Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At the February 2010 primary, there was no name printed on the Republican ballot for the office of member of the St. Clair County board of review, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in. In March, the Republican Party central committee appointed plaintiff as its candidate, and, in April, made a filing with the county clerk, entitled “resolution/certificate of appointment.” Plaintiff circulated and filed nominating petitions and other required documents, pursuant to Election Code section 7–61. The electoral board sustained an objection so that plaintiff’s name did not appear on the November ballot. Trial and appellate courts affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it could address the moot issue under the exception for matters of public interest. The lower courts applied the wrong section of the statute, which contains different sections for different situations. View "Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce" on Justia Law

In summer 2010, due to budget deficits, the board laid off 1,289 teachers. Laid-off teachers were not given preference for positions available in the district, nor were all vacancies posted on the website. In August, 2010, there was an increase in funding. Approximately 715 tenured teachers were recalled, but many positions were filled with new hires, rather than laid-off tenured teachers. There was no official recall policy. The Seventh Circuit certified, to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the question of whether the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31)), provides that Chicago tenured teachers have a right to be rehired after an economic layoff and whether they have a right to certain procedures during rehiring. The court responded that Chicago public schools are treated differently under the School Code. In all the other districts, laid-off tenured teachers have a right of recall and, subject to certification and seniority, have a right to be rehired into new vacancies in their districts for a specific period. Under 1995 amendments Chicago teachers were not given those rights. The supreme court declined to read into School Code language something which the legislature did not put there. View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ., City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Firefighters, who suffered career-ending injuries during required training exercises, obtained line-of-duty disability pensions and sought continuing health coverage under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10, which requires employers of full-time firefighters to pay health insurance premiums for the firefighter and family if the firefighter suffers a catastrophic injury as a result of a response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency. The trial court dismissed a declaratory judgment action by one firefighter and affirmed denial of the insurance benefit for one firefighter. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court held that an "emergency" means an unforeseen circumstance calling for urgent and immediate action and can arise in a training exercise. The other firefighter had obtained a declaratory judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. The supreme court distinguished the situation because, although he was instructed to "respond as if it were an actual emergency," he was not injured while making an urgent response to unforeseen circumstances involving an imminent danger to person or property. View "Gaffney v. Bd. of Tr. of Orland Fire Prot. Dist." on Justia Law

A deputy observed a woman, whose license he believed was suspended, driving, and followed her home. After confirming that her license was suspended, he attempted to effect a traffic stop, but she went inside her home. Her husband emerged and gave false information, but invited the officer to search the house. A citation for driving on a suspended license was served on wife several weeks later. Both husband and wife were convicted of obstructing a peace officer. The appellate court held that providing false information, alone, was not sufficient for a conviction. The supreme court affirmed. The offense of obstructing a peace officer does not require a physical act, but may consist of knowingly providing a false statement which interposes an obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer and is relevant to the performance of his authorized duties. In this case there was no evidence that the husband's false statements hampered or impeded the officer in any way. View "People v. Baskerville" on Justia Law

In 1991, at age 16 years, defendant pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a recommendation of a 50-year sentence. He knew that the maximum was 60 years. He had previously been adjudicated delinquent and sentenced as a juvenile. The court imposed a 50-year term, without any admonition that the term would be followed by a mandatory three-year period of supervised release (MSR). Defendant's first attempt at postconviction relief was unsuccessful. Several years later, he filed another petition, claiming that his plea had not been knowing and voluntary because he was not informed of MSR. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's rejection of the petition and reduced the sentence to 47 years with three years of MSR. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant had not been "impeded" from raising a claim about failure to advise on MSR. Lack of precedent for a position differs from "cause" for failure to raise an issue, which is a statutory prerequisite to a successive post-conviction petition. In general, a defendant must raise an issue, even when the law is against him, in order to preserve it for review.View "People v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated vehicular hijacking "while armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit: a firearm," 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a); 18-4(a); 10-2-A. Although the crimes were committed in 2004, the indictment used versions of the statutes from before a 2000 amendment because sentencing enhancements in the amended versions had been declared unconstitutional. By the time of trial in 2006, enhanced sentencing provisions in the amended statutes were back in effect, but prosecution proceeded under the indictment. Defendant raised no objection. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon because no weapon was recovered or introduced into evidence and because no testimony was provided as to size, weight, or metallic nature of the weapon. The court remanded with instructions that judgment be entered on lesser-included offenses of kidnapping, vehicular hijacking, and robbery. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court conviction. There was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that defendant had a firearm. Defendant was adequately apprised of the charges. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizens' organization, filed suit alleging violations of the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, 225 ILCS 720/8.05(a), and the Water Use Act, 525 ILCS 45/1 resulting from a coal mine reclamation. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed the dismissal as to all five counts directed against the mining company and modified the order dismissing the count against Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to be a dismissal without prejudice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The trial court properly dismissed counts I through V because those counts constitute a challenge to the provisions of the revised permits authorized by Illinois Department of Natural Resources and could not be brought under the Mining Act. Similarly, there is no statutory basis to conclude that the Water Use Act allows a private right of action to challenge conduct that is specifically mandated by the terms of a permit authorized by IDNR.View "Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant, a school district, leased portable classrooms from plaintiff under contracts including penalties for early cancellation or default. Under the Downstate School Finance Authority for Elementary Districts Law (105 ILCS 5/1F-1) the state later created the Authority to manage the District's finances. The Authority canceled the leases before expiration, but did not authorize payment of the cancellation fees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding it was legally impossible for the District to pay the cancellation fees, but also finding that the Authority had to comply with the cancellation terms of the leasing contracts. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the District on the cancellation fees and vacated as moot the declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended the Act to permit the Authority to cancel a school district's contract with a third party, but that cancellation must be consistent with the contractual terms agreed to by the school district and the third party. The Authority can cancel the leasing contracts, but must pay the contractual fees for early cancellation. View "Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest Sch. Dist. 152.5" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him when it permitted the state to introduce into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of its key and unavailable witness. The defendant also argued that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The appellate court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance, but reversed and remanded, finding that preliminary hearing testimony was improperly admitted and the error could not be considered harmless. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel was not aware of inconsistent statements the witness had given or his status as an alien or his pending deportation. Viewing cross-examination in its totality, counsel was not afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness.View "People v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2007, defendant filed a petition seeking leave to file a second successive post-conviction petition challenging his 1983 convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault. He alleged that newly discovered evidence substantiated his prior claim that his confession was the product of police brutality and torture. The trial court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, holding that defendant had satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test for successive post-conviction petitions. The Illinois Supreme court affirmed the appellate court, but remanded to the trial court for appointment of post-conviction counsel and second-stage post-conviction proceedings. Evidence of coercion is not rendered irrelevant simply because the defendant has denied confessing and use of a physically coerced confession as substantive evidence of guilt is never harmless error. View "People v. Wrice" on Justia Law