Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An undercover agent made a controlled purchase of heroin from the defendant. Evidence showed that the transaction took place 443 feet from the "High Mountain Church and Preschool." Defendant was convicted of delivering a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class 1 felony. The appellate court reduced the conviction to simple delivery (a Class 2 felony) after finding that a preschool is not a "school" within the meaning of section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The supreme court affirmed. The 1991 amendment that added the "school" provision also amended or created numerous other acts to increase the penalty for various offenses taking place on or around school grounds; it defined "school" as "any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college or university." Precedent has interpreted the Act accordingly, not encompassing a preschool.View "People v. Young" on Justia Law

The State of Illinois maintains a state park on land that was once a college founded in the nineteenth century. The township sought quiet title to two parcels comprising the park. The state has a sign on the land and mows the grass, but no legal instruments have been recorded against the parcels since the original survey and plat in 1860 by the college. When the plat was certified, the parcels complied with requirements for a statutory dedication. The dedication was impliedly accepted by the township and fee simple vested in the public. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the township quieting title, finding no lack of jurisdiction. It also affirmed on the merits, declining to reach, as premature, a claim that the township wanted to sell land that must be preserved for public purposes. The supreme court affirmed. In the initial filing by the township, the state could not have been sued in circuit court, but the state went beyond defending itself when it subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court to assert its own claim that it was entitled to have title quieted in its favor.View "Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

The manufacturer notified franchise dealers that it was discontinuing the Sterling (a subsidiary of Daimler) line of trucks. The letter offered dealers the opportunity to continue as a service dealership under a new agreement. Plaintiff, a dealer, was warned that, following the termination of the existing agreement, if it did not sign the general release and agree to terminate its Sterling franchise, Daimler Trucks would not renew its Detroit Diesel Direct Dealer Agreement. Daimler later terminated that agreement, which plaintiff alleges prevented it from obtaining parts at wholesale and performing warranty work on Detroit Diesel engines. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 and claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The circuit court dismissed all but two counts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear several counts under the Act, because those counts should have been brought before the Motor Vehicle Review Board. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp." on Justia Law

The Forest Preserve District, filed a condemnation action against defendant's golf course and 54 undeveloped acres in December, 1999. The Eminent Domain Act provided that the date of filing the complaint was to be considered the valuation date for determining just compensation. 735 ILCS 5/7-121. At a trial held nearly eight years later, a jury determined that the fair market value on December 21, 1999, was $10.725 million. The appellate court affirmed in part, but vacated as to value and remanded to determine if the property has materially increased in value. The Supreme Court affirmed. Noting that condemnation can be abandoned and that the owner may have to continue paying taxes after the filing, the court concluded that a taking, to avoid an award of substantially less than fair market value, occurs on the date that the government deposits the amount of compensation that has been awarded and acquires title and the right to possession. Defendant did not forfeit its claim by failing to demand a speedy trial. The court noted that the District has not yet taken title and still could abandon condemnation. The trial court properly concluded that the District engaged in good faith negotiations. View "Forest Pres. Dist. v. First Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

For 12 months following his injury, plaintiff, a police officer injured on duty, received salary under the Public Employee Disability Act. For a short time thereafter, he received salary through a combination of accrued sick and vacation time, light duty, and temporary total disability payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act. While plaintiff received salary under PEDA, the city deducted 20 percent of his health insurance premiums from his paycheck, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. After PEDA benefits expired, plaintiff continued to pay 20 percent of the premiums. When he was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension under the Illinois Pension Code, the city began paying 100 percent of the premiums, as required by the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10(a). Plaintiff's request for reimbursement for premiums paid since the date of injury was refused. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the city. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. Under PSEBA, an employer's obligation to pay the entire health insurance premium for an injured officer and his family attaches on the date that it is determined that the injury is "catastrophic," the date it is determined that the injured officer is permanently disabled and eligible for a line-of-duty disability pension. View "Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law

In connection with operation of a medical transport company, defendant was convicted of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1), vendor fraud (305 ILCS 5/8A-3), and money laundering (720 ILCS 5/29B-1), sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay$1.2 million in restitution. The appellate court upheld the theft and vendor fraud convictions, but reversed the money laundering conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the money laundering conviction. The trial court properly allowed the state establish guilt of money laundering with evidence of receipts rather than profits. View "People v. Gutman" on Justia Law

One appellate court rejected an argument that the probation officers in defendant's case lacked authority to file petitions alleging violation of probation and seeking revocation of probation. In another district, the court rejected the state's argument that 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1, which allows the chief circuit judge to adopt intermediate sanctions for probation violations and allows probation officers to impose intermediate sanctions instead of filing a violation, violates separation of powers by infringing on the executive branch, specifically, state's attorneys in prosecuting probation violations. The Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed. Probation officers possess authority to file petitions charging a violation of probation; the statute does not give a state's attorney power to "veto" a probation officer's decision to offer intermediate sanctions, so long as the sanction requirements are timely completed, and that construction does not violate separation of powers principles. View "People v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Defendant, originally charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was found guilty of two counts of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. He was in custody for 344 days before sentencing. He received an extended term of five years; the court also ordered indexing of defendant's DNA, and imposed monetary charges, including a $200 DNA analysis charge pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(j). The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentence, but modified his fines and fees order with regard to a $5 court system fee and a $30 children’s advocacy center charge. The court declined to modify the order with regard to the DNA analysis charge, which the court held was not subject to offset by defendant’s presentence incarceration credit. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. DNA analysis charge is not punitive. It is a one-time charge intended to cover the cost of analyzing the DNA sample submitted by the qualifying offender and is compensatory. . View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1)) and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. Her sentences were to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She was also ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence for that offense to three years; found that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; held that the trial court did not err in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the restitution order because the trial court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the restitution order and otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm under an accountability theory and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 14 years and five years,respectively. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Reversible error occurred when the state was allowed to impeach defendant, who testified at trial, with his prior juvenile adjudication for burglary. A juvenile adjudication is typically not admissible against a testifying defendant, and defendant did not "open the door" to admission of his juvenile adjudication. View "People v. Villa" on Justia Law