Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman, attending a class at a Chicago Park District fieldhouse, fell while attempting to step over a pile of snow that had collected at the edge of the parking lot during plowing. She fractured her femur and had surgery, but later suffered complications which led to her death. Her estate filed a wrongful-death action. The park district claimed immunity based on section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that there can be no liability “based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.” The circuit court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice constitutes “the existence of a condition of any public property.” The appellate court held that it did not, precluding immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 3-105 of the Tort Immunity Act provides that generally local public entities undertaking snow removal operations must exercise due care in doing so. That provision has no impact on section 3-106, which specifically provides immunity from liability for injuries on public recreational property. The allegation that the snow accumulation was “unnatural” was irrelevant to immunity because recreational uses were involved. View "Moore v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

When he was 15 years old, Geiger testified for the state at the trial of a fellow gang member for a 1999 double murder. A codefendant in that case was retried in 2008, and, as to him, Geiger refused to testify, claiming Fifth Amendment privilege. The circuit court advised him that there was no reasonable basis for the claim, given his prior testimony and own earlier statement to police. The prosecution made an offer of use immunity, but he still refused to testify and was given a 20-year sentence for direct criminal contempt. The appellate court affirmed. In the meantime, the codefendant was convicted and Geiger conceded his Fifth Amendment claim. The Illinois Supreme Court found the 20-year term manifestly disproportionate and unreasonably excessive, noting that the power to punish for contempt is discretionary with the judiciary and that there is no sentencing classification or sentencing range set by the legislature. The court also noted that there was some evidence that the refusal to testify might have been driven by fear of gang retaliation. View "People v. Geiger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault on an eight-year-old girl, at his mother’s home for babysitting, on two dates. His confession was admitted into evidence; the girl gave statements and testified at trial. At trial, he denied any inappropriate behavior. He received consecutive terms of 10 and 8 years. The appellate court held that the rule of corpus delicti required the state to produce independent evidence of the elements of penetration (the girl’s descriptions did not), and that insufficient independent evidence was presented to support the convictions. It reduced them to the lesser-included offenses of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and remanded for resentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the State need not present independent evidence corroborating every element of the charged offenses before a defendant’s statement may be used to prove the corpus delicti and that the independent evidence was sufficient to permit the defendant’s confession to be admitted. On remand the appellate court must also consider whether defendant’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse had been improperly denied and, if it was not required, whether the sentence was excessive. View "People v. Lara" on Justia Law

Pielet Brothers Scrap Iron and Metal, was founded Arthur Pielet and his brothers shortly after World War II. Arthur sold his interest to his sons in 1986 through an agreement providing for a lifetime payment to him of a “consulting” fee, and, on his death, for a lifetime fee payment to his wife, Dorothy. The agreement was binding on successors and assigns. In 1994, the then- successor company, P.B.S., dissolved, but payments to Arthur continued until 1998, when its successor, MM, had financial difficulties. It filed for bankruptcy in 1999. Litigation began. The trial court awarded Dorothy almost $2 million. In the appellate court, P.B.S. argued the traditional rule that a cause of action that accrued (1998) after dissolution (1994) cannot be brought against a dissolved corporation. The appellate court rejected the argument, holding that Dorothy’s claim could survive, but remanded for determination of whether the companies could be relieved of liability for the fee under a theory of novation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the claim of breach of contract against P.B.S. could not survive the corporate dissolution. The issue of novation is relevant as to two other successor corporations and required remand. View "Pielet v. Pielet" on Justia Law

S.B., 14 years old, and a four-year-old girl played a game; both got undressed. S.B. was charged as a juvenile with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Evidence indicated that he suffered mild retardation and functioned as if seven or eight years old, not as a pedophile. The judge found him unfit for trial and set the matter for a “discharge” or “innocence only” hearing. The provision is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure but not in the Juvenile Court Act and allows an unfit individual to be ordered held for treatment. The evidence was found sufficient to support the charge, so S.B. was found “not not guilty.” Following outpatient evaluation, the court found S.B. still unfit, although neither mentally ill nor a threat to public safety, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Because he had never been adjudicated delinquent, the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute on “discharge” or “innocence only” hearings may be applied to juveniles. S.B. can be required to register. Registration is required after “a finding not resulting in an acquittal,” following a discharge hearing on an applicable charge. The court construed the statute to allow petition for registration termination (not specified in the statute).View "In re S.B." on Justia Law

Wife suffered brain damage after a serious car accident in 1997 and became totally disabled. Husband became unable to care for her by 2004, due to his own Parkinson’s disease. Wife went to Ohio to live with her daughter, who became plenary guardian. In 2007, after living apart for nearly three years, husband filed a petition for marriage dissolution in Cook County, and, in 2008, the guardian filed a counter-petition for dissolution on behalf of wife. Husband was granted voluntary dismissal of his petition, and, claiming that wife had said that she did not really want a divorce, moved to dismiss the guardian’s petition. He argued that the guardian had no authority to seek it. The circuit court dismissed the wife’s petition, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, overruling a 1986 case, which had involved proceedings commenced before enactment of the no-fault divorce law now in effect. Protection of vulnerable individuals, such as wife n this case, should now be allowed. On remand, the guardian must satisfy a clear and convincing burden of proof that marriage dissolution is in the ward’s best interest.View "Karbin v. Karbin" on Justia Law

In 1994 Sessions created a trust for his personal benefit, with a "spendthrift" provision prohibiting use of trust assets to pay creditors. In 1995, he irrevocably promised $1.5 million to Rush Medical Center for a building and provided for it in his will. The building, now in operation, bears his name. Sessions later blamed Rush for not diagnosing sooner the cancer of which he died in 2005, without having paid the pledge. Six weeks before his death, he executed a new will making no provision for the pledge. Rush filed a successful probate claim, but estate assets were insufficient to fulfill the pledge. Rush filed a supplemental proceeding to reach assets in the 1994 trust, worth almost $19 million in 2005. The trial court entered summary judgment for Rush; the appellate court reversed, based on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the award. At common law, a person cannot settle his estate in trust for his own benefit so as to be free from liability for his debts. The fact that the Act specifies certain instances in which transfers can be considered fraudulent does not mean that the statute abrogates the common law rule. View "Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Gott was a resident of Odin Healthcare where she died, on January 31, 2006. Her estate brought a survival action under the Nursing Home Care Act and the Wrongful Death Act, claiming that as a result of violations of the Nursing Home Care Act, Gott sustained gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, and respiratory failure. The wrongful-death claim sought damages for injuries sustained by her heirs. Odin sought to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Gott and by her “legal representative.” The trial court refused to compel arbitration, viewing the agreement as unenforceable for lack of mutuality and as contrary to public policy. The court held that the wrongful-death claim was not arbitrable and that the Federal Arbitration Act was inapplicable. On remand, the appellate court accepted applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act but still affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part. Arbitration can be compelled on Survival Act claims, alleging Nursing Home Care Act violations and seeking damages for injuries sustained by Gott while alive. However, the wrongful-death claim did not accrue until Gott died, and benefits obtained under it are payable to the next of kin rather than to her estate. No previously signed arbitration agreement is applicable to this claim. View "Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was 12 years old when, in 2003, his left foot was severed above the toes when he attempted to jump onto a freight train that was moving by the parking lot of an apartment building in Chicago Ridge. The track was partially fenced off and there was a sign warning of danger and prohibiting trespassing. As a result, an amputation below the knee was performed. The company which operated the train settled for $25,000, but plaintiff sued three other railroad companies. The trial judge found that the question of whether the danger of jumping onto a moving freight train was so obvious as to preclude any duty by the defendants was a question of fact for the jury. The jury assessed $6.5 million; that amount was reduced to $3.9 million by the earlier settlement and because plaintiff was found to have been 40% negligent. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed without remand. Under Illinois law, a moving train is an obvious danger as to which any child old enough to be allowed at large should recognize the risk. The defendants never had a legal duty to the plaintiff trespasser in this situation. View "Choate v. IN Harbor Belt R.R. Co." on Justia Law

The parties, married in California, moved to Illinois in 2004, and have three minor children. In 2005, husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and, in 2006, the parties signed a joint parenting agreement which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution in May 2008. Under the agreement, mother had primary residential custody and would stay in Illinois for 24 months, but could return the children to California after 36 months. The period in between was reserved for mediation. After 24 months, mother notified father of intent to relocate, but no mediation took place until two months before expiration of the 36-month period. Father sought an injunction, claiming that mother had not requested mediation and a substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him sole custody. The circuit court refused his request, and mother and children moved to California in June, 2011.The appellate court reversed; the trial court ordered return of the children. The supreme court reversed, holding that mother had complied with the judgment of dissolution. Father’s petition to modify custody remains pending; he is free to attempt to meet the statutory burden of showing that circumstances have changed so significantly that custody modification would be appropriate. View "In re Marriage of Coulter" on Justia Law