during defendant's police detention. Defendant was able to clearly communicate and understand the questions posed to him. He was able to understand and give assent to a waiver of his Miranda rights. On tape defendant appeared mostly calm and collected. He did not appear frightened or under any intense coercion. Defendant was never threatened physically or mentally and there were no promises or assurances to defendant to contribute to a coercive atmosphere. Defendant was allowed access to food, drink, and restroom; his statements were the result of his own decisions. View "People v. Murdock" on Justia Law

When he was 15 years old, Geiger testified for the state at the trial of a fellow gang member for a 1999 double murder. A codefendant in that case was retried in 2008, and, as to him, Geiger refused to testify, claiming Fifth Amendment privilege. The circuit court advised him that there was no reasonable basis for the claim, given his prior testimony and own earlier statement to police. The prosecution made an offer of use immunity, but he still refused to testify and was given a 20-year sentence for direct criminal contempt. The appellate court affirmed. In the meantime, the codefendant was convicted and Geiger conceded his Fifth Amendment claim. The Illinois Supreme Court found the 20-year term manifestly disproportionate and unreasonably excessive, noting that the power to punish for contempt is discretionary with the judiciary and that there is no sentencing classification or sentencing range set by the legislature. The court also noted that there was some evidence that the refusal to testify might have been driven by fear of gang retaliation. View "People v. Geiger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault on an eight-year-old girl, at his mother’s home for babysitting, on two dates. His confession was admitted into evidence; the girl gave statements and testified at trial. At trial, he denied any inappropriate behavior. He received consecutive terms of 10 and 8 years. The appellate court held that the rule of corpus delicti required the state to produce independent evidence of the elements of penetration (the girl’s descriptions did not), and that insufficient independent evidence was presented to support the convictions. It reduced them to the lesser-included offenses of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and remanded for resentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the State need not present independent evidence corroborating every element of the charged offenses before a defendant’s statement may be used to prove the corpus delicti and that the independent evidence was sufficient to permit the defendant’s confession to be admitted. On remand the appellate court must also consider whether defendant’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse had been improperly denied and, if it was not required, whether the sentence was excessive. View "People v. Lara" on Justia Law