Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Walls pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. He was sentenced to three consecutive 15-year prison terms. The court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider in October 2005. In November, Walls filed a “Motion for Rehearing,” arguing that his attorney had failed to comply with Rule 604(d) because he did not review the transcript of the plea hearing or file a Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance. The case was then delayed until 2010 when Walls sought relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. After the state moved to dismiss the petition, the case was again delayed. In 2019, Walls filed “Amended Petition[s] to Vacate or Redress a Void Sentence.”The court concluded that the case was “still at the motion to reconsider sentencing stage because a [Rule 604(d)] certificate was never filed” and directed Walls’s attorney to comply. The attorney filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied Walls’s amended motion. The appellate court held that Walls’s direct appeal from the denial of his amended motion to reconsider was untimely. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b), Walls had 30 days from the 2005 date to file a notice of appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in finding the proceedings on Walls’s original motion to reconsider remained “pending” due to his attorney’s noncompliance with Rule 604(d), which is not jurisdictional. Despite the absence of a Rule 604(d) certificate, the post-plea proceedings concluded when the trial court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider his sentence in 2005. View "People v. Walls" on Justia Law

Kidd was convicted on two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)). The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The indictment does not set forth all the elements of the charged offenses; the court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment.In both counts, the grand jury alleged Kidd, "who was over the age of 17, committed an act of sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in contact with the mouth of T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” The counts alleged separate dates. A predatory criminal sexual assault indictment alleging contact requires an allegation that the purpose of the contact was for sexual gratification. The prosecutor and the court told Kidd the state could prove predatory criminal sexual assault by proving contact without also proving the purpose of the contact. Immediately before trial, the prosecutor told Kidd that he intended to prove Kidd acted for the purpose of sexual gratification. While the court did not allow the state to amend the indictment, the court permitted the change by including the statutory language of purpose in the jury instructions. View "People v. Kidd" on Justia Law

Castillo, an inmate, was charged with aggravated battery against an employee of the Department of Corrections (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)). Count II charged him with aggravated battery, “knowing Pontiac Correctional Center to be public property,” (section 12-3.05(c)). Castillo argued that a cellblock in a maximum-security prison that is inaccessible to the public is not “public property” for purposes of the aggravated battery statute and that the state failed to prove ownership of Pontiac Correctional Center.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. The plain and ordinary meaning of “public property” in the aggravated battery statute is simply property owned by the government. While the state presented uncontested evidence that the incident took place at Pontiac, it did not present evidence concerning the ownership of Pontiac, which is necessary to establish that Pontiac was public property. The fact that a battery occurred on public property is an element of the offense. However, there was no abuse of discretion in the appellate court’s decision to take judicial notice of the state’s ownership of Pontiac. View "People v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Epstein, charged with aggravated DUI, moved to exclude her blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) test result obtained from blood drawn four hours after the traffic stop. Epstein argued that the prejudicial effect of admitting that result would substantially outweigh any probative value because retrograde extrapolation could not be performed to establish her BAC at the time of driving. She offered the expert testimony of Dr. O’Donnell, who had interviewed Epstein and reviewed the traffic stop video, video of the field sobriety tests, and video of Epstein sitting in the squad car and testified that retrograde extrapolation could not be performed to determine BAC at the time of driving because the time when alcohol absorption peaked, and elimination began, could not be determined. Retrograde extrapolation could be performed only if Epstein’s alcohol absorption had peaked before the traffic stop; “drinking occurred during the hour before the traffic stop” and alcohol was “being absorbed at the time of the traffic stop.” The circuit court held that the test was inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 403.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. The admission of the BAC test would not create a mandatory presumption. The state still has the burden of proving the elements of the offenses. Epstein may submit evidence, including O’Donnell’s testimony, to show that the test result is unreliable to establish her BAC at the time of driving. The admission of the test result does not violate due process. View "People v. Epstein" on Justia Law

In 2015, Libricz was charged with committing sex offenses against his daughters, D.L. and K.L., in 1987-2006, when the victims were minors. Counts VI and VIII charged Libricz with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. This offense was created by Public Act 89-428, with an effective date of December 13, 1995. Public Act 89-428 was later held unconstitutional, as violating the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.. The General Assembly later reenacted the offense, with an effective date of May 29, 1996, with the effect of creating an entirely new criminal statute.”Libricz argued the indictment was fatally defective and asserted his convictions should be reversed because the alleged period in which the acts took place included 14 months before the effective date of the statute creating the offense. The Appellate Court found the two counts in the indictment defective but affirmed Libricz’s convictions and sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Libricz was not prejudiced by the defect in the indictment. The indictment apprised him of the nature, cause, and elements of the charges. Defense counsel had ample opportunity to raise the argument of the statute’s effective date prior to trial and even during trial. View "People v. Libricz" on Justia Law

Sauls was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, L.G.P., who was under 13 years of age (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1). Sauls filed a supplemental “Brady” motion for discovery and production of documents, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412, requesting documents pertaining to a Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigation against L.G.P.'s mother, and her “live-in girlfriend” regarding allegations of abuse against the two in 2018. The state responded that it requested the documents from DCFS but was not successful in obtaining them and that it had searched police databases for reports that would satisfy the request but that it appeared no such reports existed.The trial judge directed the circuit court clerk to issue a subpoena duces tecum. DCFS moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records pertained to an unfounded report, which was “confidential and inadmissible under Illinois law.” Alternatively, DCFS offered to turn over the report to the court for "in camera" review. The court quashed the subpoena, without requiring production or in camera review. The appellate court affirmed Saul’s conviction and 20-year sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The trial court erred in quashing his pretrial subpoena duces tecum without first reviewing in camera the requested discovery documents. View "People v. Sauls" on Justia Law

Based on allegations that he sexually abused his grandson, J.M., McKown was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)), three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (11-1.60(c)(1)(i)), and one count of child pornography (11- 20.1(a)(1)(ii)). There were inconsistencies in J.M.’s testimony. An officer testified that McKown had consented to a search of his basement, where the officer saw “multiple cutout pictures of young female children’s faces that had slits cut into the mouths and cutout images of male penises inserted into those slits.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed McKown’s convictions. The pictures of young children that McKown modified to depict sexual conduct constitute child pornography under section 11-20.1 and section 11-20.1 is consistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. McKown possessed images of actual, identifiable children that he altered to depict sexual conduct. Sufficient corroboration existed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule as to McKown’s convictions for various sexual offenses. View "People v. McKown" on Justia Law

Collins ran from Chicago police who were approaching on the street where he was standing in a group. An officer saw him drop a handgun while running. Collins was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and of being an armed habitual criminal. The circuit court merged the counts and sentenced him to 90 months. Collins argued that the prosecution improperly presented audio recordings from a bodyworn camera that were subject to exclusion as hearsay statements.The Appellate Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for leave to appeal, which raised the issue of whether the Law Enforcement Officer Body-Worn Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1) “provides that relevant body-worn camera recordings are admissible without limitation and, in any event, [whether] such recordings are … hearsay.” The state argued that such “audiovisual recordings are not hearsay and are admissible provided they are relevant and properly authenticated.” The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the state failed to argue the threshold question presented through its petition and upon which leave to appeal was granted. View "People v. Collins" on Justia Law

Pingelton was charged with criminal sexual assault on victims who were 16 years old. The emergency medicine physicians who examined the victims testified that they had no opinion as to whether either victim was sexually assaulted. The appellate court affirmed his convictions. Pingelton pro se filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, citing failure to object to the presentation of improper expert testimony by the physicians. The prosecution’s motion to dismiss was served on Pingelton’s appointed counsel. Almost two years later, postconviction counsel moved to withdraw, arguing that Pingelton’s claims could not be supported as a matter of law and that the record revealed no other meritorious issues. Pingelton requested that the court allow him to amend his petition and proceed. At a “status” hearing, the state and postconviction counsel appeared personally. Pingelton appeared via telephone. The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed, finding that none of Pingelton’s allegations indicated that he had received “unreasonable” assistance from his attorneys.The Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Pingelton’s right to procedural due process was violated when the court dismissed his postconviction petition without affording him adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. However, Pingelton’s claims lack merit, so he did not present a substantial showing of a constitutional deprivation at trial or on direct appeal. View "People v. Pingelton" on Justia Law

In 2016, Stewart, then 20 years old, was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. While the case was pending, Stewart turned 21. In 2017, a jury found Stewart guilty. The trial court found that Stewart was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b): When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. Stewart had a 2013 conviction for residential burglary, a Class 1 felony, and a 2014 conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. The trial court found Stewart eligible for Class X sentencing and sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Stewart’s first felony offense, committed when he was 17 years old, was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing and could not serve as a basis for Class X sentencing eligibility. View "People v. Stewart" on Justia Law