Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Hernandez developed Parkinson’s disease, allegedly as the result of his exposure to chemicals at Central Steel, where he worked from 1968 to 1995. From 1995 to 1996, Hernandez was represented by a firm that filed a social security disability claim. From 1999 to 2002, he was represented by Bernstein, Grazian and Volpe, who filed a 1999 workers’ compensation claim, alleging chemical exposure at work. A third law firm was retained in 2004 and filed suit for civil damage recovery, strict product liability and negligence lawsuit against various companies involved in the manufacture and sale of those chemicals; that suit dismissed as time-barred. Hernandez alleged that the Bernstein firm should have advised him that he had other ways to recover beyond seeking workers’ compensation benefits and should have advised that he file a legal malpractice action against the first law firm for its failure to file a product liability suit. In 2009 the circuit court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the elements of res judicata had not been proven.View "Hernandez v. Pritikin" on Justia Law

Chicago taxi drivers filed a class action in 2000 concerning how they received traffic tickets. The trial court certified the class in 2002 and, in 2005, issued partial summary judgment that a ticket should be issued to a driver at the scene or placed on the vehicle and that to substitute mailed notice (a fly-by ticket) would be illegal. The city argued that such occurrences were rare or had happened only if the driver was confrontational or fled. In 2008 a new judge granted a motion to decertify, concluding that commonality no longer existed. Questions concerning whether there had been a “decision on the merits” were certified. The Illinois Supreme Court held that decertification was not precluded. A decision on the merits requires a complete determination of liability on a claim based on the facts disclosed by evidence, which establishes a right to recover in at least one class member, but which is short of final judgment. Liability which would establish a right to recovery had not yet been determined; the original trial judge did not decide whether the city violated the law by issuing a fly-by citation to any driver. View "Mashal v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was injured in a 2003 automobile accident. He was admitted to Edward Hospital and, allegedly, was operated on without a sufficient period of fasting. During surgery he vomited and aspirated vomit into his lungs, causing cardiac arrest and an anoxic brain injury. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment that two defendant doctors were not actual agents of the hospital, but also held that there was a question of fact (precluding summary judgment) as to whether those doctors were the hospital’s apparent agents. The hospital sought dismissal on grounds of res judicata. The Illinois Supreme Court answered the circuit court’s certified question by holding that plaintiff’s claim against the hospital could go forward. The supreme court said there was only one cause of action for negligence and the ruling that there was no actual agency did not entirely dispose of the claim. There is no res judicata barrier to attempting to show that defendant hospital is liable on the basis of apparent agency. View "Wilson v. Edward Hosp." on Justia Law

Citizens, unhappy with how public education is funded in Illinois, sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the funding system requires taxpayers in school districts with low property values to pay property taxes to fund local public schools at a higher rate than similarly situated taxpayers in school districts with higher property values, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the complaint was properly dismissed for lack of standing. The funding statute is not a taxing statute; plaintiffs failed to establish that the inequalities alleged are a direct result of the enforcement of the education funding statute or are fairly traceable to defendants’ actions. It is entirely within the discretion of the school districts to determine the actual rate of local property taxes, and the funding statute does not require school districts to tax at a certain rate. Although a district might decide that more local property tax revenues are required in order to provide students with a sufficient education, that decision is left to the school district and is not compelled or required by the educational funding statute. View "Carr v. Koch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are minority limited partners in Urban Shopping Centers, L.P., in which defendants acquired a majority interest in 2002. Plaintiffs allege breach of fiduciary and contractual duties, claiming that, pursuant to the operating agreement, defendants were not to compete with them in business opportunities. They alleged that defendants stopped growing plaintiffs’ business, disregarded partnership agreement terms, and stole plaintiffs’ opportunities. During discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel production of documents concerning business negotiations in which each defendant’s attorney discussed with nonclients liability and obligations as Urban’s general partner and use of a “synthetic partnership” to avoid partnership obligations. Defendants claimed privilege, but plaintiffs argued that, having disclosed legal advice on these subjects with each other outside of any confidential relationship, defendants could not later object that those subjects were privileged. The motion was granted; defendants refused to comply and were held in contempt. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed, holding that attorney-client privilege had not been waived because the sought-after disclosures had occurred in an extrajudicial context and were not thereafter used by the clients to gain a tactical advantage in litigation. The “subject-matter waiver” doctrine was not shown to be applicable.View "Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, " on Justia Law

In 2010, the younger child, a boy aged 2½ years, was brought to the emergency room by his mother. He had second-degree burns on his face. His mother had found him, injured, at the home of her boyfriend, who had been babysitting her two children. She did not live with the boyfriend. The children were determined to be neglected based on a finding of “environment injurious to their welfare.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, noting that the evidence did not show that the mother had any prior indication that the boyfriend would not provide a safe environment and also noting that she immediately took the child to the hospital. The finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

Stanbridge served time for aggravated criminal sex abuse concerning a 1999 Adams County; Lieberman was convicted of multiple Cook County counts of rape in 1980. Both were committed to the Department of Human Services under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1), which establishes a framework under which persons who have been convicted of certain sex offenses may be subjected to further civil detention after service of their criminal sentences. Their petitions for release were dismissed by the circuit courts. In Stanbridge’s case, the appellate court reversed, but as to Lieberman, dismissal was affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed (reinstated) dismissal of the petitions, clarifying the evidence required at post-commitment hearings for discharge or release. There must be a plausible account on each of the required elements of the petition, demonstrating a change in the circumstances that led to the initial commitment. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to bring forward sufficient evidence. In both of the proceedings at issue, the evidence did not, essentially, present anything new; there was no “plausible account” showing that the individual should no longer be civilly committed as sexually violent. View "In re the Detention of Stanbridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of committing multiple sex offenses concerning his 14-year-old daughter in 2007 and 2008. The convictions were for two counts of criminal sexual assault, one count of criminal transmission of HIV, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant had HIV, knew it, and took medication for it. He did not always wear a condom, but the victim did not contract the disease. The appellate court reduced the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault to criminal sexual assault; the supreme court affirmed. Section 12-14(a)(3) of the Criminal Code provides for aggravation of a criminal sexual assault if the offender “during the commission of the offense … acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of the victim.” Mere exposure of the victim to HIV during the commission of the offense did not threaten or endanger her life. The court noted that the sentence for criminal transmission of HIV should be consecutive to the others. View "People v. Giraud" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty in 2006 to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor and received a 14-year term. He had originally been indicted for offenses involving several minor victims between 1995 and 1998. Some charges were nol-prossed in 1999 and the state attempted to have defendant involuntarily committed as sexually dangerous (725 ILCS 205/0.01). After a 2004 remand, the state did not seek commitment a second time, but proceeded with criminal prosecution and agreed to dismiss remaining counts except one. Considering time already spent in custody, it was anticipated that defendant would soon be sent home. However, two weeks after the plea, the Attorney General (not the State’s Attorney) sought commitment under a different statute, the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). A motion to withdraw the guilty plea was denied; the appellate and supreme courts affirmed. Where an accused pleads guilty to an offense which could trigger the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, defense counsel has a minimal duty to advise him that, after completing his prison term, he will be evaluated and may risk involuntary commitment, but defendant failed to showing that he was denied effective assistance or prejudiced: that he could establish actual innocence or a plausible defense. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a police station and reported that he had strangled his wife to death. Although there had been an argument and a struggle, he claimed that the death was an accident. At trial, defense counsel argued that the evidence showed, at most, recklessness and involuntary manslaughter. Leach was convicted of first degree murder, based on knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The court properly admitted testimony of a qualified expert that it would take three to six minutes for a person to die from strangulation. Leach raised constitutional confrontation issues because the autopsy report, concluding that the death was a homicide, was made by a pathologist who had retired before trial and could not be cross-examined. A different expert testified, based on the report. The routine autopsy report is not testimonial and not subject to the “Crawford” rule even if the examiner is aware that police suspect homicide and a specific individual. It was not prepared for the primary purpose of criminal prosecution. Any error was harmless given that Leach did not dispute the manner and cause of death or that he was guilty of some form of homicide. View "People v. Leach" on Justia Law