Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Country Casualty's agent Lessaris, issued an automobile insurance policy to Skaperdas. Skaperdas’s fiancée, Day, was subsequently involved in an accident while driving his vehicle. Country Casualty covered the loss but required Skaperdas to change his policy to include Day. Lessaris prepared the policy, but identified only Skaperdas, not Day, as a named insured. The policy's declarations page identified the driver as a “female, 30-64.” Following issuance of the policy, Day’s minor son, Jackson, was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle and seriously injured. The driver’s insurance was insufficient to cover Jackson’s medical expenses. Plaintiffs made a demand for underinsured motorist coverage under the Country Casualty policy. Country Casualty denied the claim on the ground that neither Day nor Jackson was listed as a named insured. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Lessaris breached his duty to exercise ordinary care and skill in renewing, procuring, binding, and placing insurance coverage as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-2201, and that Country Casualty was responsible for the acts of its agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. They also sought reformation of contract to include Day as an additional named insured and a declaration of coverage. The trial court dismissed the negligence and respondeat superior counts. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Code does impose a duty of ordinary care. View "Skaperdas v. Country Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old Marshana died while her family participated in One Hope’s program. The Cook County public guardian, as administrator of Marshana’s estate, filed a wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope and Marshana’s mother,alleging that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect and should not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and failure to complete parenting classes. Attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding Marshana’s case. The priority review process considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” The Public Guardian moved to compel production of the report. One Hope argued that the report was protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. The circuit court determined that the privilege did not apply. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege.” View "Harris v. One Hope United, Inc." on Justia Law

Cowper’s sentencing judgment provided that he was to receive 275 days’ credit for time served. He was transported to prison on June 2. On June 23, Cowper filed a “Motion to Recalculate Time Served.” On October 16, 2011, he was released. On November 22, the state responded, conceding that he had not been given credit for time served between January 8, 2008, and February 2, 2008, and between November 29, 2010, and May 11, 2011. The court entered an amended judgment that included all of the good time credits. Cowper sued the sheriff of Saline County and the circuit clerk, alleging negligence in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(e)(4)). The trial court dismissed, noting that the statute requires the clerk to forward the information received from the sheriff; there was no allegation that the clerk failed to do so. As to the sheriff, the court found that the statute did not expressly grant a private right of action and none could be implied. The appellate court reversed, finding that Cowper was in the class of persons for whom the statute was enacted; that implying a private cause of action was consistent with the purpose to restore the offender to useful citizenship; that the injury is one that the law was designed to prevent; and that implying a private cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the complaint alleged negligence, so the court erred in analyzing whether there was a statutory right of action. Clerks may be liable for negligence. The court agreed that Cowper had stated a claim as to the sheriff. View "Cowper v. Nyberg" on Justia Law

The law firm sued, alleging that it agreed to act as co-counsel with defendant on workers’ compensation claims; plaintiff was to receive 45% of fees recovered and defendant would receive 55%. After the cases settled, defendant refused to pay plaintiff its share of the attorney fees. Plaintiff attached an attorney-client agreement, signed by plaintiff, defendant, and the clients, describing the allocation of responsibilities and fees. Defendant argued that under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/16a(J), the Commission was to hear “[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorney’s fees.” The circuit court found plaintiff’s complaint sought recovery based on a referral agreement, that the claims based on that agreement did not fall within the Act, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that the Commission’s authority does not extend to “issues concerning a breach of a referral agreement delineating the percentage of the awarded fee that should be allotted to the attorney who represented the claimant before the Commission and the attorney who referred the claimant to that attorney,” but is limited to hearing attorney fee disputes “concerning the amount of fees to be awarded to those who represent clients before the Commission.” View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

Williams sued his employer, BNSF Railway, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging an employment related injury. BNSF filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity against QTS. A jury rendered a verdict, finding that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from his employment, but assessed 50% of the fault to Wllams, 37.5% to BNSF, and 12.5% to QTS. The jury also rendered a verdict in favor of QTS on BNSF’s claim for contractual indemnity, finding that BNSF’s notice of claim was untimely. The appellate court dismissed BNSF’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the notice of appeal was untimely. BNSF had filed its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the written order, but 72 days after the trial court’s oral ruling on BNSF’s post-trial motion. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing Supreme Court Rule 272, which states: “judgment is entered at the time it is entered of record.” The trial court’s oral pronouncement was not entered of record in the law record book. View "Williams v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Bruns, age 79, drove to a Centralia eye clinic. She did not use the parking lot, but parked on 2nd Street in front of the clinic, as she had on each of nine previous visits. As she walked toward the clinic, Bruns stubbed her toe on a crack in the sidewalk, causing her to fall and injure her arm, leg and knee. She had been looking “towards the door and the steps” of the clinic. Bruns “definitely” noticed the sidewalk defect every time she went to the clinic. Clinic employees had twice contacted the city about the defect, including after a previous accident, and offered to pay to remove the tree that caused it. The city would not authorize removal because of the 100-year-old tree’s historic significance. Bruns sued, arguing that the city should have reasonably foreseen that a pedestrian could become distracted and fail to protect herself against the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the city summary judgment, finding the defect open and obvious. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the summary judgment. The city has miles of sidewalk to maintain; imposing a duty to protect plaintiffs from open and obvious defects would not be justified. View "Bruns v. City of Centralia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Murphy and his employer, ECHO, alleging that Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson, who suffered a severe and permanent brain injury following emergency room treatment. ECHO billed Anderson for services physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit, but did not bill for Murphy’s services during the Code Blue that resulted in his injury. The hospital billed Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue. The circuit court concluded that Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/25. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides “Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” Murphy was fully compensated for his time that day. He responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job to do so. The agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the agreement that ECHO had with Murphy require that ECHO physicians to comply with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy was that emergency room physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The legislature never intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.View "Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd." on Justia Law

In the underlying litigation, the attorney represented a contractor being sued for job-site injuries and was later sued by the contractor’s insurance company for signing settlement agreements without authority. Section 13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3, sets forth a six-year statute of repose for “action[s] for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise … against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services.” The trial court held that the provision barred claims for breach of implied warranty of authority, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation against the attorney. The appellate court reversed, finding that the statute of repose did not apply to an action brought by a non-client of the defendant-lawyer for a cause of action other than legal malpractice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the dismissal, stating that under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, the claims “arose out of” the attorney’s actions “in the performance of professional services.” View "Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riseborough" on Justia Law

In 1998 the Gillespie School District hired Wight under for services preliminary to the actual designing and construction of a new elementary school building. Wight agreed to perform a “site mine investigation.” Wight hired Hanson Engineers to assess the potential for coal mine subsidence. A physical engineer at Hanson sent a letter to Wight, noting recorded subsidence events, including five to six events since 1979, affecting more than 40 structures in the area. The letter stated: “No one can predict when or if the land above the roof-and-pillar mine will subside… The owner should consider the fact that there is no economically feasible corrective action… to guarantee against future subsidence… it can be intuitively concluded that there is a relatively high risk of subsidence in the Benld/Gillespie area. The letter was not attached to the report, which noted some of its highlights. The school was built and occupied, but in 2009 was severely damaged as the result of subsidence and was condemned. The District sued Wight, alleging professional negligence, breach of implied warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment of material fact. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Wight, based on statutes of limitations applicable to the claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it was expressing no opinion concerning the merits of various claims. View "Gillespie Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Wight & Co." on Justia Law

Reyes was driving in Elgin when she was involved in an accident with pedestrians, a mother and her four-year-old son. The boy died. The mother and her husband sued Reyes for negligence and wrongful death. American Access Casualty sought a declaration that the policy it had issued to Reyes provided no coverage. The policy had been issued to Reyes on her 1999 Chrysler. She was identified as the titleholder of the vehicle, the named insured, and as “driver number one.” Next to her name, where her driver’s license number should be, was the language “Title Holder Exclude.” A friend, was listed as “driver number two” and identified as the primary driver. An endorsement excluded from coverage vehicle operation by Reyes. State Farm, which provided uninsured-motorist coverage to the mother and son, filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaration that American Access’ attempt to exclude Reyes under its own insurance policy violated public policy and was unlawful. The trial court granted American Access summary judgment, finding that the policy in question provided no coverage for the accident. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. Section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law, part of the Illinois Vehicle Code, requires liability insurance for vehicles on the road for the protection of the public. Although the exclusion of named drivers is permitted, exclusion of a vehicle owner who is also the named insured is a violation of the public policy expressed in the statute. View "Am. Access Cas. Co. v. Reyes" on Justia Law