Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1), states that “an important State interest” requires that an employer “who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who ... suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child.” The Act does not define “catastrophic injury,” which the Illinois Supreme Court has found “synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the [Illinois Pension] Code”Peoria’s ordinance was amended to define “catastrophic injury” as “[a]n injury, the direct and proximate consequences of which permanently prevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” The term “gainful work,” which does not appear in the Act, is defined as “[f]ull- or part-time activity that actually is compensated or commonly is compensated.”The Union sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment violates the Act. The circuit court granted the Union summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The ordinance’s definitions are inconsistent with the requirements of the Act and are therefore preempted; the ordinance is not a valid exercise of Peoria’s home rule authority. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Mancini Law Group sent a commercial Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (5 ILCS 140/1) to the Schaumburg Police Department seeking disclosure of all traffic accident reports for all motor vehicle accidents that occurred within the Village between June 30, 2017, and July 13, 2017. The Department provided redacted accident reports, asserting that FOIA section 7(1)(b) exempted driver’s license numbers, personal telephone numbers, home addresses, and personal license plates; the Department relied upon section 7(1)(c) in redacting dates of birth and policy account numbers. The names of drivers and witnesses were unredacted.The circuit court held that the Department had established that the information at issue was exempt and rejected Mancini’s argument that the Department was precluded from asserting that the information was exempt because it voluntarily provided unredacted traffic accident reports to LexisNexis, a third-party vendor approved by the state for assisting the Department with its Illinois Vehicle Code mandatory reporting obligations.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Department is not precluded from asserting that the redacted information is exempt under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c). An Illinois public body does not have the ability to waive an individual’s interest in his personal or private information that is contained in a document subject to a FOIA request. it is irrelevant whether the Department could have chosen to fulfill its mandatory reporting obligations in a different way. View "Mancini Law Group, P.C. v. Schaumburg Police Department" on Justia Law

School districts sought a judgment declaring that the Governor and the State of Illinois, have a constitutional obligation to provide them with the funding necessary to meet or achieve the learning standards established by the Illinois State Board of Education. Plaintiffs asked the court to enter judgment for the necessary amounts and for the court to “[r]etain jurisdiction to enforce such schedule of payments.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The plaintiffs abandoned their claims against the State; the Governor is not a proper defendant because he does not have authority to grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs acknowledged that an appropriation of public funds may come only from the General Assembly. This case does not involve an actual controversy between the parties as required to grant declaratory relief. View "Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The 2012 Cook County Firearm Tax Ordinance imposed a $25 tax on the retail purchase of a firearm within Cook County. A 2015 amendment to the County Code included a tax on the retail purchase of firearm ammunition at the rate of $0.05 per cartridge for centerfire ammunition and $0.01 per cartridge for rimfire ammunition. The taxes levied on the retail purchaser are imposed in addition to all other taxes imposed by the County, Illinois, or any municipal corporation or political subdivision. The revenue generated from the tax on ammunition is directed to the Public Safety Fund; the revenue generated from the tax on firearms is not directed to any specified fund or program.Plaintiffs alleged that the taxes facially violate the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Illinois Constitution concerning the right to bear arms and the uniformity clause, and are preempted by the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. The trial court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. To satisfy scrutiny under a uniformity challenge, where a tax classification directly bears on a fundamental right, the government must establish that the tax classification is substantially related to the object of the legislation. Under that level of scrutiny, the firearm and ammunition tax ordinances violate the uniformity clause. View "Guns Save Life, Inc. v. Ali" on Justia Law

The School Board sought equitable relief from Crest Hill ordinances creating a real property tax increment financing (TIF) district and attendant redevelopment plan and project, pursuant to the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-1). The Board complained that Crest Hill violated the TIF Act by including parcels of realty in the redevelopment project area that were not contiguous. An excluded parcel is owned by the utility company, is located outside the incorporated boundaries of the municipality and the boundaries of the redevelopment project area, and physically separates the parcels the municipality found to be contiguous for purposes of including them in the redevelopment project area.The circuit court granted Crest Hill summary judgment. The Appellate Court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. A public-utility-right-of-way exception to the contiguity requirement for annexation, found in the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-1), does not apply as an exception to contiguity required by the TIF Act. This case does not involve contiguous properties running parallel and adjacent to each other in a reasonably substantial physical sense, wherein a public utility owns a right-of-way, or easement, to pass through one or both of the physically adjacent properties. View "Board of Education of Richland School District No. 88A v. City of Crest Hill" on Justia Law

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

Tillman filed a petition for leave to file a taxpayer action under 735 ILCS 5/11-303, to enjoin the disbursement of public funds, alleging that certain general obligation bonds issued by the state in 2003 and 2017 were unconstitutional. He claimed the bonds violated article IX, section 9(b), of the Illinois Constitution on the ground that they were not issued for qualifying “specific purposes,” which, he argued, refers exclusively to “specific projects in the nature of capital improvements, such as roads, buildings, and bridges.” The 2003 “State pension funding” law authorized $10 billion in bonds to be issued “for the purpose of making contributions to the designated retirement systems.” The 2017 law authorized “Income Tax Proceed Bonds,” ($6 billion) “for the purpose of paying vouchers incurred by the State prior to July 1, 2017.”The circuit court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. the necessary elements for laches have been met in this case: “lack of due diligence by the party asserting the claim” and “prejudice to the opposing party.” There is no reasonable ground under section 11-303 of the Code for filing the petitioner’s proposed complaint View "Tillman v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, 12 tree planters who allegedly worked for Moore Landscapes under contracts that Moore executed with the Chicago Park District, sought unpaid wages, statutory damages, prejudgment interest on back-pay, and reasonable attorney fees and costs under the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/11. They alleged that Moore improperly paid them an hourly rate of $18 instead of the prevailing hourly wage rate of $41.20.The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal order. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The Park District and Moore did not stipulate rates for work done under the contracts. The Act provides that, when the public body does not include a sufficient stipulation in a contract, the potential liabilities of the contractor are narrower than those provided under section 11, when a contractor disregards a clear contractual stipulation to pay prevailing wage rates, and “shall be limited to the difference between the actual amount paid and the prevailing rate of wages required to be paid for the project. View "Valerio v. Moore Landscapes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act took effect in 2014, 410 ILCS 130/999, “to protect patients with debilitating medical conditions, as well as their physicians and providers, from arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties, and property forfeiture if patients engage in the medical use of cannabis.” The Department of Agriculture (DOA), charged with enforcing the provisions of the Act related to registering and overseeing medical cannabis cultivation centers, adopted Administrative Rules.Medponics petitioned for administrative review of a DOA decision, awarding a permit to Curative, to operate a medical cannabis cultivation center in Aurora. Medponics alleged that the location of Curative’s proposed facility violated the Act because it was located within 2500 feet of the R-1 and R-5 districts in Aurora, both of which Medponics alleged were zoned exclusively for residential use. DOA found Curative’s proposed location satisfied the location requirement because multiple nonresidential uses were authorized in Aurora’s R-1 and R-5 districts. The circuit court reversed the DOA’s decision.The appellate court ordered the permit reinstated to Curative. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. DOA’s interpretation of the location requirement is not erroneous, unreasonable, or in conflict with the Act; the definition is reasonable and harmonizes with the purpose of the Act. View "Medponics Illinois LLC v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Jackson and Pope each filed a statement as an independent candidate for village president. Jackson's petition had 50 voter signatures. Pope's had 32 signatures. An objection alleged that the number of signatures was insufficient under 10 ILCS 5/10-3. At an Electoral Board hearing, Schmidt, the Glendale Heights clerk and election official, testified that the Du Page County Clerk’s Office sent an e-mail indicating that “due to COVID, we are reducing the points of contact, here is a list of forms.” Schmidt stated that she read the State Board of Elections 2021 Candidate’s Guide, and, relying on the numbers “for non-partisan” elections, concluded that 24 signatures were required. Schmidt admitted that she did not understand the distinction between independent and nonpartisan. She acknowledged that she was never notified that the statutorily required number of signatures had been reduced because of the pandemic. Both candidates testified that they relied on Schmidt's representations.The Board overruled the objection, finding that both candidates justifiably relied on Schmidt’s statements and excusing their statutory violations. The trial and appellate courts affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that the lowest possible correctly calculated number of signatures would be 118. While ballot access is a substantial right, the best safeguard of that right is fidelity to the Election Code and not unrestrained discretion by a local election official inexplicably confused about the statutory distinction between partisan and nonpartisan elections. A precise mathematical formula, clear and certain in its application, prevents impermissible political bias. View "Corbin v. Schroeder" on Justia Law