Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Crystal Lake South High School is surrounded by land zoned “R-2 residential single family,” and constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The campus is owned by District 155. In 2013, the District’s Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The plan involved relocating new, larger, home bleachers to be adjacent to residential property and closer to the property line than existing bleachers. The McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools approved the plans and issued a building permit under the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/3-14.20. The District began work without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval. The city ordered the Board to stop construction until it obtained a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction. Owners of adjoining residential properties sought to privately enforce the zoning restrictions under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15. The Board sought declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded the city summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. View "Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155" on Justia Law

In 2010, O’Toole tripped and fell on a paved pathway at Brookfield Zoo and sustained injuries. In 2012, she filed a single-count negligence complaint against the Chicago Zoological Society, alleging that it breached its duty to inspect and maintain the pathway, proximately causing her damages. The Society sought dismissal, arguing that the one-year limitations period of section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a)), rather than the two-year limitations period of section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202), applied and time-barred O’Toole’s complaint. The trial court dismissed, finding that the Society fell under the Act’s definition of “[l]ocal public entity” as a “not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business.” The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the Society conceded that it was not a department or agency of any government; that it received less than half of its funding from tax proceeds; that its employees were not appointed or paid by the Forest Preserve District and were not covered by any public pension or workers compensation funds; and that the vast majority of its trustees were not District officials. View "O'Toole v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y" on Justia Law

In December, 2009, Heelan, a Vernon Hills police officer for approximately 20 years, responded to an emergency call, slipped on ice, and fell. He was ultimately diagnosed with significant osteoarthritis in both hips, aggravated by the fall, and had two hip replacement surgeries. He did not return to work. The Village Police Pension Board awarded a line-of-duty disability pension, 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1. The Village sought a declaration that it was not obligated to pay Heelan’s health insurance premium under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (the Act), 820 ILCS 320/10. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Heelan. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, Proof of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes a catastrophic injury under section 10(a) of the Act as a matter of law; a public safety officer’s employer-sponsored health insurance coverage expires upon the termination of the officer’s employment by the award of the line-of-duty disability pension. The Act lengthens such health insurance coverage beyond the termination of the officer’s employment. View "Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan" on Justia Law

Illinois has five state-funded retirement systems for public employees: the General Assembly Retirement System (GRS); the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois (SERS); the State Universities Retirement System (SURS); the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois (TRS); and the Judges Retirement System of Illinois (JRS). All provide traditional defined benefit plans and are subject to the pension protection clause of the state constitution. Public Act 98-599 (eff. June 1, 2014), amended the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-101), reducing retirement annuity benefits for individuals who first became members of four of the systems before January 1, 2011. Members of those systems brought separate actions challenging the amendment under the Illinois Constitution’s pension protection clause. The actions were consolidated. The circuit court of Sangamon County found plaintiffs’ challenge meritorious, declared Public Act 98-599 unconstitutional in its entirety, and permanently enjoined its enforcement, rejecting a contention that the Act could be upheld, notwithstanding its violation of the pension protection clause, based on the state’s reserved sovereign powers. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that although the financial challenges facing Illinois government are well known, “Obliging the government to control itself is what we are called upon to do today.” View "In re Pension Reform Litig." on Justia Law

Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Leetaru, a graduate student at and former employee of the University of Illinois, sought to enjoin the University from taking further action in an investigation of him, as a student, regarding allegations that he violated the University’s “Policy and Procedures on Academic Integrity in Research and Publication.” Leetaru alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the University’s rules and regulations governing student discipline and that their actions exceeded their lawful authority, were arbitrary, resulted in a gross injustice, and deprived him of due process. The circuit court dismissed, finding that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing the right to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the state, its agencies, boards, departments, commissions and agents, or to compel their compliance with legal or constitutional requirements, which includes actions to require compliance with administrative rules and regulations. Leetaru’s claims may proceed in circuit court without offending principles of sovereign immunity. Leetaru does not question the right of defendants to investigate research misconduct, but only claims that in investigating misconduct, defendants are obligated to adhere to policies and procedures promulgated by the University and that they have failed to do so. View "Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a fraternal organization and tax exempt not-for-profit corporation, owns and operates, a Macon nursing home that s licensed by the Illinois Department of Public Health, with a permit to enter into life care contracts under 210 ILCS 40/1. In 2002, the Department of Public Aid directed plaintiff to pay the “Nursing Home License Fee” of $1.50 for each licensed nursing bed day for each calendar quarter, 305 ILCS 5/5E-10. The Department then claimed that plaintiff was delinquent since 1993 and owed $244,233 in back fees plus $237,890 in penalties. Plaintiff paid under protest and sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the fee was unconstitutional as applied to it because the fee’s purpose is to fund Medicaid-related expenditures that are neither precipitated by nor paid to plaintiff. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment under the uniformity clause The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The taxing classification “every nursing home,” bears some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation and to public policy. The object of the fee is not simply Medicaid reimbursement; all fees are deposited into the Long-Term Care Provider Fund, which may be used for Medicaid reimbursement, administrative expenses of the Department and its agents, enforcement of nursing home standards, the nursing home ombudsman program, expansion of home-and community-based services, and the General Obligation Bond Retirement and Interest Fund. View "Grand Chapter, Order of the E. Star of Ill. v. Topinka" on Justia Law

Resident taxpayers of Lemont-Bromberek Combined School District 113A filed three taxpayer derivative actions on behalf of the District, asserting that certain officers and employees of the District and current and former members of its board of education had improperly transferred money from the District’s Working Cash Fund, in violation of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/20-1). Plaintiffs also sought recovery against the surety that issued the bond for the District’s treasurer and against the accounting firm that performed audits of the District’s finances. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. To seek recovery under section 20-6 for the unlawful diversion of funds or for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege that money improperly transferred from the Working Cash Fund was used for an improper purpose, resulting in an actual loss to the school district. View "Lutkauskas v. Ricker" on Justia Law

The law firm sued, alleging that it agreed to act as co-counsel with defendant on workers’ compensation claims; plaintiff was to receive 45% of fees recovered and defendant would receive 55%. After the cases settled, defendant refused to pay plaintiff its share of the attorney fees. Plaintiff attached an attorney-client agreement, signed by plaintiff, defendant, and the clients, describing the allocation of responsibilities and fees. Defendant argued that under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/16a(J), the Commission was to hear “[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorney’s fees.” The circuit court found plaintiff’s complaint sought recovery based on a referral agreement, that the claims based on that agreement did not fall within the Act, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that the Commission’s authority does not extend to “issues concerning a breach of a referral agreement delineating the percentage of the awarded fee that should be allotted to the attorney who represented the claimant before the Commission and the attorney who referred the claimant to that attorney,” but is limited to hearing attorney fee disputes “concerning the amount of fees to be awarded to those who represent clients before the Commission.” View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached. View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law