Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the younger child, a boy aged 2½ years, was brought to the emergency room by his mother. He had second-degree burns on his face. His mother had found him, injured, at the home of her boyfriend, who had been babysitting her two children. She did not live with the boyfriend. The children were determined to be neglected based on a finding of “environment injurious to their welfare.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, noting that the evidence did not show that the mother had any prior indication that the boyfriend would not provide a safe environment and also noting that she immediately took the child to the hospital. The finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

Wife suffered brain damage after a serious car accident in 1997 and became totally disabled. Husband became unable to care for her by 2004, due to his own Parkinson’s disease. Wife went to Ohio to live with her daughter, who became plenary guardian. In 2007, after living apart for nearly three years, husband filed a petition for marriage dissolution in Cook County, and, in 2008, the guardian filed a counter-petition for dissolution on behalf of wife. Husband was granted voluntary dismissal of his petition, and, claiming that wife had said that she did not really want a divorce, moved to dismiss the guardian’s petition. He argued that the guardian had no authority to seek it. The circuit court dismissed the wife’s petition, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, overruling a 1986 case, which had involved proceedings commenced before enactment of the no-fault divorce law now in effect. Protection of vulnerable individuals, such as wife n this case, should now be allowed. On remand, the guardian must satisfy a clear and convincing burden of proof that marriage dissolution is in the ward’s best interest.View "Karbin v. Karbin" on Justia Law

The parties, married in California, moved to Illinois in 2004, and have three minor children. In 2005, husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and, in 2006, the parties signed a joint parenting agreement which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution in May 2008. Under the agreement, mother had primary residential custody and would stay in Illinois for 24 months, but could return the children to California after 36 months. The period in between was reserved for mediation. After 24 months, mother notified father of intent to relocate, but no mediation took place until two months before expiration of the 36-month period. Father sought an injunction, claiming that mother had not requested mediation and a substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him sole custody. The circuit court refused his request, and mother and children moved to California in June, 2011.The appellate court reversed; the trial court ordered return of the children. The supreme court reversed, holding that mother had complied with the judgment of dissolution. Father’s petition to modify custody remains pending; he is free to attempt to meet the statutory burden of showing that circumstances have changed so significantly that custody modification would be appropriate. View "In re Marriage of Coulter" on Justia Law

The parties, who had twin children, divorced in 2007, while husband was unemployed. The issue of child support was reserved. The husband lived off assets that had been awarded to him as part of the marital estate, withdrawing about $8,500 from his savings account each month. The wife, who had custody, subsequently petitioned for child support, and, in 2010, was awarded $2,000 a month, even though the husband was still unemployed. For two children, the statutory guideline refers to 28 percent of net income, defined as “the total of all income from all sources,” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3). The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court set aside the support order, remanding for specific findings and recalculation. The amount withdrawn from savings should not be considered “income” because the money already belonged to husband. However, if use of the statutory guidelines then generates a support amount that the trial court finds inappropriate, it should make a specific finding to that effect and then adjust the support amount accordingly. One factor it can consider is “the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.” View "In re Marriage of McGrath" on Justia Law

The baby was exposed to cocaine in utero; the state took the child into protective custody and filed a petition pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/2-13. The petition did not seek termination of parental rights. Mother was personally served; abode service was made on father by leaving the summons and petition with his mother at the house they shared. The circuit court made the baby a ward of the court. By the time of the permanency hearing, mother's whereabouts were unknown. Although father did not comply with all aspects of the service plan, the court continued to set return to the family as the permanency goal. When the baby was about 18 months old, the court allowed foster parents to intervene and the state to begin termination proceedings and subsequently entered a default judgment against father. The appellate court reversed because the state had made no attempt to serve father. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted many procedural defects and that father had made progress in meeting goals during nine months following the adjudication of neglect. Because he was not found to be deficient until after that period, the petition for termination was untenable as a matter of law. View "In re Haley D." on Justia Law

The state filed a neglect petition, naming Long, the legal guardian of her grandchildren along with the children's biological mother and father, as respondents. The biological father waived adjudication. Long and the biological mother stipulated that the children were neglected. The trial court terminated the guardianship and dismissed Long from the case. The appellate court reversed, holding that the legislature could not have intended that a guardian could be dismissed from the case based simply upon her dismissal as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1), once the court directs the removal or dismissal of a guardian, that individual no longer is a guardian and, thus, no longer a party respondent to the proceedings. The appellate court erred in looking to the children's best interests in deciding that Long would remain a party to the case even after she was dismissed as the children’s guardian. She is not without recourse; pursuant to section 1-5(2)(a), she may have the right to be heard as a previously appointed relative caregiver interested in the minors.View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

Termination proceedings began with 2006 charges that children, living with their mother, were neglected. The mother received Social Security benefits, but no effort was made to determine their source or to obtain a release of Social Security information. Later that year, a proceeding to collect child support from the father was initiated in the same prosecutor's office, with a complaint signed by a caseworker in the termination proceeding. In the collection matter, the father's birth date, Social Security number and description were listed The state located the father at a treatment center and obtained consent to a support order using funds from his disability benefits.The father challenged the termination of parental rights for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that, under the Juvenile Court Act, it was improper to serve him only by publication after attempts at personal service or service by certified mail were unsuccessful. The appellate court upheld the order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the state’s ability to obtain information in the child support action cast significant doubt on the diligence of inquiry in the termination proceedings and that relying on a computerized database search of a parent's name while ignoring, or not investigating, other potentially useful information, does not constitute a diligent inquiry. View "In re Dar. C. and Das. C., Minors" on Justia Law

Th 1999 dissolution of marriage reserved the issue of contribution to college expenses for the couple's three children. In 2007 wife petitioned for contribution. Two children had attended Cornell, Wake Forest, and University of Texas; the youngest had been accepted at California Polytechnic. The court determined that husband's share was 75 percent and that he owed $227,260 for past expenses and $46,290 for the coming year. The appellate court held that the court could not order payment of expenses incurred prior to the filing of the petition. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The determination amounted to a modification of the original support determination (750 ILCS 5/510(a)). Under the statute, a retroactive modification is limited to only those installments that date back to the filing date of the petition for modification. The court noted, that in making an equitable allocation of expenses after the petition, the court can consider how pre-petition expenses depleted wife's resources. View "In re Marriage of Petersen" on Justia Law

In 2003, wife filed domestic battery charges against husband; he was found not guilty and filed for dissolution. At a 2005 hearing on a motion to modify temporary child support, the judge stated that the parties had been before him in the domestic battery case. Neither lawyer objected. Nearly a year later, husband sought substitution of judge, asserting bias. Wife testified that she worked part-time at a fitness club where the judge was a member, but had only said "hello," twice, in passing; husband testified that wife had indicated that she was "taking care of" the judge and that the judge had disclosed that wife had approached him several times. The petition was denied for lack of proof of actual prejudice. The appellate court and highest court affirmed. The "actual prejudice" standard was properly applied; a proposed "appearance of impropriety" standard would encourage judge-shopping. A litigant is entitled to one automatic substitution if requested before trial or hearing begins and before the assigned judge has ruled on any substantial issue, 735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(2)(ii). After a substantive ruling, however, (a)(3) requires substitution only when cause exists. The statute does not define "cause," but recusal is required when the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. View "O'Brien v. O'Brien" on Justia Law