Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An Illinois driver alleged that she was injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist in Wisconsin in 2007. In Illinois proceedings her insurer, Country Preferred, sought a declaration of noncoverage and she unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration. Uninsured motorist coverage was part of the policy, but the policy also provided that “any suit, action or arbitration will be barred unless commenced within two years from the date of the accident.” The insurer contended that the driver had not met this requirement, and the circuit court agreed. The appellate court reversed, persuaded by the driver’s theory that public policy was violated by virtue of the fact that the applicable statute of limitations in Wisconsin is three years, unlike Illinois (and the policy), where it is two years. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that the insured never initiated any type of legal action to settle her claim within the policy’s applicable time frame. There is no public policy violation in requiring the insured driver to bring her suit, action, or arbitration request within two years, the same time period as the Illinois statute of limitations, even though the limitation period in Wisconsin, the state where the accident occurred, is longer.View "Country Preferred Ins. Co. v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, in 1999 and 2000, marketed and sold to them investments, known as the 1999 Digital Options Strategy and the 2000 COINS Strategy, which were promoted as producing profits and reducing tax liabilities. Plaintiffs were charged substantial fees, but the promised benefits did not occur. The parties agree that the five-year statute of limitations for actions not otherwise provided for is applicable. The circuit court dismissed; the appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, applying the “discovery rule” that a limitation period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its wrongful cause. The limitation period began to run when the IRS issued deficiency notices to plaintiffs in 2008. The complaint adequately alleged breach of fiduciary duty; that there was no basis for dismissing the claim as legally insufficient.View "Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG" on Justia Law

Lawlor worked for NA, selling corporate promotional items. In 2005, she began working for a competitor. NA’s attorney, investigating whether she had violated a noncompetition agreement, retained a private investigating firm, giving Lawlor’s birth date, address, phone numbers, and social security number. That firm asked another agency to use the information to obtain personal phone records, which were forwarded to NA for determination of whether any numbers belonged to its customers. Lawlor’s tort claim alleged “pretexting,” that someone impersonated her to obtain phone records without permission. NA counterclaimed breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty by attempting to direct business to a competitor while employed. A jury awarded Lawlor $65,000 in compensatory damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages. The court heard NA’s claim, awarded $78,781 in compensatory damages and $551,467 in punitive damages, and remitted the jury’s punitive damage award to $659,000. The appellate court reinstated Lawlor’s punitive damage award. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence that NA was vicariously liable for the tortious intrusion upon seclusion by the investigators. Punitive damages should be reduced to $65,000, given the limited harm and the vicarious nature of the liability. The court agreed that evidence of breach of fiduciary duty was speculative. View "Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of IL" on Justia Law

In 2001, Keeley was acting as general contractor for reconstruction of a bridge. Three Keeley employees were injured in the collapse of a concrete I-beam used to support the bridge deck on which they were standing. They were unable to prove claims against the manufacturer of the beam and the designer of the supporting bearing assembly. Keeley had demolished the beam the day after the accident; they claimed negligent spoliation of evidence. The Illinois Department of Transportation and OSHA had inspected the site before the beam was broken up and left as “riprap” in the creek. The circuit court granted Keeley summary judgment. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the summary judgment. Generally, there is no duty to preserve evidence. The facts did not establish an exception that might apply if there had been a voluntary undertaking to preserve evidence. Keeley’s mere possession and control of the beam did not constitute special circumstances creating a duty, nor is the employer-employee relationship, in itself, a special circumstance justifying imposition of a duty to preserve evidence. Whether a reasonable person in Keeley’s position should have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential civil action was irrelevant; no duty was established. View "Martin v. Keeley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman, attending a class at a Chicago Park District fieldhouse, fell while attempting to step over a pile of snow that had collected at the edge of the parking lot during plowing. She fractured her femur and had surgery, but later suffered complications which led to her death. Her estate filed a wrongful-death action. The park district claimed immunity based on section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that there can be no liability “based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.” The circuit court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice constitutes “the existence of a condition of any public property.” The appellate court held that it did not, precluding immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 3-105 of the Tort Immunity Act provides that generally local public entities undertaking snow removal operations must exercise due care in doing so. That provision has no impact on section 3-106, which specifically provides immunity from liability for injuries on public recreational property. The allegation that the snow accumulation was “unnatural” was irrelevant to immunity because recreational uses were involved. View "Moore v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

Gott was a resident of Odin Healthcare where she died, on January 31, 2006. Her estate brought a survival action under the Nursing Home Care Act and the Wrongful Death Act, claiming that as a result of violations of the Nursing Home Care Act, Gott sustained gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, and respiratory failure. The wrongful-death claim sought damages for injuries sustained by her heirs. Odin sought to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Gott and by her “legal representative.” The trial court refused to compel arbitration, viewing the agreement as unenforceable for lack of mutuality and as contrary to public policy. The court held that the wrongful-death claim was not arbitrable and that the Federal Arbitration Act was inapplicable. On remand, the appellate court accepted applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act but still affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part. Arbitration can be compelled on Survival Act claims, alleging Nursing Home Care Act violations and seeking damages for injuries sustained by Gott while alive. However, the wrongful-death claim did not accrue until Gott died, and benefits obtained under it are payable to the next of kin rather than to her estate. No previously signed arbitration agreement is applicable to this claim. View "Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was 12 years old when, in 2003, his left foot was severed above the toes when he attempted to jump onto a freight train that was moving by the parking lot of an apartment building in Chicago Ridge. The track was partially fenced off and there was a sign warning of danger and prohibiting trespassing. As a result, an amputation below the knee was performed. The company which operated the train settled for $25,000, but plaintiff sued three other railroad companies. The trial judge found that the question of whether the danger of jumping onto a moving freight train was so obvious as to preclude any duty by the defendants was a question of fact for the jury. The jury assessed $6.5 million; that amount was reduced to $3.9 million by the earlier settlement and because plaintiff was found to have been 40% negligent. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed without remand. Under Illinois law, a moving train is an obvious danger as to which any child old enough to be allowed at large should recognize the risk. The defendants never had a legal duty to the plaintiff trespasser in this situation. View "Choate v. IN Harbor Belt R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured at work, filed a product liability complaint, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz,” the name he used at work. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, naming additional defendants, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz.” Plaintiff identified himself as “Juan Ortiz” in discovery documents. In a deposition, plaintiff stated that his birth name was “Rogasciano Santiago,” but that he had also used the name “Juan Ortiz.” The trial court allowed a second amended complaint to identify plaintiff as “Rogasciano Santiago, f/k/a Juan Ortiz.” The appellate court held that, when a plaintiff intentionally files a complaint using a fictitious name, without leave of court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-401, the court may dismiss with prejudice and that amendment, after expiration of the limitations period, to correct plaintiff’s name, requires dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A court has discretion to dismiss with prejudice a complaint filed using a fictitious name without leave of court. Dismissal is justified only when there is a clear record of willful conduct showing deliberate and continuing disregard for judicial authority and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate to remedy harm to the judiciary and prejudice to the opposing party. The original complaint is not a nullity, per se, and an amended complaint correcting the name may relate back to initial filing. View "Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were sexually abused by their teacher, White, at an Urbana school. Before working in Urbana, White was a teacher in the McLean County school district. Plaintiffs filed suit against White, Urbana, individual administrators, the McLean County district, and individual McLean administrators. Plaintiffs alleged that between 2002 and 2005, McLean administrators acquired actual knowledge of White’s teacher-on-student sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual “grooming” of minor female students, but never recorded these incidents in White’s personnel file or employment record, failed to make timely mandated reports of abuse by White, and failed to investigate parental complaints. According to the complaint McLean disciplined White for “sexual harassment, sexual grooming, and/or sexual abuse” of minor female students, then entered into a severance agreement with White which concealed his sexual abuse of students and created a falsely positive letter of reference for White. The trial court dismissed with respect to the McLean defendants, finding they owed no duty. The appellate and supreme courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The state sovereign immunity law does not extend to conduct that is willful or wanton, 745 ILCS 10/2-202; the alleged fact are sufficient to establish that, having undertaken the affirmative act of filling out White’s employment verification form,defendants had a duty to use reasonable care in ensuring that the information was accurate. View "Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs." on Justia Law

In 2004 an ambulance, answering an emergency call, drove through a stop sign and was hit by a passenger vehicle that had the stop sign in its favor. The injured driver of the passenger car sued the ambulance driver and Massac County Hospital, for which he worked, and recovered $667,216.30 for negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the situation was governed by the Vehicle Code, not by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, which protects local public entities and their employees from liability for injuries "caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle or firefighting or rescue equipment, when responding to an emergency call." The Vehicle Code imposes duties on drivers of both public and private emergency vehicles to refrain from negligence. The supreme court reversed. The evidence was insufficient to establish the willful and wanton conduct that might preclude municipal immunity. The statutes at issue are not in conflict; each governs in its own sphere. Under the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act, the legislature has chosen to grant immunity from negligence liability to public employees and employers, such as the driver and hospital, and this result is not abrogated by the Vehicle Code. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law