Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The driver pled guilty to DUI in 2009. Although the Illinois Vehicle Code and the Unified Code of Corrections provide that a fourth DUI conviction is a nonprobational Class 2 felony, the driver, who had three prior DUIs, was sentenced to only probation, in the amount of 48 months. Relying on appellate court precedent, the court accepted his argument that his 2000 conviction should not be considered for sentence-enhancement because he had pled guilty without legal counsel. The State’s Attorney objected and sought mandamus. The supreme court entered an order directing sentencing in accordance with the statute, overruling the 1991 appellate decision in light of a 1994 Supreme Court decision, Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, which indicates that a valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is also valid when used to enhance punishment as to a subsequent conviction. View "People v. Kinney" on Justia Law

The parties, who had twin children, divorced in 2007, while husband was unemployed. The issue of child support was reserved. The husband lived off assets that had been awarded to him as part of the marital estate, withdrawing about $8,500 from his savings account each month. The wife, who had custody, subsequently petitioned for child support, and, in 2010, was awarded $2,000 a month, even though the husband was still unemployed. For two children, the statutory guideline refers to 28 percent of net income, defined as “the total of all income from all sources,” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3). The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court set aside the support order, remanding for specific findings and recalculation. The amount withdrawn from savings should not be considered “income” because the money already belonged to husband. However, if use of the statutory guidelines then generates a support amount that the trial court finds inappropriate, it should make a specific finding to that effect and then adjust the support amount accordingly. One factor it can consider is “the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.” View "In re Marriage of McGrath" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of armed robbery while armed with a firearm and home invasion while armed with a firearm, Class X offenses, received concurrent terms of 25 years’ imprisonment. Both crimes had initial sentencing ranges of six to 30 years, plus a 15-year enhancement for use of a firearm, which made each range, 21 to 45 years. Defendant challenged his sentence for armed robbery with a firearm by comparison to the range for armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or II weapon. The crimes had identical elements, but the other crime had a sentencing range of only 15 to 30 years; he argued and that this discrepancy violated the proportionality clause of the Illinois Constitution. In 2007, the legislature eliminated the overlap between armed robbery and armed violence. The appellate court applied the identical-elements test and remanded for resentencing under the armed robbery statute as it existed before the 2000 effective date of the firearm enhancements. The supreme court affirmed, declining to overrule the identical-elements test, which it characterized as an objective, straightforward and bright-line test. Remanding for resentencing under the armed violence statute would be improper because defendant had never been charged with that offense.View "People v. Clemons" on Justia Law

A Spanish speaking defendant, represented by counsel and accompanied by an interpreter, pled guilty to sexual assault of a child. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) states: "No appeal from a … plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days … files … a motion to withdraw the plea." Rule 605(c) states that a court imposing sentence on a plea “shall advise the defendant substantially … that prior to taking an appeal the defendant must file … within 30 days … a written motion asking to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw the plea.” The court admonished defendant that he had a "right to return to the courtroom within 30 days to file motions to vacate your plea of guilty … In the event the motions are denied, you have 30 days … to file a notice of appeal." Defendant signed an English language form that recited Rule 605(c) almost verbatim and stated that he understood it. There were no post-plea motions; more than three months later, he filed pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed. The supreme court affirmed. Rule 605(c), requires strict compliance, but a defendant need only be "substantially" advised of the contents; it need not be read verbatim. View "People v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

A woman standing at a window inside a building was fatally shot. Gang members intended to shoot the first rival gang member to come out. Defendant, then age 15, told police that fellow gang members, closer to the building, fired first, while he, across the street, only shot into the air. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to 28 years. No evidence other than his statement linked him to the crime. In pro se attempts to file successive post-conviction petitions, defendant claimed actual innocence. He submitted affidavits from two women who claimed to have been with defendant at the time of the shooting but had refused to come forward, and from a codefendant that defendant "had nothing to do with this shooting." The attempts were rejected by the circuit and appellate courts. The appellate court considered an Illinois Supreme Court holding that the requirement of showing cause and prejudice before being allowed leave to file a successive petition may be excused where actual innocence is alleged, but found that defendant did not assert a colorable claim of actual innocence. The supreme court affirmed. The women were known and not subpoenaed for trial. Because defendant was convicted on an accountability theory, the codefendant's claims did not exonerate him.View "People v. Edwards" on Justia Law

While defendant was in custody on another matter, he became a suspect in a fatal shooting. Another inmate told police that he thought he could get the defendant to make incriminating statements concerning that homicide. Police set up the inmate-informer to wear a wire. A judicially authorized overhear was arranged, with the inmate as the consenting party. Defendant was told that he was being taken to a lineup. He called the attorney who had been appointed to represent him in the other matter. That attorney spent about 45 minutes waiting for access to defendant while the inmate-informer was conversing with defendant in an otherwise empty room and listening to his allegedly incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed and specifically overruled an earlier appellate court decision, holding that defendant was not subjected to police custodial interrogation when he conversed with the inmate-informer. The police were not required to give Miranda warnings, and defendant had no right to counsel. Neither were police required to tell the defendant that the attorney in the other matter was seeking access to him.View "People v. Hunt" on Justia Law

In 2006, following expiration of the federal assault weapons ban, Cook County enacted the Blair Holt Assault Weapons Ban. The law prohibits possession of "assault weapons," defined by characteristics, and large-capacity magazines. It includes a nonexhaustive list of prohibited models. A person who lawfully possessed prohibited items had 90 days from the effective date to surrender, remove, or modify them. Violation is punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months and a fine between $500 and $1,000. Opponents filed a preenforcement action, based on facial claims of vagueness, denial of equal protection, and violation of the right to bear arms. The trial court dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for trial on the Second Amendment claim, affirming dismissal of the due process and equal protection claims. Given the early stage of the litigation, it cannot be said conclusively whether "assault weapons" as defined by the ordinance fall within the scope of rights protected by the Second Amendment. The question requires an empirical inquiry, beyond the scope of both the record and judicial notice. The county has not had an opportunity to establish a nexus between the ordinance and the protected governmental interest. View "Wilson v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

In 2007 plaintiff died, a few months after filing a complaint, alleging exposure to asbestos brought home from work on her husband’s clothes and body between 1958 and 1964. The defense argued that no duty was owed to a third party. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the question of duty for purposes of the negligence claim was not simply a matter of whether the injured spouse worked for the defendant, but of whether defendant could have reasonably foreseen that its actions would cause this injury. Although the complaint alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that there was an unreasonable risk of harm to the worker’s wife, the complaint failed to allege specific facts as to what the defendant actually knew, or should have known, between 1958 and 1964. A complaint should not be dismissed, however, unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recover.View "Simpkins v. CSX Corp." on Justia Law

In 2005, a woman was stabbed to death in the apartment she shared with defendant. At trial, he did not testify, but the jury heard the testimony of a detective to whom he had made statements and heard audio tapes of interviews in which defendant stated that the victim had yelled at him and stabbed him before he grabbed the knife, stabbed her, and left the premises. The prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior conviction of domestic battery of the same victim. The appellate court affirmed conviction for first degree murder and a sentence of 60 years. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the murder of a family or household member involving an incident of domestic violence is the functional equivalent of domestic battery or aggravated battery, referred to in section 115-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that evidence of a prior conviction for domestic battery or aggravated battery committed against a family or household member is admissible in a later criminal prosecution for “any of these types of offenses when the victim is the same person .“ View "People v. Chapman" on Justia Law

At trial for a 2004 shooting, defendant testified to self-defense, but was impeached by introduction of earlier convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and received a 40-year sentence, but was acquitted of attempted first degree murder. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant filed a pro se petition, alleging, ineffective assistance of counsel in not challenging the judge’s refusal to rule before trial on the use of convictions to impeach. The petition was dismissed and the appellate court affirmed. The petition was filed before the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Patrick, which held that there is no justification for a blanket policy of refusing to rule on use of convictions to impeach until after a defendant testifies; the appellate court decision was released after that decision. The supreme court remanded, stating that it was clear from the record that defense counsel was aware of potential problems raised by the refusal to make a ruling, and that it was at least arguable, even pre- Patrick, that counsel’s performance was deficient and that defendant was prejudiced. View "People v. Cathey" on Justia Law