Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Keith's estate filed a wrongful death and survival action against Ortberg, a licensed clinical social worker and employee assistance program counselor, and her employer Rockford Memorial Hospital, alleging that, on September 30, 2005, Keith had an initial appointment with Ortberg; that it was Ortberg’s duty to evaluate Keith’s mental health condition; that Ortberg breached her duty by performing an inadequate assessment and failed to recognize that Keith was at high risk for suicide, and failed to refer him to an emergency room or a psychiatrist for immediate treatment. Keith died by suicide on or about October 6, 2005. The circuit court submitted an instruction, over plaintiff’s objection, asking the jury to respond “Yes” or “No”: Was it reasonably foreseeable to Ortberg on September 30, that Keith would commit suicide on or before October 9? The jury entered a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding damages of $1,495,151, but answered “No” on the special interrogatory. The circuit court ruled that the special interrogatory answer was inconsistent with the general verdict and entered judgment in defendants’ favor. The appellate court found, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, that the special interrogatory was not in proper form and should not have been given to the jury; it did not apply the objective “reasonable person” standard for determining foreseeability and, therefore, misstated the law, Because the special interrogatory was ambiguous, the jury’s answer was not necessarily inconsistent with its general verdict. View "Stanphill v. Ortberg" on Justia Law

Defendant struck Plaintiff, a pedestrian with his vehicle. Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit. Defendant filed an answer with an affirmative defense. Defendant answered an interrogatory about his drivers' license by stating that he had diabetes and required medical approval to drive, but refused to answer follow-up questions about his medical condition, stating that the question violates HIPAA, doctor-patient privilege; the Defendant has not placed his medical condition at issue. The court found that Plaintiff had legitimate cause to believe that Defendant had sight problems that could have been related to the accident and held Defendant’s attorney in contempt. The court found the attorney was not entitled to assert the physician-patient privilege, 735 ILCS 5/8-802. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the contempt order. A plaintiff may not waive a defendant’s privilege by putting the defendant’s medical condition at issue. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant asserted anything about defendant’s physical or mental condition. If these allegations put a defendant’s medical condition in issue, then it will be at issue in most traffic accident cases. The court urged the legislature to clarify the meaning of “at issue” and noted that, when a patient obtains a physician’s report to maintain his driving privileges, he is not seeking treatment so the privilege does not apply to the record filed with the Secretary of State. View "Palm v. Holocker" on Justia Law

The administrator of the decedent’s estate brought a wrongful death and survival action against Union Health Service based on alleged negligence in providing medical treatment the decedent. UHS moved to dismiss on the grounds that it is immune from suit under the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act (215 ILCS 165/26), as a “health services plan corporation”. The Act provides: A health services plan corporation incorporated prior to January 1, 1965, operated on a not for profit basis, and neither owned or controlled by a hospital shall not be liable for injuries resulting from negligence, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or malpractice on the part of any officer or employee of the corporation, or on the part of any person, organization, agency or corporation rendering health services to the health services plan corporation’s subscribers and beneficiaries.” The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that a 1988 amendment to section 26 was unconstitutional because it left intact UHS’s statutory immunity while eliminating that immunity for all other similarly situated entities. The Illinois Supreme court reversed. UHS was also immune under the prior version of the law. The former version of the law has been upheld by our appellate court against constitutional attack. addressing the constitutionality of the 1988 amendment is not necessary for resolution of this case. View "Gonzalez v. Union Health Service, Inc." on Justia Law

One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old Marshana died while her family participated in One Hope’s program. The Cook County public guardian, as administrator of Marshana’s estate, filed a wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope and Marshana’s mother,alleging that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect and should not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and failure to complete parenting classes. Attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding Marshana’s case. The priority review process considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” The Public Guardian moved to compel production of the report. One Hope argued that the report was protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. The circuit court determined that the privilege did not apply. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege.” View "Harris v. One Hope United, Inc." on Justia Law

Brunton sued her brother, Kruger, as trustee of the trusts established by their late parents and as representative of their estates, and individual family members. Brunton, who was not named a beneficiary of the trusts, alleged undue influence and her mother’s diminished capacity. The elder Krugers had consulted with an accounting firm (Striegel) for estate planning. They provided Striegel with confidential information about their family, income, assets, and goals. Striegel provided information to the attorney who prepared the Krugers’ trust documents and wills. Brunton and the Estates issued subpoenas seeking discovery of the information and documents. A CPA at Striegel complied with the Estates’ subpoenas, but did not provide the documents to Brunton. Striegel invoked the Illinois Public Accounting Act (225 ILCS 450/27), governing confidentiality of records. The circuit court ordered Striegel to produce tax documents, but held that the estate planning documents were privileged. Brunton then issued deposition subpoenas to a Striegel CPA and a non-CPA employee, seeking production of the estate planning documents. The court again found the estate planning documents privileged, but held that Striegel had waived the privilege by providing the documents to the representative of the Estates. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The privilege belongs to the accountant, not the client, and there is no testamentary exception to the privilege, but the accountant waived the privilege by disclosing information to one party. He cannot claim the privilege to avoid disclosure of the same information to the other party. View "Brunton v. Kruger" on Justia Law

Tuzzolino and his law firm represented Coletta. Coletta alleged that, in litigation, Tuzzolino failed to timely disclose expert witnesses; failed to retain needed expert witnesses; advised Coletta to settle for an amount far less than Coletta’s losses; told Coletta that negotiations were continuing after dismissal; and signed settlement documents without informing Coletta. According to Coletta, Tuzzolino offered to pay $670,000 to settle any potential malpractice claim, but never paid. Three months later, shortly before the expiration of the firm’s 2007-08 malpractice policy with ISBA Mutual, Tuzzolino completed a renewal application. In response to: “Has any member of the firm become aware of a past or present circumstance(s), act(s), error(s) or omission(s), which may give rise to a claim that has not been reported?” Tuzzolino checked “no.” Mutual issued the policy. Tuzzolino’s partner, Terpinas, learned of Tuzzolino’s malfeasance a month later, when he received a lien letter from Coletta’s attorney. Terpinas reported the claim to Mutual, which sought rescission and other relief. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Tuzzolino and rescinded the policy, finding that Mutual had no duty to defend Terpinas or the firm against Coletta’s action. The appellate court reversed as to Terpinas, citing the common law “innocent insured doctrine.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rescission, citing 215 ILCS 5/154, which allows rescission in cases involving misrepresentations “made by the insured or in his behalf,” with an actual intent to deceive or that “materially affect the acceptance of the risk or hazard assumed by the insurer.” View "Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Law Office of Tuzzolino & Terpinas" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department) permanently revoked the health care licenses of physicians (plaintiffs) pursuant to the Department of Professional Regulation Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105-165) as a result of plaintiffs’ prior misdemeanor convictions for battery and criminal sexual abuse of their patients. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed their challenges. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the Act: did not apply to individuals who were convicted of a triggering offense prior to the Act’s effective date; was impermissibly retroactive and impaired certain fundamental rights, in violation of substantive due process; violated procedural due process; was unenforceable based on the res judicata effect of the previous discipline imposed by the Department; violated federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy; violated the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder; violated the federal takings clause; and violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto law. View "Hayashi v. IL Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased FCH stock through Shearson’s broker, Steinberg, between 1987 and 1990. FCH filed for bankruptcy in 1991. Plaintiffs retained the law firm to represent them in claims under the Illinois Securities Law. At that time, they had a viable claim for rescission. The firm failed to serve the required rescission notice. In 1992, plaintiffs hired new counsel to pursue their claims against Shearson, which were later dismissed as time-barred. In 1994 plaintiffs filed a malpractice action against the law firm. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Illinois Securities Law claim, but reversed as to common law fraud and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. In 2007, plaintiffs settled those claims for $3.2 million. Later, the trial court found the law firm liable and calculated damages: plaintiffs’ $3.2 million settlement would be deducted from the total they paid for their 11 stock purchases, and 10% interest would be calculated on the remaining amount based on the dates of the stock purchases, for a total award of $4,091,752.19 plus attorney fees of $1,636,700.80, and $207,167.28 in costs and expenses. The appellate court affirmed, but remanded for recalculation of damages and attorney fees. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for calculation of statutory interest damages on the full amount paid for each security from the date of purchase to the 2007 date of settlement, then deducting the $3.2 million recovery.View "Goldfine v. Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum & Perlman" on Justia Law

Powell was adjudicated a disabled adult due to severe mental disabilities in 1997. His parents, Perry and Leona, were appointed as co-guardians of Powell’s person, but were not appointed as guardians of his estate. In 1999, Perry died following surgery. Leona engaged the Wunsch law firm to bring a claim against the doctors and hospital, Leona was appointed special administratrix of Perry’s estate. Wunsch filed a complaint under the Wrongful Death Act on behalf of Leona individually and as administratrix estate. The estate’s only asset was the lawsuit. A 2005 settlement, after attorney fees and costs, amounted to $15,000, which was distributed equally between Leona, Emma (the couple’s daughter) and Powell. The settlement order provided that Powell’s share was to be paid to Leona on Powell’s behalf. Leona placed both shares into a joint account. The probate court was not notified. Wunsch had referred the action to attorney Webb, for continued litigation. Emma waived her rights under a second settlement, Leona and Powell each received $118,000. A check was deposited into the joint account. The order did not provide that Powell’s was to be administered under supervision of the probate court and Powell did not have a guardian of his estate. Wunsch purportedly advised that it was “too much trouble” to go through the probate court for funds every time Leona needed money for Powell. In 2008, Emma petitioned to remove Leona as guardian of Powell’s person. The probate court appointed Emma as guardian of Powell’s person and the public guardian as guardian of his estate. Leona had withdrawn all but $26,000 and provided no accounting. The public guardian sued the attorneys and Leona. The trial court dismissed as to the attorneys, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege defendants owed Powell a duty and to allege proximate cause. The appellate court determined that an attorney retained by a special administrator of an estate to bring a wrongful death action for the benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin owed a fiduciary duty to those beneficiaries and remanded, with respect to the second settlement. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "In re the Estate of Powell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Murphy and his employer, ECHO, alleging that Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson, who suffered a severe and permanent brain injury following emergency room treatment. ECHO billed Anderson for services physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit, but did not bill for Murphy’s services during the Code Blue that resulted in his injury. The hospital billed Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue. The circuit court concluded that Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/25. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides “Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” Murphy was fully compensated for his time that day. He responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job to do so. The agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the agreement that ECHO had with Murphy require that ECHO physicians to comply with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy was that emergency room physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The legislature never intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.View "Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd." on Justia Law