Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two Chicago firefighters suffered duty-related injuries in the 1980s and later died. Their widows each received an ordinary widow’s pension from the Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Retirement Benefit Fund of Chicago. The two widows were later awarded annuities available to widows of firemen who died in the line of duty, retroactive to the date of death of each spouse, with interest, because the injuries were permanent and had prevented them from ever returning to active duty. The widows claimed that the calculation of their annuities (based on the current salary of the position last held by the deceased) should include duty availability pay, which is generally intended to compensate firefighters for being available for duty. This type of compensation was created in the 1990s, after these firemen’s accidents, and neither ever received it. Their argument, based on Pension Code language added in 2004, was rejected by the Board and the trial court. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial. If duty availability pay may be used for pension calculation, it must be pay that was actually received by the firemen. View "Hooker v. Ret. Bd. of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago" on Justia Law

The worker was injured in a 2006 automobile accident near Cordova, where he was working temporarily for Venture. Cordova is 200 miles from Springfield, where he lived and where his plumbers’ and pipefitters’ union was. He was living a motel 30 miles from the worksite with a coworker, also from Springfield, who was driving when the accident occurred. An arbitrator denied his workers’ compensation claim. The Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed; the trial court set aside the Commission’s finding. The Workers’ Compensation Division of the Appellate Court granted relief to the worker. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the worker was not a “traveling employee” and could not be compensated. An injury incurred by an employee in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, because it is not arising out of or in the course of employment, unless the worker can be categorized as a “traveling employee.” The employer did not direct the worker to accept the position at the Cordova location; he accepted it with full knowledge of the commute involved. His course or method of travel was not determined by the demands and exigencies of the job. He was not reimbursed for travel time or expenses or told what route to take.View "The Venture-Newberg Perini Stone v. IL Workers' Compensation Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Village of Bement, Piatt County, has a five-year contract, under which E.R.H. Enterprises operates and maintains the Village’s potable water facility and parts of its water delivery infrastructure. The Department of Labor issued a subpoena to E.R.H.’s attorney seeing employment records as part of an investigation under the Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/0.01. E.R.H. asserted that it was exempt from the Act as a public utility. The trial court ruled in favor of the Department and ordered E.R.H. to provide the requested documents, noting that the company was not regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that E.R.H. is simply an outside contractor. View "People v. IL Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

In 1998 Prazen retired as superintendent of the City of Peru electrical department. He had more than 27 years of service and purchased five years of age-enhancement credit. Prazen had an unincorporated electrical business, which was incorporated just before he retired. Before he retired, the City entered into an agreement with his corporation for operation of the City’s electrical department, including management and supervision. First year compensation under the contract was about $7,000 higher than Prazen’s prior annual salary. The relationship lasted until 2009, when the corporation was dissolved. In 2010, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund notified Prazen that, after participating in the early retirement incentive plan, he had violated the statutory prohibitions (40 ILCS 5/7-141.1(g)) against returning to work. The Fund recalculated his years of service as 27 and claimed he should repay $307,100 as a statutory forfeiture. The circuit court agreed. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The work done between 1999 and 2009 was done by a separate corporate entity and was not precluded by statute. If the legislature had wanted to specifically prohibit this, it could have said so. The statute does not show intent to prohibit outsourcing to a retired employee’s corporation and the legislature did not grant the Trustees of the Fund authority to find that a corporation was a “guise.” The court noted that, earlier in the period under consideration, the Board had expressed the view that what the arrangement was p View "Prazen v. Shoop" on Justia Law

The Peoria School District employs 26 full-time and part-time individuals who work as security agents and guards. No other Illinois school district has this type of employee. These employees were represented by a union certified by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board since 1989. The last collective-bargaining agreement expired in June, 2010. In July, 2010, a statutory amendment, Public Act 96-1257, purported to remove these employees from the oversight of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board and redefine them as “public employees” subject to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and the jurisdiction of the Illinois Labor Relations Board. The School District sought a declaration that its labor disputes with these employees were governed by the statute concerning educational employees, rather than by the one concerning public employees, challenging the enactment as invalid “special legislation,” forbidden by the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed without remand, holding that the challenged statute is invalid as forbidden special legislation because its language does not apply prospectively to school districts which may, after its effective date, employ peace officers. Although a general law could have been passed which would have affected a generic class of individuals, here, the affected class was closed on the effective date of the enactment. View "Bd. of Educ. of Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150 v. Peoria Fed'n of Support Staff" on Justia Law

The employee alleged that, while at work in 2004, he was involved in an accident that resulted in a condition for which he sought compensation. A Workers’ Compensation Commission arbitrator denied benefits, citing lack of causation, and, in 2009, the Commission adopted the decision. The trial court confirmed the denial. The appellate court vacated, finding that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The employee had calculated the 20-day time period for filing, Workers’ Compensation Act, section 19(f)(1), using the date on which required documents were mailed to the court, rather than the date on which the documents were received and file-stamped. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the so-called “mailbox rule,” which has applied to notices of appeal from the trial to the appellate court and to petitions for the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s review of arbitrators’ decisions, also applies to commencement of an action for judicial review of a Commission decision, which is an exercise of special statutory jurisdiction. Notice to the other party and the statute of limitations were not factors in this case and, absent a clear directive from the legislature, allowing the mailbox rule in such a case is most consistent with Illinois law. View "Gruszeczka v. IL Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

A “paraprofessional” who, for 11 years, had worked in the elementary school library, helped at recess, and taught keyboarding classes, was a member of the union, which had a collective-bargaining agreement with the district. The CBA provided that when “a member of the bargaining unit is required to appear before the Board of Education concerning any disciplinary matter, the staff member shall be given reasonable prior written notice of the reasons for such meeting and shall be entitled to have a personal representative at said meeting.” In 2008, the school principal recommended the employee’s discharge. The employee spoke at the regular meeting of the board, although the concerns at issue had not been specified to her She was discharged. The matter then went to arbitration, as provided in the CBA. The arbitrator ordered a reinstatement. The school district did not comply. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board confirmed the award. The appellate court held that the arbitrator’s award was “clearly erroneous.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. Judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is extremely limited; the question is whether the decision draws its essence from the CBA. The arbitrator had interpreted a quoted provision of the CBA as calling for a dismissal procedure that was not arbitrary, and he found arbitrariness in the lack of information given to the employee prior to her dismissal. View "Griggsville-Perry Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. IL Educ. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Lawlor worked for NA, selling corporate promotional items. In 2005, she began working for a competitor. NA’s attorney, investigating whether she had violated a noncompetition agreement, retained a private investigating firm, giving Lawlor’s birth date, address, phone numbers, and social security number. That firm asked another agency to use the information to obtain personal phone records, which were forwarded to NA for determination of whether any numbers belonged to its customers. Lawlor’s tort claim alleged “pretexting,” that someone impersonated her to obtain phone records without permission. NA counterclaimed breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty by attempting to direct business to a competitor while employed. A jury awarded Lawlor $65,000 in compensatory damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages. The court heard NA’s claim, awarded $78,781 in compensatory damages and $551,467 in punitive damages, and remitted the jury’s punitive damage award to $659,000. The appellate court reinstated Lawlor’s punitive damage award. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence that NA was vicariously liable for the tortious intrusion upon seclusion by the investigators. Punitive damages should be reduced to $65,000, given the limited harm and the vicarious nature of the liability. The court agreed that evidence of breach of fiduciary duty was speculative. View "Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of IL" on Justia Law

In 2001, Keeley was acting as general contractor for reconstruction of a bridge. Three Keeley employees were injured in the collapse of a concrete I-beam used to support the bridge deck on which they were standing. They were unable to prove claims against the manufacturer of the beam and the designer of the supporting bearing assembly. Keeley had demolished the beam the day after the accident; they claimed negligent spoliation of evidence. The Illinois Department of Transportation and OSHA had inspected the site before the beam was broken up and left as “riprap” in the creek. The circuit court granted Keeley summary judgment. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the summary judgment. Generally, there is no duty to preserve evidence. The facts did not establish an exception that might apply if there had been a voluntary undertaking to preserve evidence. Keeley’s mere possession and control of the beam did not constitute special circumstances creating a duty, nor is the employer-employee relationship, in itself, a special circumstance justifying imposition of a duty to preserve evidence. Whether a reasonable person in Keeley’s position should have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential civil action was irrelevant; no duty was established. View "Martin v. Keeley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

In summer 2010, due to budget deficits, the board laid off 1,289 teachers. Laid-off teachers were not given preference for positions available in the district, nor were all vacancies posted on the website. In August, 2010, there was an increase in funding. Approximately 715 tenured teachers were recalled, but many positions were filled with new hires, rather than laid-off tenured teachers. There was no official recall policy. The Seventh Circuit certified, to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the question of whether the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31)), provides that Chicago tenured teachers have a right to be rehired after an economic layoff and whether they have a right to certain procedures during rehiring. The court responded that Chicago public schools are treated differently under the School Code. In all the other districts, laid-off tenured teachers have a right of recall and, subject to certification and seniority, have a right to be rehired into new vacancies in their districts for a specific period. Under 1995 amendments Chicago teachers were not given those rights. The supreme court declined to read into School Code language something which the legislature did not put there. View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ., City of Chicago" on Justia Law