Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty in 2007 to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and received a 20-year sentence. He challenged fines and fees imposed, including a $250 public defender fee. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a), requires notice to the defendant and a hearing on ability to pay before the public defender fee may be imposed. The procedure was not followed; the appellate court vacated and remanded for notice and a hearing concerning ability to pay. The Supreme Court held that the fee should have been vacated outright, without any remand, because no motion to impose the fee had been made by the prosecution and it had not been sought by the circuit court itself. The circuit court clerk had imposed the fee unilaterally, without any authority for doing so. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Defendant was living with the mother of a developmentally disabled 17-year-old. He sexually assaulted her, but she did not immediately report it. He was convicted and received a 28-year sentence. On appeal, defendant complained that venirepersons were asked about why a victim might delay making a report. The appellate court found that the prosecutor had crossed the boundary of acceptable voir dire, but refused to excuse procedural default under the plain-error rule and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The defendant also challenged failure to mention mandatory supervised release in the sentencing judgment, after which the Department of Corrections calculated the sentence to include an indeterminate MSR term of three years to natural life. The appellate court remanded under 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d), which states that for criminal sexual assault, "the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of natural life of the defendant." The Supreme Court reversed. Indeterminate sentences have generally been abolished in Illinois, but, in 2005, were resurrected for certain specified sex offenses to create lifetime supervision for high-risk offenders because of the risk of recidivism. The new provisions contemplate indeterminate terms. View "People v. Rinehart" on Justia Law

After a minor accident, the drivers' friends and relatives gathered, arguments ensued, and shots were fired. One victim survived; another died. Recovered bullets came from the same gun. There was testimony about defendant's use of a gun. Although an instruction on justifiable use of force in self-defense was given, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. He appealed the refusal to give an instruction that would have found him guilty only of second degree murder for having had an unreasonable subjective belief that the use of force was necessary. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed. Evidence that supports a self-defense instruction also supports an instruction for second degree murder. It is the role of the court to determine if there is evidence to support a self-defense instruction, but it is the function of the jury to determine whether a defendant had a subjective belief that use of force was necessary and, if so, whether that belief was reasonable. The error would not automatically call for reversal, but with conflicting testimony, it was not harmless in the sense that the trial result would not have been different if the jury had been properly instructed. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

A jury awarded more than $20 million for the death of three persons in a 2002 collision between a car and a tractor-trailer. Original defendants included the truck driver, his employer, the owner of the load being carried, the owner of the tractor (Adler), and the owner of the semi-trailer. The driver and his employer obtained a substitution of judge, but a second motion to substitute the judge was denied on the ground that it had been requested by the same entity (employer) operating under a different name. A motion for substitution brought by the Adler was denied on the ground that the determination concerning the employer was a substantial ruling. Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives all defendants the right to one substitution of judge, provided no substantial ruling has yet been made in the case. The appellate court ordered a new trial. The parties agreed to dismiss Adler, releasing it from liability. The Supreme Court vacated the new trial order, but remanded on other issues. Once Adler, whose request to substitute had been denied, was no longer in the case, no other defendant had standing to challenge that denial. View "Powell v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired as a public school basketball coach in 1999, and made athletic director in 2003, was fired as coach in 2008, following a campaign based on his allegedly abusive and bullying style of coaching. He filed suit for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy to intentionally interfere with prospective business advantage, and slander per se. The trial court dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILCS 110/15. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the Act is to protect citizens who are attempting to speak freely or petition government from retaliatory meritless lawsuits, intended to chill exercise of constitutional rights and impose burdensome expenses. The special summary dismissal under the Act, without discovery, allows attorney fees. For SLAPP protections to apply, plaintiff's claim must be solely based on the movant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. The Act is not intended to apply to tortious acts and does not create a new privilege concerning defamation. It is possible that defendants could spread lies about plaintiff while at the same time genuinely petitioning government for redress, but such a situation cannot support dismissal as a SLAPP.View "Sandholm v. Kuecker" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for driving on a suspended license, got out of his car, and was searched. An officer testified that he found a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance in defendant's pocket. Another officer testified that the sergeant pulled the bag out of defendant's pocket and never retrieved anything from the ground. The substance tested positive for cocaine. The defendant testified that the drug was planted. The prosecutor argued to the jury that the testimony of a police officer should be believed because he would not risk "his credibility, his job, and his freedom" by lying, but no evidence was presented that such consequences would occur. Defendant was sentenced to five years in prison for possession of 0.8 grams of cocaine. The appellate court reversed, finding the prosecutorial statements improper. The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The comments were improper because no evidence was presented that officers risked their careers by testifying falsely, but it was not plain error because the defendant's version of events was highly improbable and the jury was instructed that arguments are not evidence. The error was not so serious as to affect the fairness of the trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

The attorney, admitted to practice in Illinois in 1969, was the subject of a 2004 Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission complaint following convictions relating to driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while his license was revoked. The state Supreme Court issued an order suspending him from the practice of law for a period of 18 months, and ordering him to reimburse the Disciplinary Fund for any client protection payments arising from his conduct. In 2007 the ARDC charged him with misrepresentation to a tribunal and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. The Hearing Board found proven misconduct and recommended suspension for two years, but the Review Board recommended dismissal of the charges. The Supreme Court suspended him for one year. While the violations primarily involved representation of the attorney's own bankrupt company and occurred within days of the suspension, the attorney attempted to conceal the misconduct and refused to admit wrongdoing. View "In re: Thomas" on Justia Law

Forfeiture proceedings were instituted concerning three vehicles; each had multiple owners, and, in each case, one of the owners was charged with aggravated DUI. The trial court declared the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of the Criminal Code facially unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process for lack of a provision requiring a prompt probable cause hearing after seizure of a vehicle but before trial of the forfeiture action. A new statute, effective January 1, 2012, provides for such hearings. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court looked to U.S. Supreme Court decisions and reversed. The statutory scheme does not mandate the return of a vehicle just because one of the owners demonstrates innocence. Only one of the owners need give consent to use of a vehicle in the commission of an offense for the vehicle to be subject to forfeiture, and there is no constitutional requirement for an innocent-owner defense in a forfeiture proceeding. In most cases such as this, a prompt determination of probable cause is made in connection with the underlying criminal prosecution. In the Criminal Code, the forfeiture provisions themselves comport with due process, and there is no constitutional requirement for additional procedures. View "People v. One 1998 GMC" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)). She requested that the state produce the video recording of the stop made by the camera located in the arresting officer's vehicle. The recording had been destroyed as part of a regular purge. The circuit court granted defendant's motion for sanctions and barred the state from introducing testimony concerning what was contained on the videotape. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The state was placed on notice by defendant to produce the recording of her stop and arrest in the civil statutory summary suspension proceedings and took no action to preserve it; the sanction was reasonable. View "People v. Kladis" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a), and failing to report an accident involving death or injury (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) after a collision resulting in one death and injuries to three people, filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel other than the county public defender and other motions, based on ineffective assistance. The trial court declined to consider the untimely motions. The appellate court reduced the failing to report conviction, held that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to serve 85% of his reckless homicide sentence, and remanded the pro se motions. The Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to conduct a preliminary examination into the factual basis of motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. While a motion for a new trial must be filed within 30 days of the entry of a finding or return of a verdict, an exception exists if a defendant is seeking a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance and the claim is raised before a notice of appeal is filed. View "People v. Patrick" on Justia Law