Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and defendant, both women, met in 2005 through a chatroom connected with a television series. Defendant, in Illinois, used her own name and aliases to communicate with plaintiff, in Los Angeles. One alias was that of a man, and a romantic relationship developed through the Internet, telephone, and mail. Defendant disguised her female identity using a voice-altering device. Plaintiff purchased airline tickets for a meeting in Denver, but her new “boyfriend” cancelled the plans. Plaintiff was informed that he had attempted suicide. In 2006 the two planned to live together in Colorado, but defendant subsequently informed plaintiff, using another alias, that the man had died of cancer. The deception continued for seven more months until plaintiff’s real friends confronted defendant and obtained a videotaped admission as to what had occurred. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and seeking damages for the cost of a therapist, lost earnings, and emotional distress, was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that claims made in the previous complaint, but not incorporated into the third amended complaint, had been abandoned. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not apply to a personal relationship with no commercial component. View "Bonhomme v. St. James" on Justia Law

In 2007 plaintiff died, a few months after filing a complaint, alleging exposure to asbestos brought home from work on her husband’s clothes and body between 1958 and 1964. The defense argued that no duty was owed to a third party. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the question of duty for purposes of the negligence claim was not simply a matter of whether the injured spouse worked for the defendant, but of whether defendant could have reasonably foreseen that its actions would cause this injury. Although the complaint alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that there was an unreasonable risk of harm to the worker’s wife, the complaint failed to allege specific facts as to what the defendant actually knew, or should have known, between 1958 and 1964. A complaint should not be dismissed, however, unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recover.View "Simpkins v. CSX Corp." on Justia Law

Firefighters, who suffered career-ending injuries during required training exercises, obtained line-of-duty disability pensions and sought continuing health coverage under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10, which requires employers of full-time firefighters to pay health insurance premiums for the firefighter and family if the firefighter suffers a catastrophic injury as a result of a response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency. The trial court dismissed a declaratory judgment action by one firefighter and affirmed denial of the insurance benefit for one firefighter. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court held that an "emergency" means an unforeseen circumstance calling for urgent and immediate action and can arise in a training exercise. The other firefighter had obtained a declaratory judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. The supreme court distinguished the situation because, although he was instructed to "respond as if it were an actual emergency," he was not injured while making an urgent response to unforeseen circumstances involving an imminent danger to person or property. View "Gaffney v. Bd. of Tr. of Orland Fire Prot. Dist." on Justia Law

A jury awarded more than $20 million for the death of three persons in a 2002 collision between a car and a tractor-trailer. Original defendants included the truck driver, his employer, the owner of the load being carried, the owner of the tractor (Adler), and the owner of the semi-trailer. The driver and his employer obtained a substitution of judge, but a second motion to substitute the judge was denied on the ground that it had been requested by the same entity (employer) operating under a different name. A motion for substitution brought by the Adler was denied on the ground that the determination concerning the employer was a substantial ruling. Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives all defendants the right to one substitution of judge, provided no substantial ruling has yet been made in the case. The appellate court ordered a new trial. The parties agreed to dismiss Adler, releasing it from liability. The Supreme Court vacated the new trial order, but remanded on other issues. Once Adler, whose request to substitute had been denied, was no longer in the case, no other defendant had standing to challenge that denial. View "Powell v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired as a public school basketball coach in 1999, and made athletic director in 2003, was fired as coach in 2008, following a campaign based on his allegedly abusive and bullying style of coaching. He filed suit for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy to intentionally interfere with prospective business advantage, and slander per se. The trial court dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILCS 110/15. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the Act is to protect citizens who are attempting to speak freely or petition government from retaliatory meritless lawsuits, intended to chill exercise of constitutional rights and impose burdensome expenses. The special summary dismissal under the Act, without discovery, allows attorney fees. For SLAPP protections to apply, plaintiff's claim must be solely based on the movant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. The Act is not intended to apply to tortious acts and does not create a new privilege concerning defamation. It is possible that defendants could spread lies about plaintiff while at the same time genuinely petitioning government for redress, but such a situation cannot support dismissal as a SLAPP.View "Sandholm v. Kuecker" on Justia Law

For 12 months following his injury, plaintiff, a police officer injured on duty, received salary under the Public Employee Disability Act. For a short time thereafter, he received salary through a combination of accrued sick and vacation time, light duty, and temporary total disability payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act. While plaintiff received salary under PEDA, the city deducted 20 percent of his health insurance premiums from his paycheck, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. After PEDA benefits expired, plaintiff continued to pay 20 percent of the premiums. When he was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension under the Illinois Pension Code, the city began paying 100 percent of the premiums, as required by the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10(a). Plaintiff's request for reimbursement for premiums paid since the date of injury was refused. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the city. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. Under PSEBA, an employer's obligation to pay the entire health insurance premium for an injured officer and his family attaches on the date that it is determined that the injury is "catastrophic," the date it is determined that the injured officer is permanently disabled and eligible for a line-of-duty disability pension. View "Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' 1993 Lincoln Town Car was hit while stopped. A pipe wrench in the trunk penetrated the gas tank. The car burst into flames. Husband was killed, wife was severely injured. A jury awarded wife compensatory damages totaling $23.1 million and punitive damages of $15 million and awarded compensatory damages to the estate in excess of $5 million. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The duty analysis in a negligent-product-design case encompasses a risk-utility balancing test. Compliance with industry standards (NHTSA) is a relevant, but not dispositive. Plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that Ford breached its duty of reasonable care on three negligent-design theories. Balancing foreseeable risks and utility factors, plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that, at the time of manufacture, Ford's conduct was unreasonable or that it had acted unreasonably in failing to warn about the risk of trunk contents puncturing the tank. There was no evidence of a feasible shield that would have prevented this injury. Plaintiffs' fourth theory, premised on a postsale duty to warn, was not cognizable under Illinois law and its voluntary undertakings with respect to law enforcement vehicles did not create a duty to civilian customers. View "Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought damages based on the death of her 18-year-old son in an automobile accident after allegedly consuming alcoholic beverages at defendants' residence. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court upheld the dismissal of counts IV through VI, but reversed and remanded as to counts I through III, which were based on a theory that defendants voluntarily undertook to prevent underage drinking and negligently performed that duty. The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the case as involving "nonfeasance." Defendants owed no duty to prohibit voluntary possession or consumption of alcohol, and took no action to do so pursuant to their verbalized intent to monitor, which was communicated only to their son.

The plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful-birth and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on medical-provider defendants' failure to inform them that their older child had a genetic mutation. They claim that they would not have conceived a second child if they had been given correct information. The trial court held that damages available in a wrongful-birth action do not include the extraordinary costs of caring for a disabled child after he reaches the age of majority. The appellate court held that plaintiff parents in a wrongful-birth case may recover damages for the cost of caring for their dependent,disabled, adult child and that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, noting a question of fact concerning when the limitations period began to run. The court affirmed the holding that the plaintiffs have a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; the "zone of danger" test does not apply when damages for emotional distress are an element of another tort. The court reversed and reinstated the judgment that plaintiffs may not recover damages for the postmajority expenses of caring for their son; damages incurred after the age of majority are incurred by the child, who suffered no legal harm.

Phoenix Insurance Company ("Phoenix") filed a complaint in circuit court rejecting the arbitration award given to appellee when she requested coverage under the underinsured-motorist provisions of her policy with Phoenix after she was injured in a car accident and the other driver's vehicle was underinsured. At issue was whether a provision allowing either party to an insurance contract to demand a trial de novo following arbitration was unenforceable when it appeared in an underinsured-motorist policy. The court held that the provision in appellee's underinsured-motorist policy allowing either party to reject an award over the statutory minimum for liability coverage did not violate public policy and was not unconscionable.