Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Julie was reported to the Department of Children and Family Services by her estranged husband concerning events involving alcoholism. After an investigation, DCFS made an indicated finding of child neglect and an ALJ issued an opinion that the mother had created an environment injurious to the health and welfare of her minor daughter under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. The circuit court upheld the results. The appellate court reversed and the supreme court agreed. The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act permitted a finding of neglect, prior to 1980, based on placing a child in an environment injurious to the child’s welfare. The “injurious environment” language was deleted in 1980 and was not restored until 2012, after the events at issue. During that time DCFS had promulgated rules describing specific incidents of harm constituting abuse or neglect that included “Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Environment Injurious to Health and Welfare;” the court held that, after the legislature specifically removed the injurious environment language from the Act, DCFS was without authority to reestablish an injurious-environment definition of neglect. The fact that the Juvenile Court Act, a different statute, includes injurious environment in its definition of neglect does not mandate a different result. View "Julie Q. v. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

In 2003, the doctor was charged by the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation with violating the Illinois Medical Practice Act in connection with electro-convulsive shock treatment of a patient. Administrative proceedings were stayed while the doctor pursued, among other things, a claim that a provision of the Department’s rules concerning evidentiary hearsay was invalid. The circuit court invalidated the rule in 2005, but later vacated its judgment. The appellate court reinstated the invalidation ruling in 2007, and the Department closed the case without prejudice in 2008. The doctor then filed a petition for a statutory award of his litigation expenses. The circuit court refused to award the fees, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the denial, stating that the statutory fees that are available for invalidating an administrative rule must be sought while there is still jurisdiction over the matter. The doctor waited 33 months after the original circuit court order invalidating the rule and more than one year after the appellate court reinstated that order. The courts no longer maintained jurisdiction to hear his fee petition.View "Rodriquez v. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation" on Justia Law

A woman, attending a class at a Chicago Park District fieldhouse, fell while attempting to step over a pile of snow that had collected at the edge of the parking lot during plowing. She fractured her femur and had surgery, but later suffered complications which led to her death. Her estate filed a wrongful-death action. The park district claimed immunity based on section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that there can be no liability “based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.” The circuit court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice constitutes “the existence of a condition of any public property.” The appellate court held that it did not, precluding immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 3-105 of the Tort Immunity Act provides that generally local public entities undertaking snow removal operations must exercise due care in doing so. That provision has no impact on section 3-106, which specifically provides immunity from liability for injuries on public recreational property. The allegation that the snow accumulation was “unnatural” was irrelevant to immunity because recreational uses were involved. View "Moore v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

Earls filed nomination papers for alderman of Chicago’s 28th Ward on November 22, 2010, for an election to take place on February 22, 2011. An objector complained to the board of election commissioners that Earls and her husband, joint owners, were claiming homeowner property tax exemptions for properties other than the one in which they resided. The Municipal Code states that: “A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.” Earls had obtained documentation that, as of November 17, 2010, she had no outstanding debt for parking, water, administrative hearings, inspection fees, cost recovery, and tax/licensing. The Earls waived the extra exemptions and made payment to the county treasurer. The board concluded that property taxes owed because of unauthorized exemptions did not mandate ineligibility for municipal office. The trial court affirmed. The appellate court reversed on the last business day before the election, and directed that Earls’ name be removed from the ballot or that voters be given written notice that Earls had been disqualified. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, but declined to order a new election. Earls’ property taxes were owed to the county collector, not the city. View "Jackson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2004 an ambulance, answering an emergency call, drove through a stop sign and was hit by a passenger vehicle that had the stop sign in its favor. The injured driver of the passenger car sued the ambulance driver and Massac County Hospital, for which he worked, and recovered $667,216.30 for negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the situation was governed by the Vehicle Code, not by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, which protects local public entities and their employees from liability for injuries "caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle or firefighting or rescue equipment, when responding to an emergency call." The Vehicle Code imposes duties on drivers of both public and private emergency vehicles to refrain from negligence. The supreme court reversed. The evidence was insufficient to establish the willful and wanton conduct that might preclude municipal immunity. The statutes at issue are not in conflict; each governs in its own sphere. Under the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act, the legislature has chosen to grant immunity from negligence liability to public employees and employers, such as the driver and hospital, and this result is not abrogated by the Vehicle Code. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizens' organization, filed suit alleging violations of the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, 225 ILCS 720/8.05(a), and the Water Use Act, 525 ILCS 45/1 resulting from a coal mine reclamation. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed the dismissal as to all five counts directed against the mining company and modified the order dismissing the count against Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to be a dismissal without prejudice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The trial court properly dismissed counts I through V because those counts constitute a challenge to the provisions of the revised permits authorized by Illinois Department of Natural Resources and could not be brought under the Mining Act. Similarly, there is no statutory basis to conclude that the Water Use Act allows a private right of action to challenge conduct that is specifically mandated by the terms of a permit authorized by IDNR.View "Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.S.A." on Justia Law

The State of Illinois maintains a state park on land that was once a college founded in the nineteenth century. The township sought quiet title to two parcels comprising the park. The state has a sign on the land and mows the grass, but no legal instruments have been recorded against the parcels since the original survey and plat in 1860 by the college. When the plat was certified, the parcels complied with requirements for a statutory dedication. The dedication was impliedly accepted by the township and fee simple vested in the public. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the township quieting title, finding no lack of jurisdiction. It also affirmed on the merits, declining to reach, as premature, a claim that the township wanted to sell land that must be preserved for public purposes. The supreme court affirmed. In the initial filing by the township, the state could not have been sued in circuit court, but the state went beyond defending itself when it subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court to assert its own claim that it was entitled to have title quieted in its favor.View "Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Production of steel in electric arc furnaces generates toxic waste. The company, which has had an EPA permit since 1989 to store and treat hazardous waste at its facility near Peoria, developed a new process to stabilize this hazardous residue, or electric arc furnace dust, by converting it into material that is not hazardous. It filed a "delisting" petition for an adjusted standard with the Pollution Control Board, which was granted in 2009, with conditions. Delisting removes a material from regulation as hazardous.The appellate court found that opposition groups had standing, but affirmed the Board on the merits. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed without reaching the merits. Opponents did not fall within any other statutory category which would permit them to appeal and, therefore, had to show that they were contesting a "rule or regulation," under section 29(a) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, to establish standing. The adjusted standard granted in this case is not, in itself, a rule or regulation. It is an individualized exception to a regulation. It is an adjudicatory determination which is quasi-judicial in nature, unlike a rule or regulation, which is legislative in nature. View "Sierra Club v. IL Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

Effective with 1982 legislation, a portion of each motorcycle registration fee was deposited in the state treasury to fund a motorcycle safety training program. In 1993, the amount set aside for the program was increased to be the total amount of each fee, and the monies were to be placed in a trust fund outside of the state treasury. Without amending the Act, the legislature began, in 1992, to authorize the transfer of money from the motorcycle fund and other funds into the General Revenue Fund, through budget implementation acts and amendments to the State Finance Act. A nonprofit corporation initiated a class action. Summary judgment was granted for the defense, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no evidence that the cycle fees are private. The court rejected an argument based in trust-law principles, arguing that the trust was irrevocable because no power to revoke the trust was conferred by the legislation that created it. A general assembly cannot control the actions of a subsequent elected body. It has long been recognized that the legislature has the authority to order monies collected in one fund to be transferred to a different fund. View "A.B.A.T.E. of IL, Inc. v. Giannoulias" on Justia Law