Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting the State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's appeal of the second-stage dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, holding the appellate court erred in part.Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to forty-eight years of imprisonment. Petitioner later filed a pro se postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court advanced the petition to second-stage rulings under the Act and then granted the State's motion to dismiss. In reversing and remanding for further proceedings, the appellate court concluded that Petitioner did not receive effective assistance of retained postconviction counsel at the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the appellate court's judgment reversing the circuit court's judgment of dismissal, holding that postconviction petitioners have a right to reasonable assistance of counsel under the Act; and (2) reversed the appellate court's judgment directing the circuit court to appoint new counsel, holding that the circuit court can only make one statutory appointment. View "People v. Urzua" on Justia Law

Pinkett was charged with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer after he failed to stop his motorcycle in response to police sirens and lights and traveled more than 21 miles per hour over the speed limit. Pinkett was ultimately arrested inside a Walmart. In opening statements, the prosecutor said that officers would testify that at Walmart Pinkett did not ask why he was being detained. Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. At trial, the issue was whether Pinkett was aware of the officers attempting to stop him; there was testimony about noise levels, Pinkett's earplugs, and the lack of a rear-view mirror on his motorcycle. The arresting officer testified that he told Pinkett, ‘We need to walk out the store without making a scene,’ and he did it with no problem.” In closing arguments, the prosecutor said: “[Pinkett] doesn’t ask why he’s being detained. ... [Pinkett] has the right to remain silent … Don’t you think a normal person would say what’s this all about.”The appellate court reversed Pinkett's conviction, finding that the circuit court erred in denying Pinkett’s motion for a mistrial because evidence of Pinkett’s silence during and after his arrest was only admissible for impeachment purposes whether the silence was before or after Miranda warnings. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not so overwhelming that the error was harmless. View "People v. Pinkett" on Justia Law

Illinois State Trooper Scott stopped Taylor on I-80 due to an obstructed windshield. Scott approached Taylor’s vehicle, identified himself, and informed Taylor that he would give him a warning. While Scott was preparing the warning, another officer arrived with a canine unit and walked the canine around Taylor’s vehicle. The canine alerted. Scott and the other officer asked Taylor to exit his car. Taylor refused and sped off, ultimately parking his vehicle on a country road and grabbing weapons that he had in his vehicle, an AR-15, a semiautomatic rifle, and a handgun. Taylor hid in a cornfield. Scott found Taylor’s car and exited his squad car. Taylor fired 23 shots in Scott’s direction with the AR-15 rifle. Scott was unharmed. Law enforcement officers pursued Taylor, who surrendered several hours later.Convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a peace officer, Taylor was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, plus an additional 20 years for using a firearm during the commission of the offense. The Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a second psychiatric evaluation to determine whether he was not guilty by reason of insanity. Taylor was not subject to an improper double enhancement when he received a 20-year sentence under the firearm enhancement of section 8-4(c)(1)(C), in addition to his 30-year sentence under subsection (A). View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant at a Chicago home, forcibly entering the residence after nobody answered. Inside, officers saw Ramirez descending from the second floor. Ramirez was detained but allowed to return upstairs, where he retrieved his shoes from one of the bedrooms. Police searched the house and recovered a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun, a Mossberg shotgun, a 9-millimeter handgun, and ammunition. The Benelli shotgun was recovered from under the mattress of the single bed in the room where Ramirez had retrieved his shoes. From the same bedroom, police recovered mail bearing Ramirez’s name and the home's address. Ramirez was taken into custody, provided Miranda warnings, and made a statement that he bought the Benelli shotgun from a coworker for $100.Ramirez was charged with possession of a Benelli shotgun whose serial number had been “changed, altered, removed or obliterated” (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b)). The state did not present any direct evidence that Ramirez knew that the shotgun’s serial number was defaced. Ramirez did not testify or call any witnesses. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed his conviction. Section 24-5(b)’s implied mens rea of knowledge must apply to both elements of the offense, possession and defacement. The court remanded for a new trial. At the time of trial, binding precedent from an appellate court provided that the state did not have to present evidence that a defendant knew a firearm was defaced. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Hutt was convicted of obstructing justice and driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Fourth District affirmed. Hutt argued that the trial court improperly denied him a jury trial in the DUI case and that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of obstructing justice. Hutt executed a written jury waiver and was admonished with regard to his right to a jury trial. Although all five cases against him were set for a jury trial on the day of the waiver, the written waiver did not reference the DUI case number. The pretrial conference order referenced all five case numbers, indicated that Hutt had waived a jury trial, and removed the entire cause from the jury docket. Thereafter, when all five cases were called for a status hearing, Hutt's counsel stated that Hutt had previously waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court addressed Hutt, who did not challenge the waiver but, rather, explained why he had waived his right to a jury trial. At subsequent court proceedings, Hutt never objected to a bench trial in the DUI caseThe Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Hutt’s DUI conviction but reversed his obstructing justice conviction. Hutt’s refusal or recalcitrance to comply with the police officers and the search warrant to obtain his blood or urine did not meet the definition of “conceal” for the obstruction charge. View "People v. Hutt" on Justia Law

In 2008, Graefnitz went with Wilson and Moore to buy drugs. Graefnitz was shot in the back and died from his wounds. Wilson was then 14 years old. The court granted a transfer motion, concluding that charging Wilson in the juvenile justice system “with the hope that this minor will somehow be transformed into a non-violent law-abiding citizen ready for release in society at age 21” would not serve the public interest nor the interest of justice. Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury found that Wilson did not personally discharge the weapon that caused Graefnitz’s death. The PSI consisted of more than 200 pages of reports and supporting documents, including information about Wilson’s troubled background, mental disabilities, substance abuse, criminal history, and medical diagnoses. The court sentenced Wilson to 55 years’ imprisonment for murder (which included a 15-year firearm enhancement), to be served at 100%, and a consecutive four years for attempted armed robbery.Wilson sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging his sentence as violating the eighth amendment by imposing a de facto life sentence without a finding of permanent incorrigibility or specifically addressing the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in the Supreme Court’s 2012 "Miller" decision. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed a decision that vacated Wilson’s sentence. The sentencing court reviewed the entire PSI, which contained extensive evidence regarding Wilson’s developmental age, maturity, and other circumstances, and announced several times that Wilson was young. Wilson received the constitutionally required procedure under Miller. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Conway was convicted as being an armed habitual criminal following a 2015 Chicago shooting, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7. Conway challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the identification testimony of a police officer. The appellate court found that the evidence was sufficient to convict Conway but nonetheless reversed and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court’s pronounced bias in favor of police testimony. The court had stated: I find that the officer did have a unique opportunity to view the shooter … the officer’s testimony with regard to the identity of the shooter was in fact clear, credible, and convincing… he was not in a situation where his perception might have been affected … he is a professional … which I think is something that I can take into consideration as compared to an individual who’s never had any such training.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The trial court’s comments regarding the officer’s training related to the court’s credibility determination and as nothing else in the record indicates that the trial court displayed favoritism for police testimony. View "People v. Conway" on Justia Law

Romeoville police responded to a call that a residential security alarm had been activated. Prince came to the door and stated “Jessica” lived there but was out of town. He refused to give his name or identification. Prince was arrested and taken to the police station. Another officer remained at the residence, spoke to a friend of Jessica’s, and obtained Prince’s social media username. From this, the officer determined Prince’s name and learned there was an active warrant out for his arrest. The warrant had been issued in error and was later vacated. Prince initially refused to be fingerprinted or to take a booking photo, stating his name was “Sean Williams” and giving an incorrect birth date. Prince agreed to allow the police to fingerprint and photograph him “more than minutes,” after arriving at the station.At trial, the parties did not raise, and the court did not address “material impediment” as an element of obstruction of justice by furnishing false information (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1). A jury convicted Prince. On appeal, the state conceded that the evidence presented was insufficient as a matter of law where the state offered no evidence on the “material impediment” element. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, finding double jeopardy did not bar retrial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Retrial is prohibited. There was no trial error, or anything similar, that prevented the state—which bore the burden of proof—from introducing evidence on the issue of material impediment. View "People v. Prince" on Justia Law

In 1983, Prante was convicted of a strangulation murder. The appellate court rejected Prante’s claim that the state’s expert testimony concerning bite marks should not have been admitted. In 1993, Prante filed a postconviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process claim concerning “material misrepresentation of evidence” relating to blood found at the crime scene.” The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely. In 2002, Prante filed an unsuccessful petition arguing that his sentence violated Apprendi. In 2017, Prante successfully sought DNA and fingerprint testing (725 ILCS 5/116-3). No interpretable DNA profiles were obtained, and no match was found for the fingerprint.In 2018, Prante sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition that argued actual innocence, a due process claim alleging that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of bite mark analysis evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Prante asserted that recent scientific studies had discredited the forensic bite mark opinion testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Prante is not entitled to file either the due process or the actual innocence claim. Without any allegation that the state knowingly used the false bite mark testimony or failed to exercise diligence to discover that the testimony was false, Prante has not pled a cognizable due process claim under Illinois law. Prante has not met the high standard for setting forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. View "People v. Prante" on Justia Law

Moore and Williams, both sentenced to life in prison without parole for separate murders committed when they were 19 years old, appealed from judgments denying them leave to file successive postconviction petitions challenging their sentences. The Fourth District affirmed the judgment against Moore; the Second District reversed the judgment against Williams.The Illinois Supreme Court held that neither Moore nor Williams sufficiently pled cause for filing their successive postconviction petitions. The Supreme Court’s 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences imposed on young adult offenders, it does not provide cause for Moore and Williams to file their proposed successive postconviction petitions. Moore failed to allege facts that could support a finding that his brain development at the time of the crime required the court to treat him as a juvenile offender. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law