Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Four years after he was divorced, the ex-husband suffered a workplace injury for which he received a lump-sum settlement of $239,920. He spent most of the money without notifying his ex-wife of the claim or settlement, but she later sought to modify support payments. The oldest of the couple’s children, who had been living with his father, had reached the age of majority, while the younger child, age 14, was living with her mother. The circuit court ordered the ex-husband to pay $47,984, 20% of the entire settlement. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The ex-husband sought to apportion the lump-sum award into monthly amounts (using his life expectancy of 34 years) and base his monthly liability on 20% of the monthly amount. He argued that the minor child would reach the age of majority in a few years, and that monthly payments of 20% of $580.30 ($116.06) would= yield $5,222.70 in total, a significantly smaller amount than awarded by the court. The court said that the ex-husband had not presented sufficient evidence to support a deviation from the statutory guidelines and had never specifically asked for a departure. The trial court was correct to set child support at 20% of the lump sum in the absence of any evidence to support a different amount. View "In re Marriage of Mayfield" on Justia Law

Schultz sought to recover a $100 per day statutory penalty from Performance Lighting under the Income Withholding for Support Act, 750 ILCS 28/35, claiming failure to withhold sums for child support that allegedly should have been withheld from her ex-husband’s paychecks. A2009 dissolution ordered the ex-husband to pay $600 every two weeks; he worked for Performance until May, 2010. The trial court dismissed with prejudice, finding that the notice of withholding was not in strict compliance with the Act. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The notices provided to the employer did not provide the father’s social security number, as required by the Act and were, therefore, not “regular on their face.” The requirements of the statute are mandatory. Although there are recent legislative amendments, effective August, 2012, they have no impact here.View "Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the 2004 murder of Kasavich. In pretrial motions, the trial court ruled that some evidence of domestic violence was relevant to defendant’s motive for the killing and to intent, but limited the evidence that was admissible, finding that the admission of all of it would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to exclude certain testimony from defendant’s wife based on the marital privilege. The appellate court concluded the communications between his wife and defendant were protected by marital privilege because they were made during the marriage and were made privately. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Defendant’s threat to kill his wife and Kasavich was not made in reliance on the confidences of his marriage; defendant intended that his wife reveal the threat to Kasavich. It is the type of communication that the wife might have revealed to a family member or the police. Defendant’s threat, that it was not motivated by his reliance on the intimate, special trust, and affection of the marital relationship. View "People v. Trzeciak" on Justia Law

Karavidas, admitted to practice law in Illinois in 1979, worked for the City of Chicago, the Attorney General, and several law firms. In 1988, he opened his own practice. His father executed will and trust documents prepared by another attorney in 2000, and died later the same day. Karavidas was named executor and successor trustee. His dealings with the estate resulted in charges of conversion of assets entrusted to him; breach of fiduciary obligations; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and conduct tending to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. The Review Board of the IARDC recommended that charges be dismissed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Before professional discipline may be imposed under Supreme Court Rule 770, the Administrator must demonstrate that the attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Personal misconduct that falls outside the scope of the Rules may be the basis for civil liability or other adverse consequences, but may not result in professional discipline.View "In re Karavidas" on Justia Law

The underlying divorce proceedings were initiated by the husband in 2010 through his attorney, James, and were complicated because the couple had a three-year-old son. Both parties had debts and neither was able to pay attorney fees, but husband’s family contributed more than $8,000 on his behalf, which was paid to James. When James received the money, husband signed an agreement, designating the sum as an “advance retainer” and the attorney’s property, not placed in a client trust account. Citing the “leveling of the playing field” provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the trial court entered a “disgorgement” order for James to turn over to wife’s attorney half of the fees paid to him ($4,000). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Marriage Act reflects a policy of giving trial courts discretion to do equity in dissolution proceeding by making interim fee awards where parties lack resources. Case law and ethics rules concerning attorney fees come from a different context and are not pertinent to marriage dissolution. The advance payment retainer argued by James might be appropriate in some circumstances, such as bankruptcy or a forfeiture proceeding. View "In re Marriage of Earlywine" on Justia Law

Donald died in 2007 at age 84. His will, dated December, 2006, was admitted to probate. The woman he had married one year before execution of that will, Blanca, was named as executor. James, who had been held out by Donald as Donald’s biological son throughout his life, sued Blanca in her individual capacity and as executor, contesting the will. In 2000 James had learned from Donald that James’s mother, who died in 2001, married Donald, after James’ biological father abandoned them. Donald stated that a “secret” adoption had taken place. There is no legal documentation of an adoption. The disputed will states, “I am married to Blanca DeHart. I have no children.” James cited this as evidence of unsound mind and alleged that, during the brief marriage, Blanca became joint tenant on real estate, bank accounts and brokerage accounts worth millions of dollars, and obtained a power of attorney to act on her then-husband’s behalf, exercising control over his real estate dealings and sale of the family farm. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action as to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, contract for adoption and equitable adoption. The court erroneously denied a motion to compel deposition of the attorney who drafted the disputed will.View "DeHart v. DeHart" on Justia Law

In 2009, Julie was reported to the Department of Children and Family Services by her estranged husband concerning events involving alcoholism. After an investigation, DCFS made an indicated finding of child neglect and an ALJ issued an opinion that the mother had created an environment injurious to the health and welfare of her minor daughter under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. The circuit court upheld the results. The appellate court reversed and the supreme court agreed. The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act permitted a finding of neglect, prior to 1980, based on placing a child in an environment injurious to the child’s welfare. The “injurious environment” language was deleted in 1980 and was not restored until 2012, after the events at issue. During that time DCFS had promulgated rules describing specific incidents of harm constituting abuse or neglect that included “Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Environment Injurious to Health and Welfare;” the court held that, after the legislature specifically removed the injurious environment language from the Act, DCFS was without authority to reestablish an injurious-environment definition of neglect. The fact that the Juvenile Court Act, a different statute, includes injurious environment in its definition of neglect does not mandate a different result. View "Julie Q. v. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1977, had three children, and started marriage dissolution proceedings in 2000. In 2001, the circuit court entered judgment of dissolution, reserving ancillary issues. In 2004 the court again entered a dissolution order, still reserving ancillary issues. In 2005, husband sought to establish a property valuation date, contending that it should be the date of dissolution. The trial court held that current values should be used and, initially, set a date of January 1, 2006. Matters were continued until the court held hearings in 2010 and set a new valuation date of December 31, 2010. The circuit court certified a question for interlocutory review: In a bifurcated dissolution proceeding, when a grounds judgment has been entered and there is a lengthy delay before the hearing on ancillary issues, is the appropriate date for valuation of marital property the date of dissolution or a date as close as practicable to the date of trial on ancillary issues? The appellate court held that the date of trial on ancillary matters is the time for evaluation. The supreme court disagreed, holding that the valuation date is the date of dissolution. Once dissolution has been entered, the property in question is no longer marital property.View "In re Marriage of Mathis" on Justia Law

In 2010, the younger child, a boy aged 2½ years, was brought to the emergency room by his mother. He had second-degree burns on his face. His mother had found him, injured, at the home of her boyfriend, who had been babysitting her two children. She did not live with the boyfriend. The children were determined to be neglected based on a finding of “environment injurious to their welfare.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, noting that the evidence did not show that the mother had any prior indication that the boyfriend would not provide a safe environment and also noting that she immediately took the child to the hospital. The finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law