Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Leetaru, a graduate student at and former employee of the University of Illinois, sought to enjoin the University from taking further action in an investigation of him, as a student, regarding allegations that he violated the University’s “Policy and Procedures on Academic Integrity in Research and Publication.” Leetaru alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the University’s rules and regulations governing student discipline and that their actions exceeded their lawful authority, were arbitrary, resulted in a gross injustice, and deprived him of due process. The circuit court dismissed, finding that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing the right to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the state, its agencies, boards, departments, commissions and agents, or to compel their compliance with legal or constitutional requirements, which includes actions to require compliance with administrative rules and regulations. Leetaru’s claims may proceed in circuit court without offending principles of sovereign immunity. Leetaru does not question the right of defendants to investigate research misconduct, but only claims that in investigating misconduct, defendants are obligated to adhere to policies and procedures promulgated by the University and that they have failed to do so. View "Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a fraternal organization and tax exempt not-for-profit corporation, owns and operates, a Macon nursing home that s licensed by the Illinois Department of Public Health, with a permit to enter into life care contracts under 210 ILCS 40/1. In 2002, the Department of Public Aid directed plaintiff to pay the “Nursing Home License Fee” of $1.50 for each licensed nursing bed day for each calendar quarter, 305 ILCS 5/5E-10. The Department then claimed that plaintiff was delinquent since 1993 and owed $244,233 in back fees plus $237,890 in penalties. Plaintiff paid under protest and sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the fee was unconstitutional as applied to it because the fee’s purpose is to fund Medicaid-related expenditures that are neither precipitated by nor paid to plaintiff. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment under the uniformity clause The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The taxing classification “every nursing home,” bears some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation and to public policy. The object of the fee is not simply Medicaid reimbursement; all fees are deposited into the Long-Term Care Provider Fund, which may be used for Medicaid reimbursement, administrative expenses of the Department and its agents, enforcement of nursing home standards, the nursing home ombudsman program, expansion of home-and community-based services, and the General Obligation Bond Retirement and Interest Fund. View "Grand Chapter, Order of the E. Star of Ill. v. Topinka" on Justia Law

Resident taxpayers of Lemont-Bromberek Combined School District 113A filed three taxpayer derivative actions on behalf of the District, asserting that certain officers and employees of the District and current and former members of its board of education had improperly transferred money from the District’s Working Cash Fund, in violation of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/20-1). Plaintiffs also sought recovery against the surety that issued the bond for the District’s treasurer and against the accounting firm that performed audits of the District’s finances. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. To seek recovery under section 20-6 for the unlawful diversion of funds or for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege that money improperly transferred from the Working Cash Fund was used for an improper purpose, resulting in an actual loss to the school district. View "Lutkauskas v. Ricker" on Justia Law

The law firm sued, alleging that it agreed to act as co-counsel with defendant on workers’ compensation claims; plaintiff was to receive 45% of fees recovered and defendant would receive 55%. After the cases settled, defendant refused to pay plaintiff its share of the attorney fees. Plaintiff attached an attorney-client agreement, signed by plaintiff, defendant, and the clients, describing the allocation of responsibilities and fees. Defendant argued that under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/16a(J), the Commission was to hear “[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorney’s fees.” The circuit court found plaintiff’s complaint sought recovery based on a referral agreement, that the claims based on that agreement did not fall within the Act, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that the Commission’s authority does not extend to “issues concerning a breach of a referral agreement delineating the percentage of the awarded fee that should be allotted to the attorney who represented the claimant before the Commission and the attorney who referred the claimant to that attorney,” but is limited to hearing attorney fee disputes “concerning the amount of fees to be awarded to those who represent clients before the Commission.” View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached. View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law

In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state’s request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act. View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Pusateri, a former employee of Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (PG) filed a complaint under the False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1, alleging that PG used falsified gas leak response records to justify a fraudulently inflated natural gas rate before the Illinois Commerce Commission. As a customer, the State of Illinois would have paid such fraudulently inflated rates,. The Cook County circuit court dismissed with prejudice, finding that as a matter of law, there was no causal connection between the allegedly false reports and the Commission-approved rates. The appellate court reversed, construing the complaint’s allegations liberally to find PG could have submitted the safety reports in support of a request for a rate increase, despite not being required to do so under the Administrative Code. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction to order relief. The legislature did not intend the False Claims Act to apply to a Commission-set rate. The Commission has the duty to ensure regulated utilities obey the Public Utilities Act and other statutes, except where enforcement duties are “specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal.” View "Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co." on Justia Law

Bruns, age 79, drove to a Centralia eye clinic. She did not use the parking lot, but parked on 2nd Street in front of the clinic, as she had on each of nine previous visits. As she walked toward the clinic, Bruns stubbed her toe on a crack in the sidewalk, causing her to fall and injure her arm, leg and knee. She had been looking “towards the door and the steps” of the clinic. Bruns “definitely” noticed the sidewalk defect every time she went to the clinic. Clinic employees had twice contacted the city about the defect, including after a previous accident, and offered to pay to remove the tree that caused it. The city would not authorize removal because of the 100-year-old tree’s historic significance. Bruns sued, arguing that the city should have reasonably foreseen that a pedestrian could become distracted and fail to protect herself against the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the city summary judgment, finding the defect open and obvious. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the summary judgment. The city has miles of sidewalk to maintain; imposing a duty to protect plaintiffs from open and obvious defects would not be justified. View "Bruns v. City of Centralia" on Justia Law

Slepicka, a resident of a Cook County skilled nursing facility, received a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge. A Department of Public Health ALJ held a hearing at the facility. The Department approved the involuntary discharge of Slepicka unless the amount owed was paid in full. The order was mailed from a Sangamon County post office. Slepicka sought judicial review in Sangamon County. The facility moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing that Cook County was the only proper venue. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and upheld the order allowing involuntary discharge. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper venue under Administrative Review Law section 3-104, but rejected a claim that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a jurisdictional defect. The court did not decide the merits, but vacated and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to Cook County. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Sangamon County was not a permissible venue, but held that circumstance did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision. Stating that it would be a waste of resources to require the Cook County court to review the decision again, the court vacated the portion of the judgment that vacated the Sangamon County decision and remanded to the appellate court for decision on the merits. View "Slepicka v. IL Dep't of Pub. Health" on Justia Law