Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two Chicago firefighters suffered duty-related injuries in the 1980s and later died. Their widows each received an ordinary widow’s pension from the Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Retirement Benefit Fund of Chicago. The two widows were later awarded annuities available to widows of firemen who died in the line of duty, retroactive to the date of death of each spouse, with interest, because the injuries were permanent and had prevented them from ever returning to active duty. The widows claimed that the calculation of their annuities (based on the current salary of the position last held by the deceased) should include duty availability pay, which is generally intended to compensate firefighters for being available for duty. This type of compensation was created in the 1990s, after these firemen’s accidents, and neither ever received it. Their argument, based on Pension Code language added in 2004, was rejected by the Board and the trial court. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial. If duty availability pay may be used for pension calculation, it must be pay that was actually received by the firemen. View "Hooker v. Ret. Bd. of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago" on Justia Law

The worker was injured in a 2006 automobile accident near Cordova, where he was working temporarily for Venture. Cordova is 200 miles from Springfield, where he lived and where his plumbers’ and pipefitters’ union was. He was living a motel 30 miles from the worksite with a coworker, also from Springfield, who was driving when the accident occurred. An arbitrator denied his workers’ compensation claim. The Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed; the trial court set aside the Commission’s finding. The Workers’ Compensation Division of the Appellate Court granted relief to the worker. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the worker was not a “traveling employee” and could not be compensated. An injury incurred by an employee in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, because it is not arising out of or in the course of employment, unless the worker can be categorized as a “traveling employee.” The employer did not direct the worker to accept the position at the Cordova location; he accepted it with full knowledge of the commute involved. His course or method of travel was not determined by the demands and exigencies of the job. He was not reimbursed for travel time or expenses or told what route to take.View "The Venture-Newberg Perini Stone v. IL Workers' Compensation Comm'n" on Justia Law

A 2009 collision on a rural Effingham County highway resulted in the death of a man, 18 years old and not intoxicated. The other driver was a 60-year-old man who was intoxicated and had been drinking in Johnny’s Bar and Grill. The decedent’s parents, who had already obtained $106,550 in insurance recoveries, sued under the Dramshop Act, which has a statutory cap on recovery of $130,338.51. The bar owner had insurance for that amount, but his insurer became insolvent and was liquidated. The Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund assumed his defense. The Fund statute provides that the Fund’s obligation shall be reduced by a plaintiff’s other insurance recoveries. The plaintiffs argued that, if the jury award were far in excess of the statutory cap, the setoff could first be applied to the award, and the award could then be brought down to allow them to recover the full amount of the statutory cap itself. The appellate court ruled that the reduction should be applied to the jury’s verdict. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Fund is liable only up $130,338.51. The setoff for insurance proceeds should be applied against that maximum liability. The availability of a jury trial is not relevant and the amount of a verdict cannot expand the Fund’s obligation. View "Rogers v. Imeri" on Justia Law

A February 2008 automobile accident resulted in the death of the driver who was purportedly at fault. His son was issued letters of office to serve as independent administrator of the driver’s estate. The limitations period for plaintiff’s claim of personal injuries was two years. Just before that limitations period was to expire, plaintiff filed suit, apparently unaware of the driver’s death. Her action against a dead person was invalid. Attempts to serve process were unsuccessful, but a special process server eventually notified the plaintiff that the defendant was dead. The Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-209, allows a two-year extension of the limitations period under certain conditions, including when a plaintiff moves to substitute the decedent’s personal representative as defendant. The plaintiff did not do so, but obtained the circuit court’s permission to have an employee of plaintiff’s attorney appointed as “special administrator” to defend the estate, a procedure that has no statutory authorization. The circuit court dismissed the action on limitations grounds, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Upon learning of the defendant’s demise, the plaintiff should have sought leave to amend the complaint to substitute as defendant the decedent’s son, as decedent’s personal representative, and should have then served process on that representative. The plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence. View "Relf v. Shatayeva" on Justia Law

When an insurance company authorized to transact business in Illinois becomes insolvent and unable to pay claims, the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund pays those claims after an order is entered liquidating the company, 215 ILCS 5/532. A cap on individual claims is inapplicable to workers compensation claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1. The plaintiff is the successor to Wells, a manufacturer. A Wells employee was seriously injured on the job in 1985, and, in 1993, the Industrial Commission ordered weekly lifetime benefits for total, permanent disability. Wells began to make the payments directly to the employee. Wells was self-insured, but had excess insurance from Home Insurance. After Wells’ payments to the injured employee reached $200,000, Home paid benefits until Home became insolvent in 2003 and was liquidated. The Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund took over Home’s obligations, but stopped paying the employee in 2005, arguing that payments to an excess, rather than a primary, insurer were not payments of “workers’ compensation claims” exempted from the cap. Wells continued paying the employee and sought a declaration that the Fund’s payments should continue. The circuit court agreed with Wells, awarding summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the distinctions made by the Fund between excess and primary coverage and between payments made directly or indirectly to employees. View "Skokie Castings, Inc. v. IL Ins. Guar. Fund" on Justia Law

The employee alleged that, while at work in 2004, he was involved in an accident that resulted in a condition for which he sought compensation. A Workers’ Compensation Commission arbitrator denied benefits, citing lack of causation, and, in 2009, the Commission adopted the decision. The trial court confirmed the denial. The appellate court vacated, finding that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The employee had calculated the 20-day time period for filing, Workers’ Compensation Act, section 19(f)(1), using the date on which required documents were mailed to the court, rather than the date on which the documents were received and file-stamped. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the so-called “mailbox rule,” which has applied to notices of appeal from the trial to the appellate court and to petitions for the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s review of arbitrators’ decisions, also applies to commencement of an action for judicial review of a Commission decision, which is an exercise of special statutory jurisdiction. Notice to the other party and the statute of limitations were not factors in this case and, absent a clear directive from the legislature, allowing the mailbox rule in such a case is most consistent with Illinois law. View "Gruszeczka v. IL Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Bjork was a nurse for Dama’s late wife. O’Meara was Dama’s dentist. Dama, then 90 years old, told Bjork that O’Meara had been asking for money and that “he did not want O’Meara to get everything.” Dama’s banker, Williams, informed Bjork that Dama wanted to name Bjork as death-beneficiary on a bank account and sent Bjork a “Power of Attorney,” signed by Dama. Bjork signed and returned it to Williams. Later, Dama signed a power of attorney, appointing O’Meara as agent, and revoking powers previously granted to Bjork, then executed a will, leaving his entire estate to O’Meara. Bjork and Dama remained in contact by mail, telephone, and visits until shortly before Dama’s death. O’Meara filed the will and was appointed independent representative of Dama’s estate. Bjork filed citation petitions (Probate Act, 755 ILCS 5/16-2). After the estate closed, Bjork sued for intentional interference with testamentary expectancy. The circuit court dismissed, citing the six-month limitation period of the Probate Act. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Bjork’s tort claim does not implicate concerns regarding certainty in property rights or efficient estate administration. The probate proceeding did not provide meaningful relief and the claim does not seek to invalidate Dama’s will. View "Bjork v. O'Meara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

The railroad was originally sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in 2002 in Mississippi, where Fennell lived and worked and was allegedly exposed to asbestos. He had also worked for the railroad in Louisiana. In 2006, after discovery, the Mississippi court dismissed without prejudice. In 2009, Fennell refiled in the circuit court of St. Clair County, Illinois. The railroad sought dismissal under the interstate doctrine of forum non conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the circuit court did not consider all of the relevant factors. The citizens of St. Clair County should not be asked to bear the burden of this lawsuit. The majority of the witnesses, including treating physicians, are in Mississippi and not subject to Illinois subpoenas. Although the St. Clair County circuit court cited “almost 80 years of relevant evidence as to the defendant’s knowledge of the exposure to asbestos” that were held by the defendant’s Belleville law firm located in the county, the supreme court ruled that such documents can be copied and that this is not sufficient to tip the balance as to the proper forum. View "Fennell v. IL Cent. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Hernandez developed Parkinson’s disease, allegedly as the result of his exposure to chemicals at Central Steel, where he worked from 1968 to 1995. From 1995 to 1996, Hernandez was represented by a firm that filed a social security disability claim. From 1999 to 2002, he was represented by Bernstein, Grazian and Volpe, who filed a 1999 workers’ compensation claim, alleging chemical exposure at work. A third law firm was retained in 2004 and filed suit for civil damage recovery, strict product liability and negligence lawsuit against various companies involved in the manufacture and sale of those chemicals; that suit dismissed as time-barred. Hernandez alleged that the Bernstein firm should have advised him that he had other ways to recover beyond seeking workers’ compensation benefits and should have advised that he file a legal malpractice action against the first law firm for its failure to file a product liability suit. In 2009 the circuit court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the elements of res judicata had not been proven.View "Hernandez v. Pritikin" on Justia Law