Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Rodney Martin worked for B.F. Goodrich Company from 1966 to 2012 and was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer until 1974. He was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver in December 2019 and died in July 2020. His widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil action in November 2021, alleging that Rodney’s occupational exposure caused his illness and death. She invoked the exception in section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act to avoid its exclusivity provisions.PolyOne filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss under the exclusivity provisions, arguing that section 1.1 did not apply and that using it would infringe on their due process rights. The district court denied these motions and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which then certified three related questions to the Illinois Supreme Court.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and answered the certified questions. The court held that section 1(f) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act is a period of repose for purposes of section 1.1. The court also determined that section 1.1 applies prospectively under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, meaning it applies to new actions filed after the amendment was enacted. Finally, the court found that applying section 1.1 prospectively does not violate Illinois’s due process guarantee, as defendants did not have a vested right in an exclusivity defense before the employee’s injury was discovered. View "Martin v. Goodrich Corp." on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Carmen Mercado and Jorge Lopez, filed a class action complaint against their former employer, S&C Electric Company, in the circuit court of Cook County. They alleged that S&C underpaid their overtime wages by excluding certain performance bonuses from the "regular rate" of pay used to calculate overtime. S&C argued that the bonuses were statutorily excluded from the regular rate of pay and that they had made adjusted payments to cover any alleged unpaid wages.The circuit court granted S&C's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding that the adjusted payments satisfied the alleged underpayment. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing that the bonuses were properly excluded from the regular rate of pay and that the adjusted payments fully compensated the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' judgments. The court held that the performance bonuses should have been included in the regular rate of pay for calculating overtime wages. The court found that the bonuses were not gifts but compensation for services performed, and thus did not fall under the exclusion in section 210.410(a) of the regulations. Additionally, the court held that the adjusted payments did not fully compensate the plaintiffs for their statutory damages, including treble damages, monthly interest, and attorney fees, as required by section 12(a) of the Minimum Wage Law.The Supreme Court of Illinois remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mercado v. S&C Electric Co." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, the State of Illinois, represented by the Attorney General, alleged that Elite Staffing, Inc., Metro Staff, Inc., and Midway Staffing, Inc. (collectively, the staffing agencies) violated the Illinois Antitrust Act. The agencies, which supplied temporary workers to a company called Colony Display, were claimed to have agreed to fix wages for their employees at below-market rates and agreed not to hire each other's employees. The staffing agencies argued that the Act did not apply to the charged conduct, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for interlocutory review.The Supreme Court held that the Illinois Antitrust Act does not exempt agreements between competitors to hold down wages and to limit employment opportunities for their employees from antitrust scrutiny. For the purposes of the Act, the court clarified that "service" does not exclude all agreements concerning labor services. It particularly noted that multiemployer agreements concerning wages they will pay their employees and whether they will hire each other's employees may violate the Act unless the agreement arises as part of the bargaining process and the affected employees, through their collective bargaining representatives, have sought to bargain with the multiemployer unit.The court vacated the appellate court’s answer to a question it had formulated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc." on Justia Law

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An employee alleged that her employer, White Castle, introduced a system that required its employees to scan their fingerprints to access their pay stubs and computers. A third-party vendor then verified each scan and authorized the employee’s access. In a suit under the Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d), White Castle argued that the action was untimely because her claim accrued in 2008 when White Castle first obtained her biometric data after the Act’s effective date.The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that section 15(b) and 15(d) claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, rather than only upon the first scan and first transmission. The court “respectfully suggested” that the legislature address the policy concerns inherent in the possibility of awards of substantial damages. View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

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Walton filed a class-action complaint against his former employer, alleging that Roosevelt’s collection, use, storage, and disclosure of Walton’s and similarly situated employees’ biometric data violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b), (d). Roosevelt required those employees to enroll scans of their hand geometry onto a biometric timekeeping device as a means of clocking in and out of work. Walton alleged that he was never provided with nor signed a release consenting to the collection, storage, or dissemination of his biometric data; he had never been informed of any biometric data retention policy developed by Roosevelt; and he had never been informed of the specific purpose or length of time for which his biometric information was being stored. Roosevelt argued that Walton’s Privacy Act claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, because Walton was a member of a collective bargaining unit with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that section 301 preempts Privacy Act claims asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a CBA. Noting federal precedent, the court stated that although there was no reference to biometric information in the CBA, “[t]he timekeeping procedures for workers are a topic for negotiation that is clearly covered" by the CBA and "requires the interpretation or administration of the agreement." View "Walton v. Roosevelt University" on Justia Law

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Cothron. employed by a White Castle restaurant in Illinois since 2004, filed a class action on behalf of all Illinois White Castle employees. White Castle required its employees to scan their fingerprints to access their pay stubs and computers. A third-party vendor verified each scan and authorized the employee’s access. The complaint alleged that White Castle implemented this biometric-collection system in violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d), which became effective in 2008 and provides that a private entity may not “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain” a person’s biometric data without first providing notice to and receiving consent from the person; a private entity may not “disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate” biometric data without consent. White Castle did not seek her consent to acquire her fingerprint biometric data until 2018.White Castle argued that the action was untimely because her claim accrued in 2008 when White Castle first obtained her biometric data after the Act’s effective date. The district court agreed with Cothron. The Seventh Circuit certified an interlocutory appeal, then certified a question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that a separate claim accrues under the Act each time a private entity scans or transmits an individual’s biometric identifier or information in violation of section 15(b) or 15(d). View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

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Tims filed a class-action lawsuit against Black Horse, his former employer, alleging violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a)), concerning the retention and deletion of biometric information, and sections 15(b) and 15(d), concerning the consensual collection and disclosure of biometric identifiers and biometric information. The Cook County circuit court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely, reasoning that it was timely filed because the five-year limitations period (Code of Civil Procedure section 13-205) applied to the Act, which does not contain a limitations period. Tims subsequently amended his complaint to name an additional class representative. Black Horse moved to reconsider its motion to dismiss and to certify, for immediate appeal, the question of which limitations period controlled. The circuit court certified the question. The appellate court allowed the interlocutory appeal and held that the one-year limitations period (section 13-201) governs actions under section 15(c) and 15(d) of the Act and that the five-year limitations period governs actions under section 15(a), 15(b), and 15(e) of the Act.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the five-year default limitations period governs claims under the Act, noting the need to ensure certainty, predictability, and uniformity as to when the limitations period expires in each subsection. View "Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

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O’Connell began working for the County in 1999 and became a participant in the Benefit Fund, with the County transferring a portion of his salary to the Fund as his employee contribution (40 ILCS 5/9-108). In 2001, O’Connell was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In 2017, after exhausting his paid leave, O’Connell obtained an ordinary disability benefit (50% of his salary). The Board stated that based on his years of service, the benefit would expire in August 2021. The County separated him from the position effective July 1, 2019. The Board ceased paying the ordinary disability benefit to O’Connell; the County ceased making contributions to the Fund on O’Connell’s behalf.O’Connell filed suit, alleging that the Illinois Pension Code and the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, 5) entitled him to continued ordinary disability benefit payments even though the County had terminated his employment. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of his complaint. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. O’Connell maintained standing to seek relief for reinstatement of his ordinary disability benefit by the Board and of contributions by the County and stated a sufficient cause of action for declaratory judgment and for mandamus. Once the Board grants the employee the ordinary disability benefit, Pension Code section 9-157 then enumerates triggering events, which do not include termination of employment, that halt the benefit. View "O'Connell v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

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A Pan-Oceanic supervisor, Singh, asked Green to pick up a skid steer from Patten. Green saw that the equipment was not loaded properly, and asked that it be reloaded. Patten employees refused. Singh told Green to return with the equipment. In heavy expressway traffic, Green saw that the trailer was bouncing and stepped on the brakes. The trailer swung into McQueen's car, injuring him. Pan-Oceanic acknowledged that Green was its agent, acting within the scope of his agency. A jury ruled for McQueen against PanOceanic, but not against Green, and assessed damages of $163,227.45, finding that Pan-Oceanic had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The jury subsequently awarded $1 million in punitive damages.On appeal, the court held that, when a plaintiff is injured by a company’s employee in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for direct negligence against the employer where the employer admits responsibility for the employee’s conduct under respondeat superior, concluding that the jury’s findings—that Green was not negligent but Pan-Oceanic acted with aggravated negligence—were legally inconsistent, The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. The trial court properly instructed the jury that Green claimed Pan-Oceanic was negligent for ordering Green to take the load on the highway after it knew or should have known, that it was unsafe and for failing to reject the load to prevent it from traveling on the highway. This liability did not depend on Green’s actions. The verdicts were not legally inconsistent. View "McQueen v. Green" on Justia Law

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McDonald filed a putative class action, alleging that her former employer, Bronzeville, collected, used, and stored sensitive biometric data from employees in a fingerprint timekeeping system, violating the Biometric Information Privacy Act,740 ILCS 14/1. McDonald alleged that she was never provided with nor signed a release and had never been informed of the purposes or length of time for which her biometric information was stored. Bronzeville argued that the claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries transpiring in the workplace, and that an employee has no common-law or statutory right to recover civil damages from an employer for injuries incurred in the course of her employment.The circuit court rejected Bronzeville’s argument, reasoning that privacy rights are neither a psychological nor physical injury and not compensable under the Compensation Act. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an employee's claim against an employer for liquidated damages under the Privacy Act, available without further compensable actual damages being alleged or sustained and intended to have a preventative and deterrent effect, is not the type of injury that categorically fits within the purview of the Compensation Act, a remedial statute designed to provide financial protection for workers that have sustained an actual injury. View "McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC" on Justia Law