Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
by
An undercover agent made a controlled purchase of heroin from the defendant. Evidence showed that the transaction took place 443 feet from the "High Mountain Church and Preschool." Defendant was convicted of delivering a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class 1 felony. The appellate court reduced the conviction to simple delivery (a Class 2 felony) after finding that a preschool is not a "school" within the meaning of section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The supreme court affirmed. The 1991 amendment that added the "school" provision also amended or created numerous other acts to increase the penalty for various offenses taking place on or around school grounds; it defined "school" as "any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college or university." Precedent has interpreted the Act accordingly, not encompassing a preschool.View "People v. Young" on Justia Law

by
In connection with operation of a medical transport company, defendant was convicted of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1), vendor fraud (305 ILCS 5/8A-3), and money laundering (720 ILCS 5/29B-1), sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay$1.2 million in restitution. The appellate court upheld the theft and vendor fraud convictions, but reversed the money laundering conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the money laundering conviction. The trial court properly allowed the state establish guilt of money laundering with evidence of receipts rather than profits. View "People v. Gutman" on Justia Law

by
One appellate court rejected an argument that the probation officers in defendant's case lacked authority to file petitions alleging violation of probation and seeking revocation of probation. In another district, the court rejected the state's argument that 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1, which allows the chief circuit judge to adopt intermediate sanctions for probation violations and allows probation officers to impose intermediate sanctions instead of filing a violation, violates separation of powers by infringing on the executive branch, specifically, state's attorneys in prosecuting probation violations. The Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed. Probation officers possess authority to file petitions charging a violation of probation; the statute does not give a state's attorney power to "veto" a probation officer's decision to offer intermediate sanctions, so long as the sanction requirements are timely completed, and that construction does not violate separation of powers principles. View "People v. Hammond" on Justia Law

by
Defendant, originally charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was found guilty of two counts of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. He was in custody for 344 days before sentencing. He received an extended term of five years; the court also ordered indexing of defendant's DNA, and imposed monetary charges, including a $200 DNA analysis charge pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(j). The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentence, but modified his fines and fees order with regard to a $5 court system fee and a $30 children’s advocacy center charge. The court declined to modify the order with regard to the DNA analysis charge, which the court held was not subject to offset by defendant’s presentence incarceration credit. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. DNA analysis charge is not punitive. It is a one-time charge intended to cover the cost of analyzing the DNA sample submitted by the qualifying offender and is compensatory. . View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

by
Defendant pled guilty to intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1)) and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. Her sentences were to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She was also ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence for that offense to three years; found that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; held that the trial court did not err in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the restitution order because the trial court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the restitution order and otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Snyder" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm under an accountability theory and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 14 years and five years,respectively. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Reversible error occurred when the state was allowed to impeach defendant, who testified at trial, with his prior juvenile adjudication for burglary. A juvenile adjudication is typically not admissible against a testifying defendant, and defendant did not "open the door" to admission of his juvenile adjudication. View "People v. Villa" on Justia Law

by
After thefts from a school office, a motion activated, wireless, digital camera concealed within a clock radio and a digital video recorder were installed. Over the weekend, the motion sensor triggered the DVR and a recording was made, which was later copied by the police. School officials identified a night watchman on the recording; he admitted to stealing cash from the office, but disagreed about the amount. When the state sought to admit the VHS tape at trial, defendant objected on foundational grounds, arguing that the video skips forward 30 seconds and the state failed to explain why the gap existed. Defense counsel also argued that it had not been shown that the camera was working properly. The trial court overruled the objection and found defendant guilty. The appellate court held that the state failed to establish even the probability that the VHS tape had not been tampered with. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the conviction. The totality of the evidence demonstrated that the state laid a proper foundation for admission of the VHS tape. View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law

by
Following separate convictions, the circuit court of Cook County charged the two defendants $10 each for the Arrestee’s Medical Costs Fund (medical cost assessment), 730 ILCS 125/17. Neither actually received medical services. The appellate court upheld the assessment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed with respect to one defendant and dismissed the other appeal. The plain language of the statute does not indicate the collection of the fee depends upon actual use for defendant's medical care. The statutory scheme requires convicted defendants to contribute to the fund because an arrestee who does use medical services while in custody is required to reimburse the county only to the extent that he or she is reasonably able to pay, leaving the fund to reimburse the county for the balance. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

by
An inmate, committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), claimed deprivation of his right to equal protection because he was not provided with the option to retain an independent psychiatrist to defend against the proceedings, an option afforded similarly situated individuals subject to commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). The trial court rejected the claim and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that an individual subject to commitment under the SDPA, is not similarly situated to individuals subject to commitment under the SVPA. The SDPA concerns individuals who have been charged with any type of criminal offense and suffer from a mental disorder predisposing them to commit sex crimes. The SVPA is limited to persons with mental disorders who have been convicted of serious and violent sex offenses, and are facing potential release or discharge from state custody but continue to pose a risk to commit additional sex crimes. View "People v. Masterson" on Justia Law

by
Defendant, convicted of first degree murder for a 2003 shooting death, was sentenced to 55 years' imprisonment. On appeal, his arguments included denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel because police barred his attorney from observing witnesses during a lineup. The appellate court affirmed, finding the evidence closely balanced and applying plain-error analysis. The highest court affirmed after holding that the matter was not within the purview of plain-error review and the evidence was not closely balanced. Even if the right to counsel had attached at the time of the line-up, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt in the record, the defendant could not show prejudice. The record was undeveloped on the issue of whether defendant was entitled to counsel at the line-up, because the issue was not raised at trial. View "People v. White" on Justia Law